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Under American law, only those who are mentally compe-
tent can make valid contractual and donative choices. This Ar-
ticle analyzes the theoretical implications of the capacity doc-
trine, examining both the views of the earlier commentators and
the recent cases. The author concludes that, for the most part,
courts have appropriately resolved the fundamental issues that
the commentators have identified.
THE CAPACITY DOCTRINE is a cornerstone of the law of
contracts and inter vivos gifts.' The doctrine - like those of
fraud, duress, and mistake - permits courts to regulate economic
behavior. All of these doctrines raise important theoretical issues.2
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Bridgeport School of Law; A.B., Am-
herst College (1966); J.D., University of Chicago Law School (1971).
The author wishes to thank Donald Meiklejohn, John Morgan, Robert Power, Toni
Robinson, Margaret Sachs, and Elyn Saks for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of
this Article. John Lauterbach, Elizabeth Rogers, Roberta Schwartz, Donna Thomas, and
Karen Torre provided valuable research assistance.
I. For purposes of this Article, a gift is inter vivos if, during the life of the donor, it
deprives her of either the right of revocation or the use and enjoyment of the property, or
both. The execution of a will, or of what Professor Langbein terms a "pure will substitute,"
deprives the testatrix of neither the right of revocation nor the use and enjoyment of the
property. See Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succes-
sion, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1108, 1110-15 (1984).
2. All defenses shed light on the underlying reasons for liability. In a review of Pro-
fessor Knapp's contracts casebook, Professor Klare emphasizes the moral and political im-
plications of incapacity and related doctrines:
Knapp begins with a close inquiry into the lack-of-capacity defenses and other
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Unlike other policing mechanisms,3 however, the capacity doctrine
requires courts to identify the abilities that are necessary for the
exercise of contractual and donative choices.4 In resolving capac-
ity disputes, therefore, judges and juries focus directly on the na-
ture of those choices in a complex society.
With the doctrine's critical role has come controversy. As the
cases continue to arise,6 commentators remain divided over four
forms of defective entry into contract liability, thereby casting into bold relief
the moral and political premises of contract law. Knapp's often poignant cases
vividly reveal some of the ethical and social dilemmas courts confront in decid-
ing whether to give legal effect to the apparent assent of the parties, or to upset
the litigants' private arrangements.
Klare, Book Review, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 876, 888 (1979)(footnote omitted)(reviewing C.
KNAPP, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (1976)).
3. See, e.g., A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 4.6-.8, at 225-32 (1982)(discussing the
capacity doctrine in a chapter devoted to policing mechanisms).
4. The extent to which contract liability is determined by free choice is a matter of
considerable controversy. For differing accounts of the current variety of contract theories,
see Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 271-91 (1986), and
Feinman, Contract After the Fall (Book Review), 39 STAN. L. REv. 1537, 1538-41
(1987)(reviewing H. COLLINS, THE LAW OF CONTRACT (1986)). For an argument that
contract law derives its moral authority from consent, see Barnett, supra, at 296-300. For a
very different theory of contract that nevertheless accords an important role to choice, see
I. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT 3, 47-50 (1980).
5. This Article addresses only those choices that affect the property of alleged incom-
petents. It excludes, for example, medical treatment decisions and choices made in the
course of criminal proceedings.
6. Medicine's ability to prolong life in the face of serious illness raises the probability
that each of us will eventually suffer an impairment of capacity. Cf. Redmond, Testamen-
tary Capacity, 15 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 247, 247 (1987)("As the popula-
tion lives longer, people are more apt to have the kind of medical condition that might
impair testamentary capacity or render them vulnerable to undue influence."). In 1979,
Moses and Pope reported that there is a high probability that any individual will eventually
suffer a disability that creates asset management problems:
At age twenty, 789 persons out of 1000 can expect to suffer a disability of ninety
days or more at some time during their lives. At age forty, 635 persons out of
1000 can expect to suffer such a disability, and at age sixty, 221 persons out of
1000 can expect to suffer a disability lasting ninety days or longer.
Moses & Pope, Estate Planning, Disability, and the Durable Power of Attorney, 30 S.C.L.
REv. 511, 513 (1979)(footnote omitted).
Lawyers have developed a variety of planning devices designed to minimize the legal
consequences of disability. For discussion of some of the currently available planning mech-
anisms, see infra notes 336-76 and accompanying text. Yet few people have both the fore-
sight and the resources to plan perfectly, and protective arrangements inevitably restrict
liberty. E.g., Friedman & Savage, Taking Care: The Law of Conservatorship in Califor-
nia, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 273, 276 (1988)("The consequences of conservatorship are
profound. For the ward, it is a passage into a degraded status. A ward is not fully compe-
tent at law."). The least restrictive device is probably the durable power of attorney. See
infra notes 339-40 and accompanying text. Even that device, however, involves the exercise
of control by the holder of the power over some or all of the property of the incompetent.
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fundamental problems. The first concerns psychiatric opinion evi-
dence of mental illness. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts
invites psychiatric testimony by providing that mental illness can
be a basis for avoidance of contract liability.7 Yet presumably the
standard must be legal rather than medical;' judges and juries
must not delegate to psychiatrists the task of assessing capacity.
The second problem involves the role of substantive fairness.9
The fairness of a transaction is arguably relevant to, or even dis-
positive of, the issue of capacity. Under the Restatement, for ex-
ample, entry into a fair transaction may indicate capacity,
whereas entry into an unfair transaction may indicate incapac-
ity.10 Yet admitting evidence of fairness on the issue of capacity
invites judges and juries to substitute their values for those of the
alleged incompetent.11 An alternative view, therefore, is that sub-
Capacity cases will, therefore, continue to arise. Transactions involving AIDS patients, for
example, will undoubtedly contribute to the volume of future litigation. Cf. Dintzer, The
Effect of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) on Testamentary Capacity, 8
PROB. LJ. 157, 157-59 (1988)(citing Johnson, AIDS Victims' Wills Under Attack, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 19, 1987, at BI, col. 2).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15(l) (1979). The Restatement view
is discussed infra text accompanying notes 187-202.
8. Cf. H. FINGARETTE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY 37-52 (1972). Pro-
fessor Fingarette cites, as an example of a legal as opposed to a medical standard, the
standard of adequate vision for driving purposes:
Given [a variety] of grounds for defining inadequate vision in one way or
another, the authority to establish the definition for, let us say, the purposes of
the motor vehicle bureau is in effect the authority to resolve a policy question,
not merely the ability to discover a matter of medical fact. The policy decision
calls for an evaluation and synthesis, or at least a compromise, involving medi-
cal, legal, occupational, and other issues. Neither the oculist nor the tiraffic engi-
neer alone is competent or authorized to decide the issue, although both can
present expert testimony to be used in reaching such a decision. The decision
itself must derive from an authoritative interpretation of public policy in the
light of the technical information. The definition is in this sense a governmental
one, not a medical one.
Id. at 39.
9. See Leff, Unconscionability and the Code - The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U.
PA. L. REv. 485 (1967). Professor Leff distinguishes between procedural and substantive
fairness. The former is an attribute of the bargaining process and the latter characterizes
the resulting agreement. Id. at 487. Capacity is, in Leffs terminology, clearly a procedural
concept. To say that a party to a transaction is competent is to describe bargaining ability,
but not to describe the fairness of any given bargain. On the other hand, to say that a party
made a favorable bargain is not necessarily to describe the party's bargaining strength.
For discussion of the distinction between substantive and procedural fairness in con-
nection with Professor Eisenberg's reconceptualization of contract law, see infra note 146.
10. See infra note 208.
11. The terms "incompetence" and "incapacity" are used interchangeably through-
out this Article. Unless otherwise specified, the terms denote only a lack of the requisite
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stantive fairness should be irrelevant to capacity.' 2 Even under
that view, however, fairness may bear on the issue of whether en-
forcement is appropriate regardless of the alleged incompetent's
condition. For example, a court should arguably enforce a trans-
action against an incompetent if the transaction is fair and the
competent party performed without knowledge of the
incompetence."3
The third problem concerns the role of social context. Tradi-
tional contract doctrine is unresponsive to differences among social
contexts. As Professor Grant Gilmore put it, "we feel instinctively
that commercial law is the heart of [contracts] and that, the need
arising, the commercial rules can be applied over, with whatever
degree of disingenuity may be required, to fit, for example, the
case of King Lear and his unruly daughters." 4 Yet contextual
analysis holds the promise of a more sensitive and coherent capac-
ity doctrine.
The fourth problem involves the effect of protective arrange-
ments. Under some statutes, the appointment of a guardian or a
conservator renders the ward incompetent as a matter of law.
Under other statutes, the appointment merely generates a pre-
sumption that the ward is incompetent. An alternative rule is that
the appointment has no effect on the ward's capacity. 5
This Article addresses these problems and reaches the follow-
ing conclusions: (1) the capacity doctrine is fundamentally sound
and does not produce undue deference to psychiatric testimony,
ability to enter into particular transactions, rather than the general disability that has tra-
ditionally been the basis for guardianship proceedings.
12. Cf. Comment, A Case Against Admitting into Evidence the Dispositive Ele-
ments of a Will in a Contest Based on Testamentary Incapacity, 2 CONN. L. REV. 616
(1970).
13. See infra note 222.
14. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 8 (1974). Painting with what he ac-
knowledged to be a broad brush, id. at 105 n.1, Gilmore criticized those who advocated too
great a role for social context - who urged that legal scholars should "engage in sociologi-
cal analysis rather than in historical or philosophical synthesis." Id. at 3. In the years since
the publication of The Death of Contract, the proper role of social context in the law of
contracts generally has remained the subject of considerable controversy. For a brief argu-
ment in favor of an empirical, as opposed to an abstract, approach to contract, see Macau-
lay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 465. For an historical "contextual-
ization" of the contract law of Wisconsin, see L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA
(1965). Professor Friedman offers observations concerning the relationship between legal
scholarship and social science generally in Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38
STAN. L. REV. 763 (1986).
15. See infra notes 336-76 and accompanying text.
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(2) substantive fairness should be relevant to but not dispositive of
the issue of capacity, and may also bear independently on the ap-
propriateness of enforcement, (3) courts must be responsive to so-
cial context throughout their analysis, and (4) a judicial declara-
tion of incompetence and the appointment of a guardian or
conservator should create at most a presumption of incapacity at
any later date.
These conclusions clash in significant respects with those of
other commentators. Writers who address the problems directly
include Dean Milton Green, Dean George Alexander, and Profes-
sor Thomas Szasz.16 Professor Melvin Eisenberg addresses the
problems indirectly by proposing a reconceptualization of contract
law that has important implications for the capacity doctrine. Part
I of this Article analyzes the contributions of these commentators.
Part II demonstrates that the recent cases support the Article's
conclusions rather than the commentators' opposing views.1"
I. THE COMMENTARY
Although the issue of capacity is largely factual,"' the com-
mentary is highly abstract. A representative case therefore pro-
16. Professors Anthony Kronman and Henry Weihofen also address the doctrine.
See Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983); Weihofen,
Mental Incompetency to Contract or Convey, 39 S. CAL L. REv. 211 (1966). Kronman
proposes a conception of capacity but focuses on the contracts of minors rather than on
adult incapacity. For discussion of his theory, see infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
Weihofen endorses Green's views in most respects but disagrees as to the consequences of
guardianship. For discussion of Weihofen's views on guardianship, see infra notes 108-10
and accompanying text.
17. The Article focuses on the reported cases decided since 1960. These cases, of
course, probably represent only a small fraction of the total volume of recent capacity
litigation; a comprehensive study of the doctrine as applied would include both the unre-
ported decisions and the disputes that are settled before trial. Moreover, in some instances
reported cases provide so little information about the alleged incompetent that it is not
possible to determine what prompted the court's resolution of the issue of capacity, much
less to make an independent assessment of the party's condition. The appellate opinions
nevertheless provide many examples of stories told by judges to justify their conclusions
regarding capacity. Those stories can assist lawyers in predicting the outcomes of capacity
disputes, as well as courts in deciding capacity cases.
18. In many appellate cases the question is whether there is sufficient evidence to
support the trial court's findings on the issue of capacity. See, e.g., Gaston v. Bruton, 358
S.W.2d 207, 212 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962). In Peterein v. Peterein, the Missouri Supreme
Court emphasized the factual nature of the issue: "We have read the cases cited in the
briefs but they are of little value because each case, of necessity, must be decided upon its
own facts, and we rarely find two cases where the facts are even substantially the same."
Peterein v. Peterein, 480 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Mo. 1966).
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vides a useful focus for a discussion of the commentators' contri-
butions. In Simmons First National Bank v. Luzader,x9 Dewey
Luzader and his wife Anna Pearl Luzader entered into a contract
with Dewey Luzader's uncle, N. F. Yarbrough. The contract pro-
vided that if the Luzaders gave Yarbrough a home for the re-
mainder of his life they would receive $12,000 upon his death.20
Yarbrough was eighty-four years old when the parties en-
tered into the agreement, and his wife had died three days ear-
lier.21 For many years, he had hoped to live with the Luzaders
after his wife's death.2 2 He moved in with them three days after
his wife's funeral and they began to care for him. 3 Among other
things, they bathed and dressed him. After a time, he "lost control
of his bodily functions," which caused considerable inconvenience.
Mrs. Luzader testified that he was "happy in the home, but
embarrassed."24
After several weeks, Mr. Luzader petitioned the Probate
Court for a determination that Yarbrough was incompetent by
reason of senility and old age, requesting that the court appoint a
guardian for him. 5 The court appointed Simmons First National
Bank as his guardian and also awarded the Luzaders $150 per
month for their services.26 Yarbrough contributed an additional
$150 per month during part of the time he spent with them.2
Yarbrough's niece, Connie Haner, testified that he had
trouble remembering some things and did not know how much
money he had. Hattie Blaser, an officer of a savings and loan asso-
ciation in which he maintained accounts, saw him the day after
his wife died and two days before he signed the agreement. Yar-
brough told Blaser that he wanted to transfer his funds to his
brother's account. She believed he neither understood the effect of
the transfer nor knew the amount of his savings. She also thought
that for the past two years he had been incapable of transacting
business.28 Yarbrough died approximately nine months after the
19. 246 Ark. 302, 438 S.W.2d 25 (1969).
20. Id. at 302, 438 S.W.2d at 26.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 307-08, 438 S.W.2d at 29.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 304, 438 S.W.2d at 27.
26. Id.
27. Yarbrough's pension was the source of the additional $150. Id. at 308, 438
S.W.2d at 29.
28. Id. at 307, 438 S.W.2d at 28.
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bank's appointment as guardian.29 After he died, the Probate
Court allowed the Luzaders' claim for $12,000, and the bank, as
administrator, appealed.3"
The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the bank had not
demonstrated that Yarbrough was incompetent. 1 The court found
unimportant his failure to understand "the result of a joint ac-
count," his lack of awareness of the extent of his savings, his unfa-
miliarity with matters of business, and his difficulty in recalling
details. 32 Moreover, the opinion emphasized that none of the evi-
dence of incapacity related specifically to the day the parties exe-
cuted the contract, and that there was no medical testimony that
Yarbrough was incompetent. 33 The court concluded with the ob-
servation that Yarbrough had long hoped for the arrangement, 34
and that it was by no means inappropriate in light of his family
situation:
Let it be remembered that this is not a case where a man is
depriving his wife or children of needed monies - this is not a
case where loved ones are cast aside for strangers. To the con-
trary, all heirs are collateral heirs, none of whom, from the rec-
ord, had anything to do with helping Yarbrough accumulate his
savings. Nor does it appear that the other relatives were anxious
to take care of this aged man. Also, the Luzaders are not receiv-
ing all of his money; in fact, including the amount allowed by
the Probate Court, they will be receiving but little more than
one-fourth of the estate.35
Thus Yarbrough's relationships with the Luzaders and other
members of his family were relevant to, if not dispositive of, the
outcome of the case.
The case confronted the court with three of the fundamental
problems of capacity: the relevance of medical testimony, the role
of substantive fairness, and the importance of social context. Al-
though the court did not refer specifically to psychiatric testi-
mony, the opinion did emphasize the absence of any medical evi-
dence of incompetence. The court's impression that the agreement
was fair probably contributed to the finding that Yarbrough had
29. Id. at 304, 438 S.W.2d at 27.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 309, 438 S.W.2d at 29.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 310-11, 438 S.W.2d at 29-30.
34. Id. at 311, 438 S.W.2d at 30-31.
35. Id. at 312, 438 S.W.2d at 31 (footnote omitted).
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capacity; the substance of the contract was evidence of his ability
to assess it in a competent fashion. Moreover, the court was obvi-
ously influenced by the transaction's social context - by the fact
that Yarbrough contracted with members of his family with
whom he had a close relationship. Had the Probate Court ap-
pointed the bank as his guardian before he entered into the agree-
ment, the case would also have addressed the relevance of the ap-
pointment to the court's assessment of his capacity.
A. Milton Green
Dean Green's theory of capacity has implications for the res-
olution of each of these problems. During the 1940s, Green pub-
lished a comprehensive and authoritative series of articles 6 that
remains the starting point for any analysis of the subject.37 This
Section first summarizes his argument and then critically exam-
ines his solutions to the four problems.
1. Green's Theory
Green's articles constitute a classic legal realist call for ex-
plicit discussion of the judicial goals underlying the capacity doc-
trine. In his view, the cases inevitably present a conflict between
two policies. The first is the policy of protecting incompetents and
their dependents, and the second is the policy of upholding the
security of transactions. The protective policy usually militates in
favor of invalidating transactions entered into by incompetents,
whereas the policy of upholding the security of transactions favors
enforcement. 8 Green observes, however, that courts seldom dis-
cuss either policy; the need to protect incompetents remains the
36. Green, Public Policies Underlying the Law of Mental Incompetency, 38 MICH.
L. REV. 1189 (1940) [hereinafter Green, Public Policies]; Green, Judicial Tests of Mental
Incompetency, 6 Mo. L. REV. 141 (1941) [hereinafter Green, Judicial Tests]; Green, The
Operative Effect of Mental Incompetency on Agreements and Wills, 21 TEx. L. REv. 554
(1943) [hereinafter Green, The Operative Effect]; Green, Fraud, Undue Influence and
Mental Incompetency: A Study in Related Concepts, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 176 (1943) [here-
inafter Green, Fraud]; Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed Major
Premise, 53 YALE L.J. 271 (1944) [hereinafter Green, Proof].
37. Green defined "contract" to include "any consensual transaction; hence, in addi-
tion to contracts in the strict sense, it includes gifts and so-called voluntary conveyances."
Green, Judicial Tests, supra note 36, at 141; Green, Proof, supra note 36, at 273 n.15.
Although Green does not address the point, the term presumably refers to donative
promises as well.
38. Green, Public Policies, supra note 36; Green, The Operative Effect, supra note
36, at 589.
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"unexpressed major premise" of the capacity doctrine.39 The un-
fortunate result is considerable uncertainty as to the outcome in
any given case.
Green maintains that courts avoid reference to policy by
adopting a "subjective" standard of capacity. This standard fo-
cuses on the mental state, as opposed to the behavior,4" of the
alleged incompetent:
It should be emphasized, and borne in mind, that the in-
quiry is into the understanding and memory of the individual
whose jural acts are in question; it is an attempt to probe into
the inner consciousness of the author of the contract or the will;
it is the degree of his understanding or memory which is made
crucial. In short, the test is purely and wholly subjective."x
The subjective standard of capacity is consistent with the subjec-
tive theory of contracts: "A contract required the 'meeting of the
minds' of two individuals, and an insane person had nothing which
the law recognized as a mind. Hence, there could be no 'meeting
of the minds.' "42
Green argues, however, that a subjective standard works only
in cases of obvious capacity or obvious incapacity, and that few
cases are obvious. In most cases, neither a court nor a jury can
determine the actual state of mind of the alleged incompetent at
the time of the transaction.4" Moreover, he believes that the sub-
jective theory of contracts is obsolete; courts base their decisions
in contracts cases on the parties' behavior rather than on their
states of mind. 4
In Green's view, the law of capacity would be almost com-
pletely chaotic if the courts actually applied the subjective stan-
39. Green, Proof, supra note 36.
40. Green's use of the terms "subjective" and "objective" is consistent with tradi-
tional contract terminology in that both terms refer to the promisor. See, e.g., Barnett,
supra note 4, at 300-09 (relating the subjective and objective theories of contract to a
"consent" theory). Green's usage is inconsistent with traditional tort phraseology, in which
"subjective" refers to a particular person and "objective" refers to the population gener-
ally. For discussion of the distinction in the tort context, see Note, Tort Liability of the
Mentally III in Negligence Actions, 93 YALE LJ. 153 (1983).
41. Green, Judicial Tests, supra note 36, at 144 (footnote omitted).
42. Id. at 145.
43. Green, Proof, supra note 36, at 310 ("There are no guide posts marking the
boundaries of 'understanding,' no outside limits."). Green buttresses his argument with a
demonstration that there is wide variety among judicial formulations of the subjective test,
and that many of the formulations are in conflict. Green, Judicial Tests, supra note 36, at
147-52.
44. Green made this argument in 1941. Green, Judicial Tests, supra note 36, at 162.
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dard in all cases. He contends, however, that in most cases the
subjective standard functions only as a rhetorical device. The stan-
dard that the courts actually employ is objective or "behav-
ioral."' 45 In most cases, the factor that is "of controlling impor-
tance" 46 is the substantive fairness, or "normality, '47  of the
transaction 4 8 Where the transaction is fair, courts are apt to find
capacity; where the transaction is unfair, courts are apt to find
incapacity. 9
Green believes that the objective standard generates greater
certainty because the courts respond not to vague, general notions
of fairness, but rather to specific and identifiable norms. He ar-
gues that the norms fall into two broad categories: those that
bear on business agreements and those that relate to wills and in-
ter vivos gifts.50 Cases involving business transactions are con-
trolled largely by the relatively simple prescription that "one
should not try to overreach his neighbors, friends, and business
associates."' 51 In more technical language, inadequacy of consider-
ation, normally relatively unimportant in contract cases,52 be-
comes a potent factor when coupled with an allegation of incapac-
ity.5 3 Adequacy of consideration, by the same token, is a powerful
counter to a claim of incompetence."
Cases involving inter vivos and testamentary gifts, on the
other hand, are influenced by several norms:
The mores of the United States approve of work, condemn idle-
ness, and look askance at unearned gain; they believe that the
45. See Green, Proof, supra note 36.
46. Id. at 293.
47. Id.
48. Substantive fairness is by no means the only relevant factor. Green's overall
scheme groups evidentiary factors under four "rather arbitrary headings." Id. at 275. His
categories, listed in inverse order of importance, are: "(1) symptomatic conduct of the al-
leged incompetent; (2) opinion testimony of incompetency; (3) organic condition and habits
of the alleged incompetent; (4) moral aspects of the transaction and its consequences." Id.
The final category consists of six subcategories: "The first five in this group are the pres-
ence or absence of independent advice, a confidential or fiduciary relationship, undue influ-
ence, fraud, and secrecy. The sixth, the abnormality of the transaction, is of controlling
importance." Id. at 293.
49. According to Green, a decision to enter an unfair transaction indicates incapac-
ity: "if the transaction in itself is irrational, it is evidence of a disordered mind, as is any
other item of irrational behavior." Id. at 305.
50. Id. at 299.
51. Id. at 303 (footnote omitted).
52. Id. at 303.
53. Id. at 304-05.
54. Id. at 303-05.
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first duty of the head of a house is to provide for his family, that
"charity begins at home." While they approve of voluntary gifts
for public purposes where the donor is in a position to make
them, improvidence is something to be condemned. Gratitude is
one of the virtues, and a reward based upon merit is always
commendable. 55
Green does not rank these norms in order of importance. Each one
is presumably of equal potential relevance in any dispute over
donative capacity.
In Green's view, the objective standard of capacity is genu-
inely responsive to the policies of protecting both incompetents
and the security of transactions. The concepts of commercial over-
reaching and donative improvidence, for example, both facilitate
protection of incompetents. The objective standard therefore tends
to produce fair results.5
Green believes, then, that the courts actually apply the
proper standard of capacity. Yet he argues that as long as judges
continue to employ the phraseology of the subjective test, consid-
erable uncertainty will plague the doctrine.57 Explicit discussion of
relevant norms, on the other hand, will generate greater predict-
ability and fairness.5 8
Green advocates only one exception to this general approach.
If an alleged incompetent enters into a transaction while under
active guardianship, there is no need for an inquiry into his condi-
tion. The existence of the guardianship should mean as a matter
of law that the ward's action is of no legal consequence. Thus even
a ward who is in fact competent is unable to bind himself contrac-
tually without first securing an order terminating the guardian-
ship. The reason is twofold. First, the order establishing the
guardianship includes a declaration that the ward is incompetent,
55. Id. at 299 (footnote omitted).
56. Green emphasizes this point:
An abnormal transaction is an unfair transaction. The standards of unfairness,
in each instance, will be furnished by the mores of the community. To be action-
able the unfairness must manifest itself in a transaction which is obviously out of
line with the institutional pattern of similar transactions. To make such a deter-
mination all of the circumstances must be taken into account. The dominant
factor in the evidence is whether the court sees the particular transaction in its
result as that which a reasonably competent man might have made. This is both
rational and reasonable and true to the essence of a case-law system.
Id. at 309.
57. Id. at 310.
58. Id. at 309.
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and that order is "binding on the world."5'9 Second, the guardian
must have control over the ward's estate in order to protect it. If
the ward is able to engage in effective inter vivos transactions, the
guardian's control may be seriously impaired.60
2. Green's Solutions to the Problems of Capacity
a. Mental Illness and Psychiatry
Green's stress on transactional fairness leads him to deem-
phasize psychiatric opinion evidence of incapacity. 1 His articles
reflect the view that advances in medical science can lead courts
to a more sophisticated understanding of mental disorders, and
that psychiatrists, like judges, employ behavioral standards.6 2 Yet
he recognizes that the standard of capacity is legal rather than
medical.63 His argument implies that the debate concerning psy-
chiatric evidence is essentially unimportant.6 4
b. The Role of Substantive Fairness
Green contends that in most cases substantive fairness should
be dispositive - not simply relevant - on the issue of capacity.
While the fairness of the transaction should indeed be relevant to
capacity, 5 Green's contention is vulnerable in two respects. First,
it underestimates the intuitive appeal of the subjective standard.
The subjective theory of contract has survived, at least in the form
59. Green, The Operative Effect, supra note 36, at 578. The rule does not apply to
adjudicated incompetents for whom no guardians have been appointed because "mere adju-
dication of incompetency for the purpose of commitment to an asylum or hospital, without
the appointment of a guardian, should be merely evidence of incompetency." Id. at 580.
60. Id. at 578-79.
61. Green argues that judges feel free to disregard medical opinion evidence of inca-
pacity when it conflicts with the conclusions they have formed on the basis of transactional
fairness. Green, Proof, supra note 36, at 284-86.
62. Id. at 306.
63. Green, Judicial Tests, supra note 36, at 146.
64. Green's resolution of the first problem thus depends upon the success of his argu-
ment with respect to substantive fairness. Because the latter is flawed, see infra notes 65-74
and accompanying text, the first problem remains. For further discussion of the role of
psychiatric testimony, see infra notes 111-18 and accompanying text (analyzing the views
of Alexander and Szasz).
65. Cf. Langbein, Living Probate: The Conservatorship Model, 77 MicH. L. REV.
63, 77 (1978)("Attaching the will [to a petition for living probate] ... is essential. The
standard of the substantive law is testamentary capacity not in the abstract, but in the
context of the particular testamentary disposition."); but cf. Comment, supra note 12, at
616 (nature of disposition should be inadmissible in litigation over testamentary capacity).
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of judicial rhetoric, 66 and references to intention are no more
likely to disappear from the capacity cases than from daily life.67
Indeed, Green himself adopts the subjective theory in one respect
by assigning legal consequences to the state of mind of the party
who deals with an alleged incompetent.6 8
Second, Green's study is based almost entirely on appellate
cases, which, as a group, should represent the most debatable of
the capacity disputes. The cases that never come to trial and those
that are tried and not appealed probably provide many examples
of either obvious capacity or obvious incapacity.6 9 And Green ac-
knowledges that the subjective standard functions adequately ex-
66. Professor Corbin argues that the objective theory is "based upon a great illusion
- the illusion that words, either singly or in combination, have a 'meaning' that is inde-
pendent of the persons who use them." The cases, he writes, do not demonstrate the demise
of the subjective theory. A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 106, at 474 (1963).
For a recent account of the continuing tension between the subjective and objective
theories, see Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J.
997, 1039-66 (1985). Professor Dalton points out that the tension is reflected in the alter-
nately subjective and objective phraseology of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
(1979). Id.
Eisenberg emphasizes the role of intentions:
Contract is a social institution before it is a legal institution, and the rules of
contract law must respond to the social institution, not to autonomous legal con-
ventions. Because the social institution is designed to facilitate the advancement
of individual objectives, contract law must be designed to deal with acts that
often cannot even be properly described unless intentions are taken into account.
Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of Contract Law, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1107, 1109 (1984).
Professor Farnsworth believes, however, that in general the courts now employ an ob-
jective approach. A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 3.6, at 113-16.
67. The psychologist Jerome Bruner contends that narrative, one of the two basic
modes of human thought, "deals with the vicissitudes of human intentions." J. BRUNER,
ACTUAL MINDS, POSSIBLE WORLDS 16 (1986). He elaborates as follows:
[O]ne can make a strong argument for the irreducible nature of the concept of
intention (much as Kant did for the concept of causation). That is to say, inten-
tion is immediately and intuitively recognizable: it seems to require for its recog-
nition no complex or sophisticated interpretive act on the part of the beholder.
The evidence for such a claim is compelling.
Id. at 17.
68. Green endorses the view that the contract of an incompetent who is not under
guardianship should, as a general matter, be voidable by the incompetent but not by the
other party. Yet he advocates enforcement despite the general rule in cases in which cir-
cumstances render avoidance unjust. One circumstance that militates in favor of enforce-
ment is the other party's lack of awareness of the incompetent's condition. Green, The
Operative Effect, supra note 36, at 575-76.
69. Only a study of disputes that do not reach the appellate level could prove this
point. Moreover, the cases Green cites may support his view of the role of substantive
fairness at the appellate level. In the reported cases decided since 1960, however, fairness is
unquestionably relevant but by no means dispositive. See infra notes 208-21 and accompa-
nying text.
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cept where the issue of capacity is debatable. 0
Green's willingness to accord fairness a dispositive role on the
issue of capacity may reflect a failure to consider other potential
bases for decision in the capacity cases. A court that wishes to
uphold a fair transaction may be able to do so legitimately even if
one party was incompetent, either on the basis of ratification 1 or
as a result of a good faith change of position by the other party.72
Even if the court does not enforce the transaction according to its
terms, it may be able to accomplish the same result by holding the
incompetent liable for the reasonable value of necessaries fur-
nished by the competent party. For example, in Simmons First
National Bank v. Luzader, the bank may have ratified the con-
tract and the Luzaders almost certainly furnished necessaries. 73
Moreover, a court that wishes to invalidate an unfair transaction
may be able to do so on the basis of fraud or undue influence74
even if the evidence does not justify a finding of incapacity.
c. The Role of Social Context
Although Green assigns an unduly important role to substan-
tive fairness, his articles present a forceful argument in favor of
the relevance of social context in capacity cases. Yet his account
of the role of context stops short of its logical conclusion in two
respects. The first relates to fairness and the second to the concept
of capacity itself.
70. See supra text accompanying note 43.
71. See, e.g., Sawtellev. Tatone, 105 N.H. 398, 403, 201 A.2d 111, 115 (1964)(rati-
fication by incompetent's sister, acting first as guardian and then as administratrix of es-
tate); Weihofen, supra note 16, at 232-34.
72. See infra note 222.
73. If the bank knew of the arrangement, its failure to object while the Luzaders
provided services probably constituted ratification. Even in the absence of ratification, the
fact that the Luzaders performed would militate in favor of enforcement. Their awareness
of Yarbrough's condition, however, constitutes a serious obstacle to a recovery on the
agreement. See infra note 222.
The Luzaders were undoubtedly entitled to recover in quasi contract for the value of
the necessary services they furnished over and above the amount that they received from
Yarbrough and from the bank in its capacity as guardian. See, e.g., Green, The Operative
Effect, supra note 36, at 562; Weihofen, supra note 16, at 238; Comment, Mental Illness
and the Law of Contracts, 57 MICH. L. REv. 1020, 1089-91 (1959).
For thoughts relating to ratification and the effect of good faith performance in the
context of agency law, see Meiklejohn, Incompetent Principals, Competent Third Parties,
and the Law of Agency, 61 IND. L.J. 115, 134-45 (1986).
74. See, e.g., Geiger v. Palmer, 249 Or. 123, 437 P.2d 750 (1968). Undue influence
and incapacity are, however, analytically continuous in some respects. See infra notes 288-
308 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 39:307
CONTRACTUAL AND DONATIVE CAPACITY
i. Fairness
Green's fundamental thrust is that courts should respond to
norms of fairness rather than to such formalistic notions as the
subjective standard of capacity. Yet he includes a formalistic ele-
ment in his own structure by relating one set of norms to business
agreements and another to gifts. 5 As the agreement between Yar-
brough and the Luzaders demonstrates, the distinction is unduly
rigid - not every transaction fits into one of those categories.
Green's phraseology suggests that the agreement was a business
transaction and thus subject to the norm that proscribes over-
reaching;78 yet the close relationship between the parties probably
helped to persuade the court that the contract was fair. Indeed, an
amount in excess of $12,000 would have been fair if the Luzaders
had furnished substantial goods or services to Yarbrough in the
past.77 As Green put it, "[g] ratitude is one of the virtues, and a
reward based upon merit is always commendable. 7 8 Since no con-
tract comes into being in a social vacuum, 79 norms that govern
75. Green, Proof, supra note 36, at 299-305.
76. The norm applies to transactions between "neighbors, friends, and business asso-
ciates." Green, Proof, supra note 36, at 303.
77. Where the transaction is contractual in form, there are, of course, doctrinal ob-
stacles to this approach. The principal source of difficulty is the consideration requirement.
At least two aspects of the requirement create potential barriers to judicial sensitivity to
relational factors. First, as Professor Shultz observes, courts have traditionally been reluc-
tant to accord to noneconomic factors the status of consideration. Shultz, Contractual Or-
dering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 204, 297-300
(1982). Although she believes that this barrier is crumbling, Shultz does not describe the
process of disintegration as complete. Id. Thus Yarbrough's affection for and gratitude to
the Luzaders might not function as part of the consideration for his promise.
Second, benefits of any kind that are furnished before the parties enter into the trans-
action may run afoul of the past consideration rule. Professor Patterson advocates enforce-
ment of promises supported by past consideration where the consideration "was part of an
agreed exchange at the time when it was conferred," or, in effect, where the transaction
was commercial. Patterson, An Apology for Consideration, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 954-
55 (1958). He regards enforcement as inappropriate, however, where the promise for past
consideration was "gratitude-motivated," or essentially where the transaction was social.
Id.
Farnsworth indicates that, as of 1982, the past consideration rule was extant, but
whether it would govern in any given case was uncertain. A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 3,
§§ 2.7-.8, at 50-59 (1982).
Despite these obstacles, however, the Luzader court clearly considered the relationship
between Yarbrough and the Luzaders to be relevant to the outcome of the dispute.
78. Green, Proof, supra note 36, at 299.
79. See, e.g., I. MACNEIL, supra note 4, at 11; see also Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71
CALIF. L. REV. 795, 798 n.11 (1983)("There appears to be no discussion of the possibility
that persons can be totally self-sufficient, except in economic literature and in Robinson
Crusoe.").
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human relationships are likely to bear on the fairness of many
transactions that are not cast as donations.
In addition, the proscription of overreaching that Green re-
lates to business agreements may apply to gifts as well. The con-
cept of a gift as a reward based upon merit underscores this point.
If the Luzaders had furnished goods and services to Yarbrough
for many years and he had then given them $12,000 out of grati-
tude, both the motive and the form of the transfer would have
been donative in a traditional sense. Yet the transaction would
have been part of an ongoing process of economic exchange be-
tween the parties.8 0 And economic exchange is traditionally cogni-
zable under the rubric of contract rather than gift."' This suggests
that the norms that prescribe appropriate contractual behavior
would have some bearing on the transaction. If $12,000 greatly
exceeded the value of the goods and services, for example, the
payment might be unfair. Green's distinction between donative
transfers and business agreements for purposes of normative anal-
ysis thus represents a surprisingly artificial holdover of the tradi-
tional approach. 2
Green fails, moreover, to make explicit the consequence for
fairness analysis of a fiduciary relationship between the parties to
the transaction." Transactions between fiduciaries and "entrus-
tors" 84 may be subject to an elevated standard of substantive fair-
ness. 85 If the entrustor seeks to invalidate the transaction on the
80. See Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155 (1989)(anthropologists,
sociologists, and psychologists view gifts as exchanges).
81. See, e.g., A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 2.5, at 46-48 (absence of exchange
underlies general rule that gratuitous promises are unenforceable); Shultz, supra note 77,
at 217 ("The concept of bargain or exchange is the hub of the contract wheel, the transac-
tion type that most clearly justifies a state choice to defer to private ordering while giving
access to public enforcement.").
82. The recent cases do fall into categories consisting of business agreements, trans-
actions between parties to close relationships, and dealings between fiduciaries and entrus-
tors. See infra notes 227-335 and accompanying text. For a definition of the term "entrus-
tor," see infra note 84. The categories, however, are by no means intended to serve as
doctrinal compartments. See infra text following note 335.
83. Green notes that a fiduciary relationship may be relevant to an assessment of
transactional fairness but does not develop the point. See Green, Proof, supra note 36, at
296-97.
84. An "entrustor," in Professor Tamar Frankel's terminology, is a party to whom a
fiduciary obligation runs, whether or not that party participated in the creation of the fidu-
ciary relation. Frankel, supra note 79, at 800 n.17.
85. Frankel points out that any fiduciary relation involves the risk that the fiduciary
will abuse delegated power. She lays the groundwork for a body of "fiduciary law" whose
central purpose is to protect entrustors against breaches of trust. Id. at 808-16. An elevated
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basis of incapacity, the court should assess substantive fairness by
reference to the higher standard.
ii. Capacity
Green also fails to recognize that social context has important
implications for the concept of capacity itself. In a sense, of
course, his rejection of the subjective standard implies that there
is no such concept. The capacity doctrine consists, in his view, of a
collection of cases in which more or less random evidence of inca-
pacity combines with coherent evidence of substantive fairness to
produce at least somewhat predictable results. Yet his identifica-
tion of relevant norms suggests that the evidence of incapacity is
not entirely random, since different social contexts call upon dif-
ferent abilities. The traditional standard of contractual capacity is
geared to business agreements."6 A contract that takes place in
the context of a close relationship, however, implicates abilities
that are foreign to impersonal commercial transactions. Moreover,
in a transaction between a fiduciary and an entrustor, a court may
appropriately require a high degree of understanding on the en-
trustor's part. The concept of capacity must, therefore, be respon-
sive to both close relationships and fiduciary relations.
(A) Close Relationships
A transaction between parties to a close relationship calls
upon each party's ability to relate to the other in an appropriate
fashion - each party's relational capacity. Although courts have
not recognized the concept of relational capacity in an explicit
fashion, it is implicit in one feature of the traditional capacity
doctrine.
One explanation of the concept of relational capacity begins
with substantive fairness: if a relationship affects the fairness of a
transaction, then capacity includes the ability to perceive the na-
ture of the relationship. The transaction between Yarbrough and
the Luzaders was fair in light of their relationship, and an impor-
tant component of Yarbrough's capacity was his ability to assess
standard of fairness is clearly designed to serve that purpose. Id. at 819 n.75. See also
Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REv. 741, 748 (1982)("off-
market contracts between a beneficiary and his trustee or between a fiduciary and his cor-
poration are customarily subject to review for objective fairness").
86. The question is whether the alleged incompetent was capable of protecting her
own interests. See infra notes 228-33 and accompanying text.
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the relationship with some degree of sensitivity.
This explanation finds support in a conception of capacity
proposed by Professor Anthony Kronman. For Kronman, capacity
is the ability to exercise judgment:"'
Judgment is . . . best thought of as the faculty of moral imagi-
nation, the capacity to form an imaginative conception of the
moral consequences of a proposed course of action and to antici-
pate its effect on one's character. A person has good judgment if
this faculty is developed and strong, poor judgment if it is not.88
To anticipate a transaction's effect on one's character is, at a min-
imum, to appreciate its relation to the norms that bear on its fair-
ness - to recognize its normality or abnormality.8 9 If a transac-
tion takes place in the context of a close relationship, then moral
imagination incorporates sensitivity to the relationship. Yarbrough
knew he would enjoy living with the Luzaders both for the sake of
their company and because he could count on them to take good
care of him despite the stress that his declining health was likely
to create.9"
87. Kronman does not discuss the doctrine of adult incapacity in any detail. He ar-
gues, however, that the law permits children and adult incompetents to avoid contracts on
the basis of impaired judgment. Kronman, supra note 16, at 788-89.
88. Id. at 790 (footnote omitted).
89. This does not mean, of course, that a promisor or donor must adhere to every
norm that bears on a particular transaction. Given Green's account of relevant norms, how-
ever, the faculty of judgment is the ability to evaluate a proposed contract or gift in rela-
tion to those norms, as well as in light of any conflicting personal values. Kronman explains
as follows:
When a person is considering a particular course of action, he may ask a
variety of questions regarding its moral acceptability. Is it permitted (is the ac-
tion consistent with his moral and legal obligations)? Does the action conform
with his personal ideals? What effect is it likely to have on his character (will
the action change him and if so, in a direction he approves)? To answer these
questions, he must construct a mental image of the action and, then, with this
image as an aid, attempt to determine the moral effects the action is likely to
have.
Id. at 791 (footnote omitted).
90. To treat sensitivity to human relationships as a relevant factor is not necessarily
to describe a high standard of ability. Read casually, Kronman's account does suggest that
capacity consists of a range of abilities and a level of skill that few, if any, possess. Yet that
reading is erroneous; Kronman does not address the issue of the degree of impairment of
judgment that justifies a finding of adult incapacity.
Nor does Kronman's argument imply that relational faculties are solely affective. He
notes with respect to moral imagination generally that "a free imagination is possible only
if we have first given it the space it requires by distancing ourselves from our own desires."
Id. at 793. In order to understand the fairness of the transaction, Yarbrough needed to see
the situation from the Luzaders' point of view as well as his own.
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A different explanation of relational capacity sees a contract
or gift as, under some circumstances, an exercise of relational
ability.9 The transaction may permit the parties to continue a
close relationship with a sense of contribution and fair dealing on
both sides. Yarbrough was, as the court put it, "quite devoted" to
the Luzaders. 2 The agreement probably enabled him to live with
them without feeling unduly indebted or burdensome. It thus rep-
resented an exercise of his capacity to carry on the relationship.
The two explanations simply reflect different perspectives;
Yarbrough needed both to assess the agreement and to carry on
the relationship. The transaction represented one element in his
ongoing interaction with the Luzaders, and as such it implicated
both relational and other93 faculties.
The feature of the traditional doctrine that implicitly recog-
nizes the concept of relational capacity is the notion of different
levels of ability for contracts and wills. As Green observes, some
courts state that the standard of contractual capacity is higher
than the standard of testamentary capacity.94 The basis of the dis-
tinction is probably a shared intuition that, in general, relation-
ships have more to do with wills than with contracts.
Professor Erik Erikson's theory of the life cycle illuminates
this shared intuition. The cycle consists of stages that Erikson de-
fines largely in relational terms:
Personality can be said to develop according to steps predeter-
mined in the human organism's readiness to be driven toward, to
be aware of, and to interact with, a widening social radius, be-
ginning with the dim image of a mother and ending with man-
kind, or at any rate that segment of mankind which 'counts' in
the particular individual's life."
The circle widens in childhood to include first parental persons,
91. The term "relational ability" might, of course, refer to the capacity to engage in
any kind of continuing relation. As used in this Article, however, the term refers only to
the ability to carry on personal relationships. For thoughts concerning a wider theory of
relational contract, see MacNeil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know,
1985 Wis. L. REV. 483.
92. Simmons First Nat'l Bank v. Luzader, 246 Ark. 302, 311, 438 S.W.2d 25, 30
(1969).
93. Yarbrough understood, for example, that the arrangement kept him out of a
nursing home. Id. at 308, 438 S.W.2d at 29. For discussion of a case in which relational
considerations were probably even more important than in Luzader, see infra notes 247-62
and accompanying text.
94. Green, Judicial Tests, supra note 36, at 158-59.
95. E. ERIKSON. IDENTITY AND THE LIFE CYCLE 54 (1980).
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then "basic family," then neighbors, teachers, and other school-
children. It later encompasses peer groups, and then expands far-
ther to take in those with whom the young adult cooperates and
competes in the world of work.96 In old age, the circle may con-
tract to complete the cycle; the human interaction may encompass
only those who "count" in the individual's life.9" In Yarbrough's
case, for example, the circle presumably narrowed to the point
where it included only the Luzaders and a few others. Testamen-
tary capacity is no more than the ability to understand one's prop-
erty and situation vis-a-vis those who are within the narrowed ra-
dius. It centers on basic relational abilities that formerly served as
the foundation for "higher" business skills. 8
The notion of a higher level of capacity for contracts than for
wills is problematic, both as a matter of common sense99 and in
96. Id. at app., Worksheet, col. B.
97. Id. at 54.
98. An image of a narrower radius is, of course, not the same as an image of a
"lower" level of capacity; nor is an image of widening the same as one of increasing height.
Yet in Erikson's view the process whereby the widening in youth takes place involves "suc-
cessive stages of increasing capacity." Id. at 53. The first stage in an infant's growth, for
example, involves the development of a sense of "basic trust." Id. at 57-58. That sense is
the "cornerstone of a healthy personality" - the foundation on which all other faculties
rest. Id. at 58.
The court's rhetoric in Terry v. Buffington associates social radius with levels of
capacity:
This, by way of illustration, we will designate as the morning dawn of reason, or
the break of day of the mind, in legal contemplation. It continues to unfold and
expand until it culminates to the meridian blaze of noon, when no suspicion is
entertained of the competency and freedom to act of the testator. It then begins
to go down until its disk disappears beneath the horizon. Still, there is the mel-
low glow of twilight, by which the testator is enabled to comprehend the con-
tents of his will - the nature of the estate he is conveying to his family connex-
ion - their relative situation to him - the terms upon which he stands with
them - his own situation, and the circumstances which surround him. These
and like objects, although seen by the testator as through a glass dimly, by rea-
son of the infirmity of age, or other causes, are still contemplated, not by the
flashy, fitful and evanescent glare of the aurora borealis; but the steady, though
subdued light and illumination of the "glorious king of day," although disrobed
of his gorgeous and dazzling beams. The animus testandi, the soul of a will,
animates the form of the instrument which he has executed.
Terry v. Buflington, II Ga. 337, 345 (1852).
The testator sees dimly and not very far. He perceives his property and his family and
comprehends the relation between the two, but, the court implies, does not see beyond into
the world of business. Earlier in his life he could see much farther - he was much more
capable - but the vision he retains is enough to enable him to execute a valid will.
99. Many estate plans are highly complex, either because they relate to extensive
and varied property holdings or because of tax considerations, or for both reasons. Many
contracts, on the other hand, are both easy to comprehend and economically trivial. More-
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light of Erikson's theory. 00 Yet the distinction suggests that
courts are indeed responsive to a shared perception that transac-
tional capacity at times incorporates relational faculties.
(B) Fiduciary Relations
The connection between the capacity doctrine and the law of
fiduciary relations grows out of the rule that a transaction be-
tween a fiduciary and an entrustor is enforceable only if the en-
trustor consented on the basis of full understanding.101 Since any
impairment of capacity is likely to vitiate complete comprehen-
sion, entrustors should be able to establish incapacity with relative
ease.10 2
Close personal relationships and fiduciary relations, then,
have important implications for both substantive fairness and the
over, parties can and do engage in bargaining over wills as well as over contracts. Thus,
neither greater complexity nor the need for strength to engage in bargaining justifies a
higher standard of capacity for contracts than for wills.
100. Erikson effectively undercuts the thought, not infrequently expressed by judges,
that a person who has contractual capacity must have testamentary capacity:
One of the chief misuses of the schema presented here is the connotation
that the sense of trust (and all the other positive senses to be postulated) is an
achievement, secured once and for all at a given stage. In fact, some writers are
so intent on making an achievement scale out of these stages that they blithely
omit all the negative senses (basic mistrust, etc.) which are and remain the dy-
namic counterpart of the positive senses throughout life ....
What the child acquires at a given stage is a certain ratio between the
positive and the negative which, if the balance is toward the positive, will help
him to meet later crises with a better chance for unimpaired total development.
The idea that at any stage a goodness is achieved which is impervious to new
conflicts within and changes without is a projection on child development of that
success ideology which so dangerously pervades our private and public
daydreams and can make us inept in the face of a heightened struggle for a
meaningful existence in our time.
Only in light of man's inner division and social antagonism is a belief in his
essential resourcefulness and creativity justifiable and productive.
E. EIKSON, supra note 95, at 182 n.4.
101. Frankel, supra note 79, at 819 n.75 ("Fiduciary law protects the entrustor by
obligating the fiduciary to disclose all material facts, requiring an intelligent, independent
consent from the entrustor, a substantively fair arrangement, or both. If the beneficiary is
unable to give such informed consent, courts may review the arrangement.").
102. The requirement of full understanding does not necessarily create a high stan-
dard of capacity. If a transaction is complex, complete comprehension will in fact demand
a high level of intelligence and perhaps education. Yet a fiduciary's duty of disclosure
should, in general, require simplification of any unduly complex information. Where the
fiduciary complies with that obligation, the entrustor needs no more than the ability to
understand the simplified information.
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concept of capacity.103 Although Green recognizes only some of
these implications, his argument that context bears on the issue of
fairness retains considerable force. Indeed, the argument in favor
of contextual analysis is probably stronger today than when his
articles appeared. As organizations, particularly large firms, have
come to dominate the business arena, 0 4 individual incapacity has
become less relevant to the enforceability of commercial contracts.
Organizations that serve as financial intermediaries have probably
made a particularly important contribution to this process.01 At
the same time, some commentators argue that contract is gaining
value as a tool for structuring family and other close relation-
ships."06 In future capacity cases, sensitivity to context, and par-
ticularly to close relationships, will probably become even more
important.
d. Guardianship
Green argues that wards should possess neither contractual
nor donative capacity. 0 7 Like his distinction between donations
and business agreements, his position regarding guardianships is
unduly rigid and likely to produce unfair results. Professor Henry
Weihofen argues forcefully that an order establishing a guardian-
ship should do no more than create a rebuttable presumption of
incapacity to enter into contracts during the course of the guardi-
anship. 0 8 Weihofen points out that an adjudication hardly com-
103. There is obviously a potential for interaction between personal and fiduciary
relations. For discussion of the relation between the presence of a fiduciary and other con-
textual factors, see infra notes 312-35 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96
HARV. L. REv. 1174, 1220 (1983). Professor Rakoff argues that "[tihe development and
use of contracts of adhesion represents one facet of the domination of the modern economy
by business organizations," and that "[a] dominant feature in the growth of the modern
business firm over the past century and a half has been the replacement of market transac-
tions by managerial coordination." Id. (footnote omitted).
105. A firm that invests retirement funds, for example, makes many investments that
affect each contributor. The contributor's capacity to engage in the transactions is in most
instances irrelevant. Potential capacity problems are relegated to a much smaller number
of transactions between the contributor and the firm. Cf. Langbein, supra note 65, at 67
(use of financial intermediaries may have the effect of diminishing the volume of litigation
over testamentary capacity). Many of the recent capacity cases involve land and arise in
rural areas where financial intermediaries probably play a less important role in the process
of transmission of wealth from one generation to another.
106. See, e.g., Shultz, supra note 77; Temple, Freedom of Contract and Intimate
Relationships, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 121 (1985).
107. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
108. Weihofen, supra note 16, at 211-13.
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pels the conclusion that the ward is incompetent at any subse-
quent time 09 and that the status of our public records fails to
justify a rule that those who deal with the ward have constructive
°notice of the declaration.110
B. George Alexander and Thomas Szasz
In a 1973 article entitled "From Contract to Status via Psy-
chiatry,"""" Dean Alexander and Professor Szasz argued that
mental incompetence should not be a ground for avoiding
contracts:1
12
[W]e believe that this policy is most consistent with the tradi-
tional moral aims of Anglo-Saxon law, and especially contract
109. Weihofen explains as follows:
The short and summary character of most adjudication hearings gives reason to
question whether a determination based on such typically minimal hearings
should be conclusive not only of the single issue on which the court has any
evidentiary basis for decision, namely the person's competence at that time, but
also of such person's condition at some later time. As a California opinion notes,
"proceedings for the purpose of adjudicating the mental status, although satis-
factory to all parties concerned, are frequently uncontested and therefore no
more comprehensive or extensive than the particular circumstances require."
Id. at 213 (quoting Estate of Young, 38 Cal. App. 2d 588, 591, 101 P.2d 770, 771-72
(1940). A more recent report on one state's experience with conservatorship concluded that
a relatively small percentage of petitions for conservatorship are contested. Friedman &
Savage, supra note 6, at 281. That study also observed that conservatorship is probably
imposed unjustifiably in a "small number of instances." Id. at 285. Due process issues
arising out of summary proceedings are beyond the scope of this Article.
110. Weihofen, supra note 16, at 214.
111. Alexander & Szasz, From Contract to Status via Psychiatry, 13 SANTA CLARA
L. REv. 537 (1973). The title reflects the authors' belief that the capacity doctrine is, in a
sense, retrogressive. Sir Henry Maine wrote in 1864 that "the movement of the progressive
societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract." H. MAINE, ANCIENT
LAW 165 (1864). The movement had the effect of increasing individual liberty. According
to Alexander and Szasz, however, judicial invalidation of contracts on the basis of incapac-
ity has the opposite effect:
Contract is . . .a process by which men shape their own destiny, weaving their
self-interest into the fabric of society. Individual decisionmaking ...brings
[the] authority of the state into the contract, and individual decisionmaking can
end the contract by mutual agreement. Contract and autonomy are inseparable.
When the right to contract is severed from the individual, so is a large portion of
his humanity. Yet in contract, as in other areas of the law, the right is taken
away with astonishing regularity in the name of mental health.
Alexander & Szasz, supra, at 537-38.
112. In their concluding paragraph, Alexander and Szasz advance the alternative
suggestion that the law might continue to employ the concept of incapacity if the criteria
for avoidance were "operational, not psychiatric, and precise in the extreme." Alexander &
Szasz, supra note 11, at 559. However, their skepticism about the development of a pre-
cise test effectively neutralizes the suggestion. Id. at 541.
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law - namely, the expansion of the scope of individual self-
determination and the protection of personal dignity; and ...
we cherish and support these values and rank them, on our own
scale, higher than security or "mental health." '13
The authors' dedication to liberty leads them to address the prob-
lem of undue dependence on psychiatric testimony as well as the
problem of the role of substantive fairness.
1. Mental Illness and Psychiatry
Like Green, Alexander and Szasz describe the traditional
standard of contractual capacity as essentially cognitive: "Was the
person capable of understanding the nature and effect of the
transaction in dispute?""' 4 They object to recent efforts, including
that of the Restatement," 5 to broaden the standard to include vo-
litional and affective disorders." 6 One of the drawbacks of the
broader standard is that it accords a greater role to "psychiatric
discretion.""11 7
The authors' fear of undue deference to psychiatric testimony
is not entirely without foundation." 8 Yet they draw upon very few
of the numerous capacity cases, and fail to demonstrate that psy-
chiatric opinion evidence is often dispositive. Their argument with
respect to this problem thus constitutes a warning to the courts,
rather than a demonstration that the capacity doctrine is generally
applied in an inappropriate fashion.
2. The Role of Substantive Fairness
Alexander and Szasz object strongly to Green's view that
substantive fairness should be dispositive of the issue of capacity.
To invalidate transactions on the basis of their abnormality is,
they argue, to unduly infringe the liberty of alleged incompe-
113. Id. at 559.
114. Id. at 540 (footnote omitted).
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15(1) (1979)(discussed infra notes
187-202 and accompanying text).
116. Alexander & Szasz, supra note 111, at 542-44.
117. Id. at 544-46.
118. In addition to the Restatement, Alexander and Szasz cite two well-known New
York cases: Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement Bd., 25 N.Y.2d 196, 250 N.E.2d 460, 303
N.Y.S.2d 362 (1969) (discussed infra notes 188-99 and accompanying text) and Faber v.
Sweet Style Mfg., 40 Misc. 2d 212, 242 N.Y.S.2d 763 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963)(discussed
infra note 200).
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tents.' 19 Individual self-determination has been "swallowed up in
the battle between protecting transactions and protecting
incompetents.'1 20
The authors concede that a court that abandons the notion of
contractual incapacity will enforce some "unfortunate" transac-
tions .21 They believe, however, that the ill effects will be miti-
gated by other doctrines. The principles of fraud, duress, and un-
due influence, and the rules relating to adhesion contracts, for
example, entitle courts to protect both competent and "incompe-
tent" parties from the consequences of unfair transactions. 122 Like
the capacity doctrine, of course, these principles limit freedom of
contract. 23 Alexander and Szasz thus object more to special
treatment for incompetents than to restrictions that apply to all
those who make contracts. A fear of discrimination against eccen-
tricity, carried out under cover of psychiatry, pervades their
analysis.
Alexander and Szasz's argument regarding substantive fair-
ness is vulnerable to two criticisms. First, it is based upon the as-
sumption that a dispute over capacity inevitably poses a conflict
between the personal values of the alleged incompetent and so-
cially imposed norms. Yet there may be no such conflict, either
because the alleged incompetent adheres to the general norms or
because the court assesses the transaction by reference to the al-
leged incompetent's own idiosyncratic moral code.12 4 One factor in
119. Alexander & Szasz, supra note Ill, at 540-41 ("The practical effect of apply-
ing this theoretical standard is to deprive the alleged incompetent of his right to contract
because his transaction is eccentric or does not meet the normative standards of the courts.
This is punishment for deviancy, not protection against helplessness.").
120. Id. at 547.
121. Id. at 558-59.
122. Id. at 558.
123. In his defense of the objective standard, Green makes this point more generally:
While it is true that an external standard is being imposed in such a way as to
restrict individual freedom, this is no innovation in law. . . .The indirect sanc-
tion of illegality which courts apply in refusing to enforce certain contracts obvi-
ously restricts individual freedom. So does the disability of infancy.
Green, Proof, supra note 36, at 305.
124. Green acknowledges that the capacity doctrine restricts liberty, but argues in
effect that contextual analysis minimizes the restriction: "the abnormality of the transac-
tion is viewed in the light of the social environment of the party making the contract or the
will." Id. at 305-06.
Professor Baron argues that courts assess testamentary capacity largely by reference
to testators' personal values:
Indeed, the most striking aspect of opinions on the subject of testamentary
capacity is the similarity of their structure. Virtually all such opinions, after
1988-89]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
the Luzader court's analysis was its impression that Yarbrough's
contract was consonant with his affection for the Luzaders and his
desire to avoid living in a nursing home. Had he made the agree-
ment with an institution rather than the Luzaders, the court
would have been right to suspect that he lacked capacity. Entry
into a transaction that is at odds with one's own moral code may
reflect freedom from restraint, but it does not represent the exer-
cise of effective control over one's own life.125
Second, the authors base their fears regarding substantive
fairness on Green's research in the 1940's 2.16 They fail to consider
the numerous capacity cases decided thereafter. 2 7 Moreover, they
advance no proof of any connection between findings of contrac-
tual incapacity and more drastic deprivations of liberty such as
involuntary civil commitment. If the recent cases demonstrate that
substantive fairness is generally not "of controlling importance,"
their fears are unfounded. 2
C. Melvin Eisenberg
In one of a series of major articles 2 ' re-examining the first
describing the will contest and any challenged rulings by a lower court, go on to
examine the evidence concerning the testator's life - particularly in the years
immediately preceding and following the execution of the will - in minute de-
tail. If, on the basis of that evidence, the court can find a reason for the testa-
tor's disposition in the circumstances, the will is upheld.
Baron, Empathy, Subjectivity, and Testamentary Capacity, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1043,
1073 (1987) (footnotes omitted). See also Spaulding, Testamentary Competency: Recon-
ciling Doctrine with the Role of the Expert Witness, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 113, 133-39
(1985)(determination of testator's personal values in will contests promotes freedom of tes-
tation). But see Saks, Capacity to Make Treatment Decisions (unpublished manuscript on
file with the author) (rejecting "different person" standard of capacity on the basis that the
fact-finder cannot know the alleged incompetent's values).
125. Kronman makes this point with reference to the contracts of minors:
Anyone who claims that the principle of equal respect for persons requires that
we defer to the choices of children as we do to those of adults has lost sight of an
important fact: However great their eventual powers of autonomous self-control,
persons have a natural history in which they undergo moral and psychological
development along predictable lines and normally acquire the various capacities
- including judgment or moral imagination - without which freedom in any
meaningful sense is impossible.
Kronman, supra note 16, at 795-96.
126. Alexander & Szasz, supra note 111, at 541.
127. The authors devote most of their attention to cases addressing capacity to make
medical treatment choices. Id. at 548-53.
128. The cases do not bear out the authors' fears. See infra notes 208-21 and accom-
panying text.
129. Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHi. L. REv. 1 (1979); Eisenberg, supra
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principles of contract law, Professor Eisenberg suggests a refor-
mulation of the capacity doctrine. 30 His argument has implica-
tions for both the role of substantive fairness and the appropriate-
ness of contextual analysis in the capacity cases.
Eisenberg's reconceptualization of contract begins with a dis-
tinction between donative promises and bargains. 3 A donative
promise is a promise "to confer a benefit by gift."132 A bargain is
"an exchange in which each party views the performance that he
undertakes as the price of the performance undertaken by the
other."'33 Courts should enforce donative promises, for the most
part, where they generate reliance, and the measure of recovery
should be the extent of the reliance. M Fairness3 5 and economic
efficiency, 3 6 rather than reliance, justify enforcement of most bar-
gains, and the appropriate measure of relief is normally the prom-
isee's expectation. 3 7 Although Eisenberg addresses capacity only
in relation to bargains,1 38 his argument regarding donative
promises also bears on the capacity doctrine.
1. Substantive Fairness
A principal focus of Eisenberg's argument is the role of sub-
note 85; Eisenberg, The Principles of Consideration, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 640 (1982);
Eisenberg, supra note 66.
130. Eisenberg, supra note 85, at 799-800.
131. The distinction is reminiscent of Green's division between business agreements
and gifts. See supra text at note 50. Green's study encompasses completed gifts, however,
whereas Eisenberg's does not. Compare Green, Judicial Tests, supra note 36, at 141 (de-
fining "contract" to include gifts) with Eisenberg, Donative Promises, supra note 129, at 3
n.5 (noting that informal and unrelied-upon donative promises, unlike completed gifts, are
normally not enforceable). For discussion of one consequence of Eisenberg's exclusion of
completed gifts, see infra note 162.
132. Eisenberg, Donative Promises, supra note 129, at 1.
133. Eisenberg, supra note 85, at 742.
134. Eisenberg, Donative Promises, supra note 129, at 32 (advocating a general rule:
"[a] promise that is reasonably relied upon is enforceable to the extent of the reliance").
135. In Eisenberg's terminology, "fairness" has both substantive and procedural
components. See infra note 146.
136. According to Eisenberg, a transaction is efficient if it moves a good or service to
the party who values it most highly. Eisenberg, supra note 85, at 747, 765-66.
137. Id. at 798-801 (summarizing his argument with respect to bargains).
138. Eisenberg does note that informal donative promises "may raise a problem akin
to capacity, because they are frequently made in highly emotional states brought on by
surges of gratitude, impulses of display, or other intense but transient feelings." Eisenberg,
Donative Promises, supra note 129, at 5. He does not, however, locate the concept of ca-
pacity in the analytical framework he proposes for donative promises.
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stantive fairness in relation to bargains. 39 Yet, perhaps because
he does not address the capacity doctrine in detail, he takes no
position on the issue over which Green disagrees with Alexander
and Szasz - the interplay between substantive fairness and ca-
pacity itself. He does not indicate, that is, whether substantive
fairness is probative of capacity or substantive unfairness suggests
incapacity.
Eisenberg does, however, suggest that substantive fairness
bears on enforcement regardless of the alleged incompetent's con-
dition. His suggestion for reformulation of the capacity doctrine is
that it might "apply only where exploitation is present."' 40 His
argument implies that, in at least some circumstances, proof of
incapacity alone is insufficient to prevent or to limit 4' enforce-
ment. Even if Yarbrough had been incompetent, for example, his
estate might have been liable to the Luzaders for $12,000 because
the transaction was substantively fair.
Proof of substantive unfairness is necessary in cases in which
the competent party has performed. Eisenberg points out that, in
general, the half-completed exchange presents the strongest possi-
ble case for enforceability. 42 Even where the competent party has
performed, however, incapacity, as a norm of unconscionability, 43
139. Eisenberg, supra note 85, at 752-54.
140. Id. at 800.
141. Eisenberg discusses bargains not in terms of enforceability but rather in terms
of remedy:
By the bargain principle, I mean the common law rule that, in the absence of a
traditional defense relating to the quality of consent (such as duress, incapacity,
misrepresentation, or mutual mistake), the courts will enforce a bargain accord-
ing to its terms, with the object of putting a bargain-promisee in as good a posi-
tion as if the bargain had been performed.
Id. at 742 (footnote omitted). He argues, for example, that "[t]he hard question. . . is not
whether half-completed-bargain promises should be legally enforced, but the extent to
which such promises should be enforced." Id. at 744. Thus, rather than arguing that sub-
stantive fairness should bear independently on enforceability, he would probably argue that
fairness should bear independently on the issue of remedy.
142. Id at 743.
143. Eisenberg conceives of unconscionability as a paradigm, or general principle
that encompasses a variety of norms, both past and future. Id. at 751-54. In context, his
suggestion for reformulation of the capacity doctrine implies that a reformulated doctrine
would function as a specific unconscionability norm:
Looking backward, the new paradigm enables us to reconstruct prior theory
and phenomena by providing a general explanation for a wide variety of contract
concepts that heretofore seemed distinct. So, for example, duress may now be
seen as simply a special case of the exploitation of distress; undue influence may
now be seen as simply a special case of unfair persuasion; and the prohibition
against exploiting palpable unilateral mistake may now be seen as a specific
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may prevent or limit enforcement.1 " Unconscionability requires
proof of both inefficiency and unfairness.145 Moreover, "unfair-
ness," in Eisenberg's terminology, has both substantive and proce-
dural components.1 46 Thus, in order to prove unfairness, Yar-
norm of unconscionability. Similarly, the apparent anomaly of review for fair-
ness in courts of equity and admiralty can be explained by the new paradigm,
while guidelines can now be set for that review; and the doctrine of general
incapacity might be reformulated to apply only when exploitation is present.
Id. at 799-800 (footnote omitted). For a discussion of the norms he develops, see infra note
146.
144. Eisenberg describes the bargain principle as, "in large part . . . a rule about
remedies." Eisenberg, supra note 85, at 745. See also supra note 141.
145. "Since the bargain principle rests on arguments of fairness and efficiency, it is
appropriate to develop and apply a specific unconscionability norm whenever a class of
cases can be identified in which neither fairness nor efficiency support the bargain princi-
ple's application." Eisenberg, supra note 85, at 754.
146. Eisenberg develops four specific norms of unconscionability, centering on (1)
exploitation of distress, (2) exploitation of "transactional," as opposed to "general" inca-
pacity, (3) unfair persuasion, and (4) price-ignorance. Id. at 754-85. In developing each
norm, he incorporates both procedural and substantive components of unfairness. Thus in
analyzing a bargain entered into under conditions of distress, Eisenberg argues that "a
promise to pay an unfair price, extracted through the promisee's exploitation of the prom-
isor's distress, should not be enforced to its full extent." Id. at 755.
He posits a case of transactional incapacity as follows: "Assume . . . that A, who
knows or has reason to know of B's inability to deal with a given complex transaction,
exploits that incapacity by inducing B to make a bargain that a person who had capacity to
deal with the transaction probably would not make .... " Id. at 763-64. He does suggest
that an occasional case of transactional incapacity might not involve substantive unfairness:
"Unless the [party claiming transactional incapacity] can show not only that he lacked
transactional capacity, but that a person who had such capacity would not have made the
contract, he will normally lose." Id. at 771. Even in the occasional case, however, "the
competent party will get back . . . what he transferred . . . or its fair value." Id.
Eisenberg defines unfair persuasion as "the use of bargaining methods that seriously
impair the free and competent exercise of judgment and produce a state of acquiescence
that [the party engaging in unfair persuasion] knows or should know is likely to be highly
transitory." Id. at 773-74 (footnotes omitted). In the exemplary case of unfair persuasion
that follows, the transitory nature of the acquiescence is almost certainly due to the sub-
stantive unfairness of the resulting bargain. See id. at 774.
And in describing the prohibition of exploitation of price ignorance, Eisenberg begins
with the following observation:
One condition of a perfectly competitive market is a homogeneous marketplace
in which cost-free information concerning price is readily available. When this
condition is not satisfied and marketplaces are differentiated, the price of a ho-
mogeneous commodity in a given marketplace may be strikingly higher than the
price at which the commodity is normally sold.
Id. at 778. Thus the price-ignorance norm, like the other three, proscribes unfairness that
has both procedural and substantive components.
Eisenberg does object to Leff's distinction between substantive and procedural uncon-
scionability (discussed supra note 9). He writes that the distinction has had the unfortu-
nate effect of "domesticating" unconscionability by "accepting the concept insofar as it
could be made harmonious with the bargain principle (that is, insofar as it was 'proce-
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brough's estate would be obligated to demonstrate both that he
lacked capacity and that the transaction was substantively unfair.
Eisenberg does not discuss unconscionability norms in the
context of wholly executory bargains. Where the party seeking en-
forcement has not performed, the case for expectation relief is ob-
viously less compelling.147 Something short of unconscionability
may, therefore, appropriately limit or prevent enforcement. Had
the Luzaders not performed, for example, Yarbrough might have
been able to escape liability for the full $12,000 on the basis of
incapacity alone. Yet, because Eisenberg does not address the sub-
ject, the application of a reformulated capacity doctrine to execu-
tory bargains remains unclear.
Like Green's theory, Eisenberg's suggestion for reformulation
of the capacity doctrine places an undue emphasis on substantive
fairness, at least in the context of half-completed bargains. Proof
that a transaction is substantively unfair should not be a prerequi-
site for the application of the capacity doctrine. 48 Even where the
competent party has performed, the incompetent should be able to
avoid contract liability, although she may be liable in quasi-con-
dural'), while rejecting its wider implication that in appropriate cases the courts might
review bargains for fairness of terms." Eisenberg, supra note 85, at 752. He also regards
the distinction as "too rigid to provide significant help in either the development or the
application of [unconscionability] norms." Id. at 754 (footnote omitted). See also id. at
800.
To refer to incapacity and substantive unfairness as distinct components of a reformu-
lated doctrine is not, however, to describe either component as an independent form of
unconscionability. Rather than producing a "domesticated" version of unconscionability by
confining judicial analysis to the procedural issue of capacity, this interpretation of Eisen-
berg's argument incorporates substantive fairness as a relevant factor in capacity cases. It
is thus consistent with his view that "in appropriate cases the courts [may] review bargains
for fairness of terms." Id. at 752.
147. Eisenberg, supra note 85, at 743, 785.
148. Cf. Kronman, supra note 16, at 789. Kronman writes that minors should be
able to avoid their contracts even in the absence of exploitation:
IT]he rule that a child may avoid his contracts if he wishes is intended to do
more than protect him against adult exploitation. A child possesses this power of
avoidance even when there has been no fraud or overreaching, and both courts
and commentators agree that it is appropriate he have such power. Whether or
not he has been misled, a child may show poor judgment in making a particular
contract, and it is protection against his own ignorance and immaturity - not
merely the advantage-taking of others - that the law affords.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Even a fair contract may be highly disadvantageous to an incompetent. If, for exam-
ple, an incompetent pays a fair price for a new car that she does not need, she will proba-
bly be unable to sell the car without taking a substantial loss.
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tract. 14 9 Had the court found Yarbrough incompetent, for exam-
ple, his promise should have been unenforceable but his estate
would undoubtedly have been liable for the value of the Luzaders'
services.150 Moreover, if the competent party knew or had reason
to know of the incompetent's condition, the latter should arguably
not be liable on any basis.1
2. Social Context
Eisenberg's conception of the appropriate role of social con-
text, and particularly of close relationships, is more restrictive
than that of Green.152 The analytical structure that Eisenberg pro-
poses effectively excludes the norms that Green identifies as bear-
ing on gifts. For example, Green argues that courts properly re-
gard gratitude as a virtue,1 53 implying that they should also
regard ingratitude as a vice. Eisenberg, however, describes ingrati-
tude as an unfit subject of common law adjudication:
An inquiry into ingratitude involves the measurement of a mael-
strom, since many or most donative promises arise in an inti-
mate context in which emotions, motives, and cues are invaria-
bly complex and highly interrelated. Perhaps the civil-law style
of adjudication is suited to wrestling with these kinds of inquir-
ies, but they have held little appeal for common-law courts,
which have traditionally been oriented toward inquiry into acts
149. An alternative rule that in many situations will produce the same result is that
the incompetent is entitled to avoid the contract upon restoration of the consideration fur-
nished by the competent party. Green writes that a "tolerable compromise" is that the
contract is enforceable if "(1) the bargain was fair, and (2) the other party entered into it
without knowledge of the incompetency." Green, The Operative Effect, supra note 36, at
575. Fundamentally, however, he favors a flexible approach to the situation in which the
contract is wholly or partly executed:
It is submitted that the rule should be that the agreement of an unadjudicated
mental incompetent is voidable, but that in determining how and under what
conditions it should be avoided the court should take into consideration all of the
equities of both parties and should make a decree adjusting those equities.
Id.
For another view of the problem of the restoration of the status quo, see Comment,
supra note 73, at 1079-91.
Quasi-contractual liability for necessaries is discussed supra note 73.
150. See supra note 73.
151. For discussion of Green's views concerning the state of mind of the competent
party, see supra note 68.
152. Unlike Green, however, Eisenberg does recognize the implications of a fiduciary
relationship for a judicial assessment of substantive fairness. See Eisenberg, supra note 85,
at 748.
153. See supra text accompanying note 55.
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rather than into personal characteristics.'"'
The argument presumably applies to bargains as well as to dona-
tive promises. Thus, any appreciation Yarbrough felt for goods
and services furnished by the Luzaders before the parties entered
into their agreement is, in Eisenberg's view, irrelevant to a judicial
assessment of the agreement. For similar reasons, courts should
not admit evidence of improvidence in contract cases. 55 Norms
relating to improvidence and ingratitude are "person-oriented"
rather than "act-oriented" 1 56 and, as such, are ill-suited for judi-
cial consideration. 157
Eisenberg recognizes that principled dispute-resolution can
incorporate person-oriented norms.1 58 He also acknowledges that
American courts can and do administer those norms in, for exam-
ple, divorce cases.'59 Moreover, his argument for exclusion of the
norms may have less force with respect to narrow classes of cases
- those involving disputes over capacity, for example - than
with respect to contract cases generally. Nevertheless, his thesis
154. Eisenberg, Donative Promises, supra note 129, at 15-16 (footnote omitted).
155. Id.
156. An act-oriented norm is one whose applicability does not usually depend on
"the personal characteristics of the disputants," whereas a person-oriented norm is one
whose applicability does depend on those characteristics. Wealth, poverty, and kindness are
examples of personal characteristics. Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiatior"
Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REv. 637, 643-44 (1976).
157. Id. at 644.
158. Eisenberg quotes at some length a case history of dispute-negotiation in the
Arusha society of northern Tanzania. The dispute was over the land of a man named
Makara, and was between his son, Kadume, and his next-door-neighbor and half-brother,
Soine. A process of negotiation led to a settlement in which the two divided the land. Id. at
640-42.
Eisenberg points out that Professor Gulliver, from whose book he draws the case his-
tory, regards the result as inconsistent with principle in that "despite the enunciated norms
of inheritance, Kadume obtained only about half of his father's land." Id. at 645. Accord-
ing to the applicable norm of inheritance - "sons inherit" - Kadume should have owned
all of the property. Id. Eisenberg argues, however, that the result reflects an accommoda-
tion of three relevant norms. The norm of inheritance was not dispositive because two other
norms also bore on the dispute:
(1) A well-off relative should not begrudge means of sustenance to a needy rela-
tive (Kadume already had a farm almost as big as the land in dispute, Soine did
not); (2) One who voluntarily cares for an aging relative until the latter's death
should share in his estate (Soine took care of Makara until his death, Kadume
did not). Out of the collision between the act-oriented dominant norm favoring
Kadume, and the person-oriented subordinate norms favoring Soine, an outcome
issued which accommodated all of the relevant norms by tacitly recognizing that
as a matter of principle Kadume and Soine each had a right to the land.
Id. at 645-46 (footnote omitted).
159. Id. at 644 n.20.
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constitutes a fundamental challenge to Green's advocacy of con-
textual analysis.
The premise of his challenge, however, is false. In Luzader,
for example, the court did not examine the personal characteris-
tics of any of the parties. It did not decide whether the Luzaders
were kind people or whether Yarbrough was an ingrate. Instead,
it focused on the interaction between the parties. The norms it
applied were essentially relation-oriented rather than person-ori-
ented.'6 0 And the length and character of a relationship are better
suited to judicial inquiry than are the personal qualities of any
individual. Whatever their conclusions regarding Yarbrough's ca-
pacity, for example, the witnesses in the case agreed that he had
long wished to live with the Luzaders and that they fulfilled their
promise to'care for him.
The need for predictability in capacity cases mandates judi-
cial consideration of relation-oriented norms. If the parties to a
close relationship enter into a contract, a court cannot properly
evaluate either fairness or capacity without examining the human
interaction. Eisenberg characterizes classical contract law as un-
duly abstract,' yet as long as his analytical framework remains
160. Eisenberg recognizes the distinction but rejects it. Thus he describes as person-
oriented the norm "'brothers should help each other' . . . because, despite its apparent
generality, its application depends almost entirely on the personal characteristics of the
individual parties - a wealthy brother should not seek economic help from a poor one; an
unkind brother may not be entitled to any help at all." Id. at 644.
The norm "brothers should help each other," however, varies in application largely
because it is not based upon any substantial interaction between the parties but only upon a
family connection. The norm "[a] well-off relative should not begrudge means of suste-
nance to a needy relative," id. at 645, is similarly unstable. Its applicability might well
depend, for example, on whether the needy relative had displayed ingratitude.
By contrast, norms that are grounded in interaction are likely to be much more con-
stant. In effect, the interaction establishes certain personal characteristics of each party vis
a vis the other. Consider, for example, the norm "[o]ne who voluntarily cares for an aging
relative until the latter's death should share in his estate." Id. The younger relative does
demonstrate generosity to the elder by providing care, but she is entitled to a share in the
estate because she provided the care rather than because she is a generous person. Evidence
that she is not generous to others is irrelevant. Moreover, she is probably entitled to share
in the estate even if she is wealthy.
161. The reaction of modern contract scholars against the "standardization" and
"objectivity" of the classical theory was proper:
These elements, however, were not necessary features of contract theory, but
simply an artifact of the classical model. The task now is to reconceptualize
contract law so that it consists of a body of principles that are both intellectually
coherent and sufficiently open-textured to encompass the complex and evolving
realities of contract as a social institution.
Eisenberg, supra note 66, at I I 1.
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insensitive to relational factors, it will not accommodate the ca-
pacity cases.162
162. One reason for Eisenberg's exclusion of "person-oriented" norms may be that
his analytical framework incorporates donative promises but does not incorporate com-
pleted gifts. This approach is standard; the law school curriculum and most texts address
donative promises under the heading of contracts and gifts under the heading of property.
The consequence is that the field of contracts remains largely free of the kind of relational
thinking that pervades the law of donative transfers. See, e.g., E. CLARK, L. LUSKY & A.
MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS: WILLS, INTESTATE SUCCES-
SION, TRUSTS, GIFTS, FUTURE INTERESTS AND ESTATE AND GIFr TAXATION 121-201 (1985).
The line between contracts and property may, of course, be essentially arbitrary. If it
is, the norms that apply in the donative capacity cases are also applicable in at least some
cases of alleged incapacity to contract. If the-line between the two fields reflects substantive
differences, however, those differences may justify treating one set of norms as relevant to
gifts and another as relevant to contracts.
According to traditional theory, one important difference lies in the "future" orienta-
tion of contract law as opposed to the "present" orientation of property law. Many com-
mentators view contracts as concerned primarily with promises. See, e.g., A. CORBIN, supra
note 66, § 4, at 7-8; A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 1.1, at 4-5. The fact that promises
are made with reference to the future means that transactions lacking in future orientation,
such as barter and gift, fall outside the domain of contract law. Thus Eisenberg argues that
"[a]lthough parties may barter bargained-for performances without making any promises,
contract law is concerned with those bargains that involve a present promise to render a
future performance - that is, that involve an exchange over time." Eisenberg, supra note
85, at 742. This difference arguably has substantive consequences as applied to donative
transactions. Farnsworth suggests that "a policy of leaving parties to gratuitous transac-
tions where they stand" may underlie the general rule that a completed gift is enforceable
whereas a donative promise is not. A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 2.5, at 47.
Yet recently commentators of diverse viewpoints have indicated that the distinction
between present and future-oriented transactions is of limited significance. See, e.g., Baron,
supra note 80 (questioning the appropriateness of disparate legal treatment of bargains and
donative transfers); Barnett, supra note 4, at 299 n.123 ("If promising is but a special
instance of consent, it may well be that the traditional conception of contracts as exclu-
sively concerning the matter of enforceable promises is what has blinded the profession to
the more fundamental theoretical role of consent."); Fellows, Donative Promises Redux, in
PROPERTY LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN E. CRIBBET 27
(1988)(donative transfer principles are relevant to the analysis of donative promises: "con-
tractual analysis [of donative promises] is neither wrong nor irrelevant, but it is incom-
plete, because it highlights the act of promising without considering the donative compo-
nent of the promise."); MacNeil, supra note 91, at 523 n.185 ("so-called present exchanges
always, in my view, involve some projection of exchange into the future").
Even if the law maintains a general policy of leaving the parties to a donative transac-
tion where they stand, it nevertheless makes exceptions in many cases involving donative
promises. And where capacity to make a donative promise is at issue, the transaction
should not be immune to contextual analysis simply because the promise is still executory.
The relevance of contextual factors to donative intent and to substantive fairness is at least
as great in the absence of delivery as in its presence. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Davis,
14 Cal. 3d 33, 533 P.2d 1047, 120 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1975)(discussed infra note 310).
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D. Summary
None of the commentators satisfactorily resolves any of the
four fundamental problems posed by the capacity doctrine. Alex-
ander and Szasz properly challenge the courts to refrain from
granting undue weight to psychiatric testimony and substantive
fairness in assessing capacity. The authors do not demonstrate,
however, that the courts fail to meet the challenge. Green recog-
nizes but overstates the relevance of substantive fairness to the
issue of capacity. Eisenberg argues cogently that fairness bears
directly on enforceability but fails to acknowledge that incapacity
can justify invalidation of a fair transaction. While Green's argu-
ment for contextual analysis is compelling, his distinction between
gifts and business agreements is formalistic and he fails to per-
ceive the relation between context and the concept of capacity.
Eisenberg's reconceptualization excludes relation-oriented norms
altogether, thereby depriving the capacity doctrine of needed sen-
sitivity and coherence. And Green's position regarding guardian-
ship is unsound and unnecessarily restrictive of contractual and
donative liberty.
II. THE DOCTRINE APPLIED: THE RECENT CASES
The decisions demonstrate that, on the whole, the courts' so-
lutions to the four problems are preferable to those of the com-
mentators. First, judges and juries for the most part avoid undue
deference to psychiatric testimony; the opinions generally cite evi-
dence of helplessness, as opposed to proof of mental illness per se,
as probative of incapacity. Thus the concept of capacity as applied
is legal rather than medical.16 3 Second, courts generally treat sub-
stantive fairness as relevant to but not dispositive of the issue of
capacity,164 and perhaps as bearing independently on enforceabil-
ity."65 Third, courts display considerable sensitivity to social con-
text in connection with both fairness and capacity. The opinions
reflect judicial awareness of the importance of close relation-
ships,1 66 as well as solicitude for the interests of entrustors in their
dealings with fiduciaries.167 And fourth, recent legislation and
163. See infra notes 169-207 and accompanying text.
164. See infra notes 208-21 and accompanying text.
165. See infra note 222 and accompanying text.
166. See infra notes 245-308 and accompanying text.
167. See infra notes 312-35 and accompanying text.
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case law demonstrate some movement toward more flexible rules
regarding guardianship and conservatorship. 168
A. Mental Illness and Psychiatry
In general, the courts assess capacity by reference to lay tes-
timony of disability. While no set of generalizations can convey a
full sense of the evidence in any given case,"6 9 the nature of the
proof that courts typically cite indicates that Alexander and
Szasz's fears are largely unfounded. The most common factor evi-
dencing loss of capacity is probably forgetfulness, particularly of
recent events."' Almost as common is disorientation with respect
to time or place.1 " Confusion is probative of incapacity,1 2 as is
rambling or fragmented conversation. 73 Many of the cases involve
168. See infra notes 336-76 and accompanying text.
169. The core of the opinion in a capacity case is a narrative that relates part of the
life of the alleged incompetent. Whether the opinion conveys an impression of incapacity is
largely a matter of the force of the narrative. Bruner argues that the narrative mode of
thought is not reducible to the mode of logical argument:
A good story and a well-formed argument are different natural kinds. Both can
be used as means for convincing another. Yet what they convince of is funda-
mentally different: arguments convince one of their truth, stories of their lifelike-
ness. The one verifies by eventual appeal to procedures for establishing formal
and empirical proof. The other establishes not truth but verisimilitude. It has
been claimed that the one is a refinement of or an abstraction from the other.
But this must be either false or true only in the most unenlightening way.
J. BRUNER, supra note 67, at 11.
170. See, e.g., Gulf Life Ins. v. Wilson, 123 Ga. App. 631, 633, 181 S.E.2d 914, 916
(1971)(incompetent requested daily bath shortly after receiving one); Krasner v. Berk, 366
Mass. 464, 466, 319 N.E.2d 897, 898-99 (1974)(incompetent doctor forgot appointments
and other matters, manifesting a "disorder of immediate recall"); Peterein v. Peterein, 408
S.W.2d 809, 811 (Mo. 1966)(incompetent forgot close relations); Bach v. Hudson, 596
S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980)(incompetent forgot "people and recent occur-
rences"); Gaston v. Bruton, 358 S.W.2d 207, 213 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962)(incompetent
failed to recognize family members and friends, and failed to use correct names).
171. See, e.g., Barth v. Gregory, 79 Ill. App. 3d 510, 513-18, 398 N.E.2d 849, 851-
55 (1979); Costello v. Costello, 186 N.W.2d 651, 653-54 (Iowa 1971); In re Estate of
Nordorf, 364 N.W.2d 877, 879 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Westerdale v. Johnson, 191 Neb.
391, 394, 215 N.W.2d 102, 104 (1974); Jackson v. Henninger, 482 S.W.2d 323, 325-26
(Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
172. See, e.g., Knott v. Pervere, 285 F. Supp. 274, 278 (D. Mass. 1968)(confusion
resulting from manic-depression and alcoholism); Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Pearson, 67 III.
App. 3d 457, 458, 384 N.E.2d 548, 550 (1978)(confusion and disorientation basis for in-
ability to comprehend nature and effect of deed); In re Estate of Faris, 159 N.W.2d 417,
419 (Iowa 1968)(confusion and senility); Pollard v. El Paso Nat'l Bank, 343 S.W.2d 909,
911 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961)(confused behavior plus undue influence).
173. See, e.g., Knott v. Pervere, 285 F. Supp. 274, 279 (D. Mass. 1968)(incoherent
speech probative of incapacity to transact business); Krueger v. Zoch, 285 Minn. 332, 333,
173 N.W.2d 18, 20 (1969)(finding of incompetence based in part on rambling conversa-
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impaired physical health, often incident to old age.11 4 The courts
cite a wide variety of ailments, the most common of which are
arteriosclerosis 7 5 and organic brain syndrome. 1 6 Alcoholism is
tion); Peterein v. Peterein, 408 S.W.2d 809, 811-12 (Mo. 1966)(inability to hold conversa-
tion noted in opinion cancelling deed).
174. As one court said of an incompetent grantor, "[t]hese utterances demonstrate
that age and illness with their 'stealing steps' had removed his power to realize his situation
or whereabouts." Jackson v. Henninger, 482 S.W.2d 323, 326 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972)(foot-
note to "Hamlet" omitted).
175. See, e.g., Neal v. Jackson, 2 Ark. App. 14, 22, 616 S.W.2d 746, 750 (1981)(ar-
teriosclerotic heart disease); Barth v. Gregory, 79 Ill. App. 3d 510, 513, 398 N.E.2d 849,
851 (1979)(generalized and cerebral arteriosclerosis); Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Pearson, 67
Ill. App. 3d 457, 459, 384 N.E.2d 548, 550 (1978)(cerebral arteriosclerosis); In re Estate
of Faris, 159 N.W.2d 417, 418 (Iowa 1968); Anderson v. Claussen, 200 Neb. 74, 75, 262
N.W.2d 438, 439 (1978)(cerebral arteriosclerosis); Westerdale v. Johnson, 191 Neb. 391,
394, 215 N.W.2d 102, 104 (1974)(general cerebral arteriosclerosis).
176. See, e.g., Williamson v. Matthews, 379 So. 2d 1245, 1248 (Ala. 1980)(early
organic brain syndrome); Neal v. Jackson, 2 Ark. App. 14, 22, 616 S.W.2d 746, 750
(1981)(chronic brain syndrome); In re Estate of Faris, 159 N.W.2d 417, 421 (Iowa
1968)(chronic brain syndrome); Interdiction of Burns, 486 So. 2d 977, 979 (La. Ct. App.
1986)(organic brain syndrome); Anderson v. Claussen, 200 Neb. 74, 75, 262 N.W.2d 438,
439 (1978).
According to Kolb and Brodie, brain syndromes "are induced by a general derange-
ment of cerebral metabolism, which produces a diffuse dysfunction of brain tissue and
thereby impairs those functions most expressive in human beings of brain action - the
positive functions of awareness, retention, memory, and comprehension." L. KOLB & H.
BRODIE, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 226 (1982). The authors describe the symptoms
of acute brain syndromes at some length:
The characteristic symptoms of the delirium usually associated with the acute
brain syndromes are fearfulness, clouding of consciousness with bewilderment,
restlessness, confusion, disorientation, and impairment in thinking, sometimes
with delusions and hallucinations. Thus the acute brain syndrome differs from
the so-called functional psychosis in the marked impairment of cognitive func-
tions. It must be emphasized that the recognition of the cerebral insufficiency
should not wait until the full appearance of the previously mentioned symptoms.
Long before gross cognitive disorganization takes place, the acute observer will
note failures in cognition. In the earliest stages, in which the condition might be
likened to the mild intoxication experienced by many persons when drinking,
there is a blurring or haziness of perception so that the sufferer notices a limita-
tion in the accuracy of identification and apperception of sensations. He has dif-
ficulty in focusing attention on important percepts and in screening out interfer-
ing percepts. Again, one with incipient delirium will note a difficulty in thinking
clearly and coherently; he may complain of inability to bring forward desired
memories and associations. In the milder stages of the delirious process, such
difficulties can sometimes be overcome by heightened attention and effort ort, the
part of the affected person. Unless complained about, they may be quite inap-
parent to the clinical observer, who may note only some vagueness, uncertainty,
and hesitancy on the part of the patient.
At a further level of impairment of consciousness, the affected person has
difficulty performing correctly in spite of personal effort, and there now is evi-
dence of confusion and bewilderment. In addition to hesitation in responses to
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relevant,17 7 as is erratic or imprudent behavior. 78 While an occa-
sional opinion indicates that eccentricity is evidence of incapac-
ity,179 the Luzader court, for example, emphasized that eccentric
behavior per se is irrelevant. 180
questions, it is possible to expose defects in memory, retention, and recall .
At this level of impairment, the patient usually has some difficulty in dealing
with abstract concepts; the earliest expression may be in disturbance of time
orientation, initially expressed for days of the week and later expanding to con-
fusion concerning the month and the year. Furthermore, an examiner will note
problems in retention of instructions, grasping their meaning, and carrying out
directions. The patient may complain of inability to read as he cannot retain
what has been put before him. At a still later stage of cerebral insufficiency,
orientation as to place fails, and misidentification of perceptions with a develop-
ment of illusions is noticeable. At this time, language difficulties appear, and
there develops a defect in a coherent train of expression. Eventually, there takes
place a deterioration in motor activity with problems in writing, eating, and
grooming, and finally, incontinence of urine and feces may take place. In the
later stage of delirium, complete disorientation exists, with delusory and halluci-
natory experiences and severe impairment of motor control. Grasping and grop-
ing movements may occur. Delirium of this degree represents a critical impair-
ment of cerebral function and should be recognized as diagnostically serious for
life if it proceeds without arrest. The final stages of progressive cerebral insuffi-
ciency are stupor and coma.
Id. at 229-30.
177. See, e.g., Williamson v. Matthews, 379 So. 2d 1245, 1248 (Ala. 1980)(vendor's
excessive drinking and alcohol consumption on day of negotiations contributed to dimin-
ished capacity to transact business); Chesson v. Pilot Life Ins., 268 N.C. 98, 99, 150
S.E.2d 40, 41 (1966)("acute alcoholism" resulted in mental disorders); Hunt v. Golden,
271 Or. 321, 323, 532 P.2d 26, 27 (1975)(excessive alcohol consumption resulting in
mental and physical disabilitites).
178. See, e.g., Barth v. Gregory, 79 II. App. 3d 510, 516, 398 N.E.2d 849, 853-54
(1979) (telephoning a neighbor as many as forty-five times in one day, leaving $2,000 in
cash on a tray in the living room); In re Estate of Faris, 159 N.W.2d 417, 419-20 (Iowa
1968)("bouncing" checks despite wealth, keeping frozen meat for up to twelve years, hav-
ing a building roofed from the top down); Krueger v. Zoch, 285 Minn. 332, 333, 173
N.W.2d 18, 20 (1969)(sale of "valuable antiques for next to nothing when approached by
various dealers"); Bach v. Hudson, 596 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980)(erratic and
irrational business decisions).
179. See, e.g., Costello v. Costello, 186 N.W.2d 651, 653 (Iowa 1971)(citing evi-
dence of the "idiosyncracies" of an incompetent grantor). The case, however, involved con-
siderable evidence of confusion and forgetfulness. Id. at 653-54.
180. The court quoted from an earlier case that addressed testamentary capacity:
The fact that the testator was filthy, forgetful and eccentric, or that he was
miserly and filthy, or that he was blasphemous, filthy, believed in witchcraft, and
had dogs eat at the same table with him or that he was filthy, frequently refused
to eat, and would lie in bed with his clothes on for two weeks at [a] time, or that
he would leave his home only at night, and would count or recount his money, or
that he was high tempered and violent, or was irritable and profane, or that
testator thought that others were plotting against him and was afraid to go out
in the dark, or that he was inattentive when spoken to and mumbled when trying
to talk, does not establish lack of capacity.
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Although capacity is not synonymous with a high degree of
intelligence,""1 evidence of severely impaired intellect is probative
of incapacity." 2 If the promisor or donor is declared incompetent
or committed to a mental institution soon after the transaction
takes place, the court may reason that the condition that gave rise
to the declaration was present at least to some degree at the time
of the transaction . By the same token, the fact that the alleged
incompetent has not been adjudicated as such may militate in
favor of a finding of capacity. 8 Moreover, in general the thresh-
old of capacity remains appropriately low; an appellate court will
reverse a trial court finding of incompetence if the trial court im-
poses too high a standard.8 5
As Alexander and Szasz point out, recent years have indeed
Simmons First Nat'i Bank v. Luzader, 246 Ark. 302, 310, 438 S.W.2d 25, 30 (1969)(quot-
ing Harwell v. Garrett, 239 Ark. 551, 559, 393 S.W.2d 256, 261 (1965)). In fact, the court
overstated its case. The excerpt describes evidence that is, at a minimum, relevant on the
issue of capacity. See, e.g., Barth v. Gregory, 79 Ill. App. 3d 510, 398 N.E.2d 849 (1980)
(discussed infra note 216).
For discussion of the relation between contractual capacity and testamentary capacity,
see supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., Kruse v. Coos Head Timber Co., 248 Or. 294, 306-07, 432 P.2d 1009,
1015-16 (1967)("dullness of intellect" does not amount to incapacity).
182. See, e.g., Oncale v. Clement, 411 So. 2d 543, 544-46 (La. Ct. App. 1982)(evi-
dence of retardation); Coburn Fin. Corp. v. Bennett, 241 So. 2d 802, 803-04 (La. Ct. App.
1970)(promisor with mentality of a five or six year-old); Coke v. Coke, 242 Or. 486, 489,
410 P.2d 214, 215-16 (1966)(grantor was "low on marbles").
183. For example, in Krueger v. Zoch, the alleged incompetent contracted to sell his
farm to the plaintiff. Krueger v. Zoch, 285 Minn. 324, 173 N.W.2d 18 (1969). The con-
tract was signed six weeks before the appointment of a guardian for the alleged incompe-
tent. Id. at 333, 173 N.W.2d at 20. In affirming the trial court's finding of incapacity, the
appellate court emphasized the guardianship proceeding:
The finding of incompetence in this case is greatly strengthened by the fact
that [the alleged incompetent] was placed under guardianship on January 9,
1967. The subsequent adjudication of incompetency in guardianship is relevant
and probative on the issue of his competence at the time he signed the earnest
money contract, November 30, 1966. The closer in time the adjudication of in-
competency is to the transaction, the greater the weight that can and should be
given it.
Id. at 335, 173 N.W.2d at 21. See also Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Pearson, 67 Ill. App. 3d
457, 384 N.E.2d 548 (1978)(grantor adjudicated incompetent four weeks after signing
deed).
Not all courts agree, however. See, e.g., Cohen v. Crumpacker, 586 S.W.2d 370, 376
(Mo. Ct. App. 1979)("adjudication of incompetency is only prospective in application and
is inadmissible as evidence to show prior mental disability").
184. See, e.g., Curry v. Curry, 31 111. App. 3d 972, 334 N.E.2d 742 (1975).
185. See, e.g., Columbia Say. & Loan v. Carpenter, 33 Colo. App. 360, 521 P.2d
1299 (1974), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Judkins v. Carpenter, 189 Colo. 95, 537
P.2d 737 (1975).
1988-89]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
witnessed efforts to expand the capacity doctrine to encompass vo-
litional and affective as well as cognitive disorders. 186 While these
efforts have met with some success, they have not produced undue
deference to psychiatric testimony. Courts continue to assess ca-
pacity primarily by reference to lay testimony of forgetfulness,
confusion, disorientation, and erratic or imprudent behavior.
The Restatement provides that under some circumstances a
volitional disorder can produce incapacity.18 7 The provision is
based principally on a series of New York cases that includes
Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement Board,188 perhaps the best-
known of the modern contractual capacity cases. Ortelere involved
an election of pension benefits 89 by a teacher who suffered from
"involutional psychosis, melancholia type."' 90 After the teacher's
186. Alexander & Szasz, supra note 111, at 542-44.
187. The Restatement provides as follows:
(1) A person incurs only voidable contractual duties by entering into a transac-
tion if by reason of mental illness or defect
(a) he is unable to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and con-
sequences of the transaction, or
(b) he is unable to act in a reasonable manner in relation to the transaction
and the other party has reason to know of his condition.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15(1) (1979). Thus a promisor's volitional or
motivational disorder renders his promise voidable if the other party knew or should have
known of his condition.
188. 25 N.Y.2d 196, 250 N.E.2d 460, 303 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1969).
189. The court assumed without discussion that, for purposes of its capacity analysis,
the transaction was a contract. This characterization finds support in Green's argument
that a change of beneficiary of a life insurance policy represents a modification of the
original contract of insurance. Green, The Operative Effect, supra note 36, at 577. The
election was neither a contract nor a contract modification in the traditional sense, how-
ever. It followed no bargaining and involved no promise, and was certainly susceptible of
analysis as a donation rather than as a contract.
Although the court treated the transaction as a contract, it did not emphasize that the
applicable standard of capacity was higher than the standard for gifts or wills. For an
argument that a differential standard is inappropriate, see supra notes 99-100 and accom-
panying text.
190. Ortelere, 25 N.Y.2d at 200, 250 N.E.2d at 462, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 365. Accord-
ing to Kolb and Brodie, the "involutional period" is the stage during which "the endocrine
and reproductive glands begin to suffer a decrease in functional activity." L. KOLB & H.
BRODIE, supra note 176, at 435. The authors describe the symptoms of major depression
during the involutional period in part as follows:
As with all the affective disorders, the major component in the disturbance
is the development of an unpleasant affective state. This state is compounded of
a number of subjective components, of which grief and sadness represent only a
part. Those others are varying degrees and combinations of intense anxiety,
shame, and guilt. To these affects are added, as major components of the state,
ego attitudes of profound helplessness and diminution of self-esteem, with severe
inhibitions of previous personality functioning.
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death, her husband sought to invalidate the election, which de-
prived him of the benefit of her contributions to the pension
fund."'
In remanding the case for a new trial, the New York Court
of Appeals stated that the teacher's cognitive ability was
unimpaired but strongly suggested that her mental illness never-
theless deprived her of capacity. 192 The court took the position
that a "medically classified psychosis" can justify a finding of in-
competence. 9 3 According to the opinion, "traditional [cognitive]
standards of incompetency for contractual capacity are inadequate
in light of contemporary psychiatric learning and applied modern
standards."'" 4 The court expressed optimism that advances in psy-
chiatry would lead to a workable standard of capacity, thereby
diminishing the role of substantive fairness. 95
Despite its considerable reputation,'96 Ortelere is of question-
able precedential value for three reasons. First, the holding was
based in part on fiduciary principles. The court perceived the
The manifest symptoms of the psychosis are often preceded by a period of
several weeks or a few months during which the patient exhibits hypochondria-
cal trends, becomes irritable, peevish, pessimistic, suffers from insomnia, is per-
haps suspicious, shows a disinclination for effort, and may be given to spells of
weeping. She is unable to concentrate and shows doubt and indecision. Fre-
quently there are a narrowing of interests and a shrinking from the environment.
The patient complains of distressing sensations in the head, eats poorly, loses
weight, worries about health or finance, and becomes apprehensive and restless.
In a more or less typical case, the most conspicuous symptoms are profound
depression, anxiety, agitation, hypochondriasis, and guilty delusions of sin, un-
worthiness, disease, and impending death.
Id. at 437.
191. Ortelere, 25 N.Y.2d at 199, 250 N.E.2d at 462, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 364.
192. Id. at 205-06, 250 N.E.2d at 465-66, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 369-70.
193. Id. at 206, 250 N.E.2d at 466, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 370.
194. Id. at 204, 250 N.E.2d at'465, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 369.
195. In the court's view, movement toward a "modern posture" was "glacial" and
generally covert; "[v]arious devices have been used to avoid unacceptable results under the
old rules by finding unfairness or overreaching in order to avoid transactions ...." Id. at
204, 250 N.E.2d at 465, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 368 (citing Green, Proof. supra note 36, at 298-
305). Green, of course, saw the findings of unfairness and overreaching as applications of
the true test rather than as devices for avoiding unacceptable results. See supra notes 45-
58 and accompanying text.
196. The case figures prominently in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15,
comment b (1979), and is noted with general approval in Comment, Restatement of Con-
tracts Formulation for Mental Competency to Contract Adopted in New York, 45 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 585, 591-94 (1970), and with qualified approval in Note, Contracts-Competency to
Contract of Mentally Ill Person Who Fully Understands Transaction But Is Unable to
Control Conduct, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 1188, 1193-95 (1970)(criticizing the court's empha-
sis on psychosis as well as its stress on the state of mind of the competent party).
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transaction as unfair to the teacher in light of the retirement
board's obligation to protect its members. 97 Second, the teacher's
cognitive functioning may have been impaired.198 If it was, she
probably lacked capacity according to the traditional standard,
and her mental illness furnished at most an alternative ground for
the court's decision. Third, there is persuasive evidence that the
court's suggestion that she lacked capacity was based on an un-
critical reading of the psychiatric testimony presented in the
case.
99
197. See infra text accompanying note 323.
198. Trial Transcript, Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement Bd., (docket number un-
available)(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 31, 1968), rev'd, 31 A.D. 139, 295 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1968),
rev'd, 25 N.Y.2d 196, 250 N.E.2d 460, 303 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1969), reprinted in R. DANZIG,
THE CAPABILITY PROBLEM IN CONTRACT LAW 161-200 (1978). The principal evidence of
Mrs. Ortelere's cognitive ability was a letter sent to the retirement board three days before
she made her election. Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement Bd., 25 N.Y.2d 196, 200-01, 250
N.E.2d 460, 462-63, 303 N.Y.S.2d 362, 366 (1969). The letter asked a series of detailed
questions about her retirement options. One of the questions suggested that she might
make her daughter her beneficiary. Both the testimony of her daughter, R. DANZIG, supra,
at 175-76, and that of her husband, id. at 165, indicated that she acted withdrawn during
the two months before she made the election (although her husband testified that she con-
tinued to write the checks to pay their bills). Id. at 173. This raises the possibility that her
daughter wrote the letter, and that her cognitive functioning was indeed impaired. Her
daughter testified, however, that she "just listened any time [Mrs. Ortelere] said anything
about pensions." Id. at 176.
199. Most of the proof of incapacity consisted of testimony presented by Mrs.
Ortelere's husband and by her psychiatrist, Dr. D'Angelo. The Court of Appeals focused
principally on the doctor's opinion. Ortelere, 25 N.Y.2d at 202, 250 N.E.2d at 463-64, 303
N.Y.S.2d at 367. Dr. D'Angelo treated Mrs. Ortelere for several months. He held monthly
consultations, or "interviews" with her during the period when she made her election. R.
DANZIG, supra note 198, at 177-78. He diagnosed her as suffering from involutional psy-
chosis, melancholia type, id., and cerebral arteriosclerosis. Id. at 181. He testified that at
no time when she was under his care was she mentally competent. Id. at 182. He stated
that her arteriosclerosis caused some confusion and forgetfulness. Id. at 183-84. The princi-
pal thrust of his testimony, however, was that Mrs. Ortelere was so preoccupied with her
own depression that she was unable to engage in rational thought. Id. at 180.
Dr. D'Angelo nevertheless testified that Mrs. Ortelere had lucid intervals. Id. at 189.
One such interval occurred several days after she made her election. She consulted him
about the election, indicating that she thought she had made a mistake. As the doctor put
it, "she realized she couldn't have been thinking right when she made her first choice.
Now, then I say she was - she had a lucid interval." Id. at 190. Asked whether she might
have executed the election form during a lucid interval, he answered: "Not the remotest
possibility. She would never have signed such a document." Id. at 195. His testimony was
thus shaped in significant measure by his conviction that the election was foolish. The
Court of Appeals' opinion made no reference to his views on lucid intervals.
As Judge Jason argued in dissent, the election, which afforded Mrs. Ortelere and her
husband more income during her life, may not have been foolish. Ortelere, 25 N.Y.2d at
207-08, 250 N.E.2d at 467, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 372. Even if it was, however, the court's
reliance on Dr. D'Angelo's testimony is ironic in light of the fact that he, in turn, relied on
the nature of the transaction for his opinion regarding lucid intervals. The virtue of the
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At least two other New York cases have recognized the voli-
tional approach, but the broader standard is by no means well-
established in the state.200 Moreover, although decisions in other
modern approach to the issue of capacity, according to the court, is a reduced emphasis on
the nature of the transaction. Id. at 205, 250 N.E.2d at 465, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 369.
200. The two cases are Fingerhut v. Kralyn Enter., 71 Misc. 2d 846, 337 N.Y.S.2d
394 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971) and Faber v. Sweet Style Mfg., 40 Misc. 2d 212, 242 N.Y.S.2d
763 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963). In Fingerhut, the court rejected a claim of incapacity based on
manic depression, concluding that the plaintiff was not psychotic. Fingerhut, 71 Misc. 2d
at 856-57, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 405. In Faber, the plaintiff sought to rescind a contract to
purchase a parcel of vacant land on the basis that a manic-depressive psychosis deprived
him of capacity. Two of the three doctors who testified supported his claim; the third be-
lieved that, when he signed the contract, "there was no abnormality in [the plaintiff's]
thinking, that his judgment [on the day when he signed the contract] was intact." Faber,
40 Misc. 2d at 214, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 766. The court released the plaintiff from the con-
tract. Id. at 218, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 769.
Although the Faber court permitted the plaintiff to avoid the agreement, the opinion
reflected considerable skepticism as to the value of psychiatric opinion evidence of
incapacity:
The psychiatrist in presenting his opinion is, in final analysis, evaluating factual
information rather than medical data, and is working largely with the same evi-
dence presented to the court by the other witnesses in the action. Moreover, in
the great majority of cases psychiatrists of equal qualification and experience
will reach diametrically opposed conclusions on the same behavioral evidence.
The courts have, therefore, tended to give less weight to expert testimony than to
objective behavioral evidence.
Id. at 216, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 768 (citations omitted). The testimony of the two doctors who
supported the plaintiff's claim was "but confirmatory of the conclusion reached by the
court on the basis of [other evidence]." Id. at 217, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 769.
The evidence to which the court referred consisted of accounts of the plaintiff's behav-
ior in business and personal matters which suggested that his illness was responsible for his
entry into the contract:
[T]he rapidity with which plaintiff moved to obtain an architect and plans, hire
laborers, begin digging on the property, and his journey to Albany to obtain
building approval, all prior to title closing, are abnormal acts. Viewing those acts
in the context of [certain other business decisions], and his complaint to [one of
the psychiatrists] . . .that his wife was in need of help because she was trying
to hold him back, the court is convinced that the contract in question was en-
tered into under the compulsion of plaintiff's psychosis.
Id. During the several weeks preceding the execution of the contract, the plaintiff's behav-
ior had changed radically:
Though under care of [one of the psychiatrists] . . . for his depression, he can-
celled [a particular appointment] and refused to see the Doctor further. Previ-
ously frugal and cautious, he became more expansive. ., began to drive at high
speeds, to take his wife out to dinner, to be sexually more active and to discuss
his prowess with others. In a short period of time, he purchased three expensive
cars for himself, his son and his daughter, began to discuss converting [a] bath-
house and garage property into a twelve story cooperative and put up a sign to
that effect, and to discuss the purchase of [certain land] for the erection of
houses . .. [A]gainst the advice of his lawyer, he contracted for [certain land]
costing $11,500 and gave a $500 deposit on acreage, the price of which was
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jurisdictions lend qualified support to the notion that volitional
disorders can produce incapacity, the cases do not reflect judicial
deference to psychiatric opinion evidence of incapacity. 01 As one
$41,000 and talked about erecting a 400 room hotel with marina and golf course
on the land.
Id. at 213, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 765.
The court's conclusion that the plaintiff lacked capacity was arguably unjustified. The
wheeling and dealing that the opinion describes might have constituted generally effective
business behavior on the part of a person who had the ability to evaluate projects quickly
and to engage in a variety of different enterprises at one time. The court was probably
motivated by the episodic nature of the plaintiff's activities, but the opinion fails to demon-
strate a pattern of improvident or unrealistic decision-making even during his manic
episodes.
The plaintiff's lawyer was evidently not satisfied that he could finance the transaction,
and withdrew from the negotiations because the seller would not agree to a condition relat-
ing to another piece of property. Id. at 213, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 765. This suggests that the
plaintiff was acting imprudently even if the price was otherwise fair, arguably demonstrat-
ing a lack of understanding of the transaction's consequences as opposed to its nature. The
court, however, did not explore the question. The opinion suggests but does not demon-
strate that the plaintiff made a series of very unwise business decisions. While the holding
may have been justifiable on the facts, it is not supported by the court's narrative.
Faber is noted in Note, Manic-Depressive Held Incompetent to Contract Despite Ap-
parent Ability to Understand Transaction, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 356 (1964).
201. For example, in Knott v. Pervere, 285 F. Supp. 274 (D. Mass. 1968), a United
States district court, applying California law, invalidated a pre-incorporation agreement on
the basis that the principal subscriber was incompetent. Medical evidence indicated that
the subscriber had suffered from manic depression for many years and that he was in a
manic state when he executed the agreement. Id. at 278-80. He also suffered from other
ailments, however, including acute brain syndrome and both chronic and acute alcoholism.
Id. In addition, there was considerable lay testimony of erratic and imprudent behavior. Id.
Five days after the United States District Court's decision in Knott, however, the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal interpreted the relevant sections of the California Civil Code to
mean that manic depression did not produce incapacity. Smalley v. Baker, 262 Cal. App.
2d. 824, 69 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1968). Similarly, in Walton v. Bank of California, 218 Cal.
App. 2d 527, 32 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1963), the California District Court of Appeal rejected a
claim of incapacity to execute an inter vivos trust despite medical evidence that the settlor
"suffered from an anxiety neurosis, was subject to fits of depression, sought relief and es-
cape in the use of alcohol and experienced an unpleasant relationship with her son . . .
itself productive of additional tension and stress." Id. at 531, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
In First Nat'l Bank v. Williams, 346 So. 2d 257 (La. Ct. App. 1977), the Louisiana
Court of Appeal affirmed a finding of capacity to enter into an agreement for the purchase
of cattle and agricultural implements and for the lease of certain land. The court upheld
the finding despite the fact that all three doctors who testified agreed that, as of eight days
after he signed the contract, the buyer suffered from manic depressive psychosis. Id. at
262.
In Star Realty v. Bower, 17 Mich. App. 248, 169 N.W.2d 194 (1969), the Michigan
Court of Appeals upheld a trial court's denial of specific performance of a contract to sell
real estate. The trial court's holding was supported by the testimony of a psychiatrist. Id.
at 253-55, 169 N.W.2d at 197. The appellate court observed that emotional disorders per
se do not produce contractual incapacity. Yet it concluded that an emotional disorder could
vitiate understanding:
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court put it, "[t] he science of psychiatry . . . has not yet reached
the plateau of infallibility where courts must cede their powers of
We are not concerned with what impairs capacity. There is considerable testi-
mony of emotional instability on the part of defendant. While plaintiff urges that
such testimony is immaterial, there is unrefuted testimony by [a psychiatrist
who treated the defendant] that defendant's emotional state could overwhelm
any intellectual appraisals that he should make. In such case defendant would
lack capacity to contract.
Id. at 258, 169 N.W.2d at 199. The record, however, also contained lay testimony that the
defendant drank heavily and behaved in an erratic and imprudent fashion:
Robert Porter, a cousin of defendant, testified as to defendant's behavior in
the hospital after an automobile accident which occurred the day after the con-
tract was signed. Mr. Porter stated that defendant broke down and cried about
his condition; that his appearance was unkempt, unshaven and dirty; that he was
fighting with his wife over the divorce; that he was drinking quite a bit and that
he was completely in debt and "flat broke." Mr. Porter testified that defendant's
despondency continued and that he made threats against his wife's new boy-
friend. According to Mr. Porter, defendant would break down, cry and become
incoherent. He lacked self control. His emotions would run from anger to very
low fits of depression. He suffered from gastrointestinal distress, nausea, throw-
ing up - he couldn't retain food and was constantly broken out in a rash. His
business and personal behavior was erratic.
Id. at 255, 169 N.W.2d at 197-98. Other lay witnesses concurred. Id. at 255, 169 N.W.2d
at 198.
In Gore v. Gadd, 268 Or. 527, 522 P.2d 212 (1974), the plaintiff argued that she
suffered from an affective disorder that rendered her incompetent to contract for the sale of
her home. Id. at 528, 522 P.2d at 213. The Oregon Supreme Court assumed arguendo that
affective disorders could produce incapacity, but upheld the trial court's decision that the
plaintiff was competent. Id. at 530, 522 P.2d at 214. The Supreme Court noted that two
psychiatrists had reached opposing conclusions regarding the plaintiff's capacity and that
the trial court had relied primarily on lay testimony. Id. at 528, 522 P.2d at 213. In Kruse
v. Coos Head Timber Co., 248 Or. 294, 432 P.2d 1009 (1967), the court upheld a trial
judge's determination that the plaintiff had produced insufficient evidence for the jury on
the issue of his capacity to execute a release. The plaintiff, who was examined by experts,
argued that he signed the release at a time when he suffered from "post-traumatic psycho-
neurosis," and there was evidence to support his claim. The court noted that "there was no
evidence that this type of psychoneurosis would interfere with his mental capacity to enter
into a contract." Id. at 305, 432 P.2d at 1015.
In Nohra v. Evans, 509 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974), the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals followed the New York cases in holding that the trial court should have included a
volitional prong in its instruction to the jury on the issue of the plaintiff's capacity to enter
into a business transaction. The plaintiff was entitled to a trial on the issue of whether she
lacked capacity in the depressed phase of a manic-depressive illness. Id. at 654-55. The
appellate court remanded the case for a new trial, but did not indicate whether the testi-
mony in the record would serve as proof of either the illness or the connection between the
illness and the plaintiff's capacity. Id. at 655. Members of the plaintiff's family testified
that, although she was a shrewd businesswoman, she was in the depressed phase of a manic
depressive illness - that she understood the transaction but was "very susceptible to sug-
gestion" and did not care about what she was doing. Id. at 649-50. The only medical
testimony referred to in the opinion related to manic depression generally and not to the
plaintiff in particular. Id. at 649.
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adjudication even when a pronouncement has been made by a psy-
chiatrist in answering the ultimate question at issue, that his pa-
tient was incompetent.1 20 2
In capacity disputes that do not involve volitional disorders or
mental illness per se, judges have buttressed their conclusions by
reference to medical evidence, 20 3 or to its absence, 0 4 without
treating it as dispositive. Many cases involve conflicting medical
testimony. 0 5 Even where there is no disagreement among doctors,
however, lay testimony may prevail over contrary medical opinion
evidence. 06 The standard, then, remains legal rather than medi-
cal. The promisors in the capacity cases may indeed be moving
"from contract to status" with respect to particular transactions,
but in general they are not doing so via psychiatry. °7
B. Substantive Fairness
According to Green, transactional fairness now furnishes the
standard of capacity. 20 8 This view is not entirely without support
202. Mills v. Kopf, 216 Cal. App. 2d 780, 785-86, 31 Cal. Rptr. 80, 84 (1963)(re-
jecting a claim of contractual incapacity despite supporting testimony by the promisor's
psychiatrist).
203. See, e.g., Knighten v. Davis, 358 So. 2d 1022 (Ala. 1978); Bryant v. Bryant,
379 So. 2d 382 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Greathouse v. Vosburgh, 19 III. 2d 555, 169
N.E.2d 97 (1960); Barth v. Gregory, 79 II1. App. 3d 510, 398 N.E.2d 849 (1979); Krasner
v. Berk, 366 Mass. 464, 319 N.E.2d 897 (1974); Coke v. Coke, 242 Or. 486, 410 P.2d 214
(1966).
204. See, e.g., Simmons First Nat'l Bank v. Luzader, 246 Ark. 302, 309, 438
S.W.2d 25, 29 (1969)(capacity upheld in part because no medical evidence of incapacity
was introduced)(the case is discussed supra text accompanying notes 19-35).
205. See, e.g., Neal v. Jackson, 2 Ark. App. 14, 616 S.W.2d 746 (1981); Costello v.
Costello, 186 N.W.2d 651 (Iowa 1971).
206. See, e.g., Cundick v. Broadbent, 383 F.2d 157, 161 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. de-
nied, 390 U.S. 948 (1968)("It has even been said that opinion evidence in cases of this
kind is . . . 'generally considered low grade, and not entitled to much weight against posi-
tive testimony of actual facts.' ")(citation omitted); Alley v. Rodgers, 269 Ark. 262, 265,
599 S.W.2d 739, 741-42 (1980)(doctor had treated alleged incompetent primarily for phys-
ical ailments); Smith v. Blum, 143 So. 2d 419, 421-22 (La. Ct. App. 1962) (applicable
statute required that incapacity be evident to other party to transaction); First Nat'l Bank
v. Nennig, 92 Wis. 2d 518, 532-33, 285 N.W.2d 614, 621-22 (1979)(opinion evidence of
incapacity based upon diagnosis of chronic paranoid schizophrenia, but doctors conceded
entry into contract might have occurred during lucid interval).
207. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
208. The Restatement commentary adopts this view in part: "Where a person has
some understanding of a particular transaction which is affected by mental illness or de-
fect, the controlling consideration is whether the transaction in its result is one which a
reasonably competent person might have made." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 15, comment b (1979).
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in the cases. In the unlikely event that a trial court excludes evi-
dence of fairness - of the value of property sold by an alleged
incompetent, for example - the appellate court will probably re-
verse and remand for a new trial." 9 More importantly, courts do
tend to find capacity to enter fair transactions210 and incapacity to
enter unfair transactions 1.2   The decisions demonstrate clearly
that substantive fairness is relevant to the issue of capacity.21 2
Yet the cases fail in at least three respects to justify Green's
view. First, substantive unfairness is not a prerequisite for a find-
ing of incapacity. In some cases involving no evidence of unfair-
ness, appellate courts uphold findings of incapacity213 or conclude
that the evidence of disability creates a question for the jury. 14
Where there is some evidence of unfairness but no overall assess-
ment of the substance of the transaction, the court may be willing
to affirm as to incapacity215 or even to reverse a trial judge's find-
209. See Bach v. Hudson, 596 S.W.2d 673, 677 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
210. See, e.g., Simmons First Nat'l Bank v. Luzader, 246 Ark. 302, 438 S.W.2d 25
(1969) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 19-35); Eslick v. Montgomery, 3 Il1.
App. 3d 447, 278 N.E.2d 412 (1972) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 297-306);
Estate of Ferling v. Abernathy, 670 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Gindhart v.
Skourtes, 271 Or. 115, 530 P.2d 827 (1975)(contract upheld where transaction was not
grossly unfair); Cyrus v. Tharp, 147 W. Va. 110, 126 S.E.2d 31 (1962)(discussed infra
notes 247-63 and accompanying text); First Nat'l Bank v. Nennig, 92 Wis. 518, 285
N.W.2d 614 (1979) (discussed infra notes 266-76 and accompanying text).
211. See, e.g., Knott v. Pervere, 285 F. Supp. 274 (D. Mass. 1968)(evidence that
contract was irrational or probative of incapacity); Knighten v. Davis, 358 So. 2d 1022
(Ala. 1978)(drastically insufficient consideration furnished indication of incompetence);
Costello v. Costello, 186 N.W.2d 651 (Iowa 1971)(contract and deed set aside where
purchase price was one-half of appraised value); Krasner v. Berk, 366 Mass. 464, 319
N.E.2d 897 (1974)(improvident agreement relating to rent supported finding of
imcompetence).
212. Cf. Baron, supra note 124, at 1059 ("Cases sounding the rationality theme and
the self-consistency theme alike hold that the fact finder may consider the will's dispositive
provisions in evaluating the testator's mental capacity."); Fellows, In Search of Donative
Intent, 73 IowA L. REV. 611, 621 (1988)("The nature of the distribution plan is probably
the most critical observable fact influencing the outcomes of cases in which [testamentary]
capacity . . . [is] at issue.")(footnote omitted).
213. See, e.g., Coburn Fin. Corp. v. Bennett, 241 So. 2d 802 (La. Ct. App. 1970);
Krueger v. Zoch, 285 Minn. 332, 173 N.W.2d 18 (1969); Faber v. Sweet Style Mfg., 40
Misc. 2d 212, 242 N.Y.S.2d 763 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963) (discussed supra note 200).
214. See, e.g., Ludwig v. Hart, 40 N.C. App. 188, 252 S.E.2d 270 (1979); Nohra v.
Evans, 509 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
215. In In re Estate of Faris, 159 N.W.2d 417 (Iowa 1968), an eighty-four year old
widow leased her 220-acre farm for a period of five years. The appellate court viewed the
lease as unduly long but made no finding with respect to the rent. The case is discussed
infra text accompanying notes 236-41.
In Fidelity Fin. Serv. v. McCoy, 392 So. 2d 118 (La. Ct. App. 1980), the appellate
court affirmed a finding of incapacity to execute a promissory note and a chattel mortgage.
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ing of capacity.216
Second, evidence of fairness is not essential for a determina-
tion that the promisor or donor had capacity. An appellate court
may uphold a finding of capacity,21 or even reverse a judgment of
incapacity,"' where the evidence as to fairness is inconclusive. In-
deed, the higher court may reverse a finding of incompetence in
the face of a suggestion that the transaction is substantively un-
fair.2 9 Moreover, in some of the cases in which the appellate
The only indication of substantive unfairness in the opinion is a suggestion that the chattel
mortgage covered property other than the car the borrower was financing. Id. at 119. Even
assuming that the mortgage included the other property, however, there is no indication
that the value of the security exceeded the amount of the debt.
216. In Barth v. Gregory, 79 Ill. App. 3d 510, 398 N.E.2d 849 (1979), Barth, a
seventy-two year old widower, entered into a contract to sell his farm for $400,000. Id. at
511-12, 398 N.E.2d at 850. Two doctors, one of whom was a psychiatrist, testified that
they believed him to be incompetent. Id. at 513-15, 398 N.E.2d at 851-52. Several lay
witnesses testified that his living conditions were deplorable. Id. at 515-17, 398 N.E.2d at
853-56. The court summarized the testimony of a witness named Pakosta:
[T]he house was dirty, dishes were scattered over the floor in the kitchen, and
located just outside of the house was a big pile of garbage. Barth would wear the
same pair of pants day after day. His eating habits were poor, and beginning the
end of August, Pakosta began to bring Barth food.
Until January of 1976, Pakosta saw Barth on a regular basis, sometimes
visiting as often as four or five times a day. Pakosta testified that during these
November and December visits the odor inside Barth's house was "very, very
terrible." He would often find the floors of the house full of human excrement,
particularly the floors in the kitchen and the main bedroom. Human waste could
also be found outside of the house, as Barth would defecate outdoors when the
weather was warm. ("You kind of had to watch where you were walking or else
you would walk all over it," Pakosta said). Barth himself would often have feces
on his pants and underwear.
Id. at 515-16, 398 N.E.2d at 853. Pakosta and other witnesses also stated that Barth be-
haved in a confused and erratic fashion. Id. at 515-18, 398 N.E.2d at 853-56. The defend-
ants, who had persuaded Barth to enter into the contract, testified to the contrary. Id. at
521-22, 398 N.E.2d at 857. The court, however, did not believe them: "[W]e think it un-
usual for Barth to be disoriented and confused on every occasion when a disinterested wit-
ness was with him, but perfectly lucid whenever he was in the presence of one of the
defendants." Id. at 524, 398 N.E.2d at 859.
The evidence of substantive unfairness was minimal. The court decided neither that
the property was worth more than the sales price, id. at 527, 398 N.E.2d at 861, nor that
the six percent commission that was to go to the defendant brokerage firm was excessive. It
pointed out only that one of the individual defendants, who was to receive part of the
commission, had not done much to earn it. Id. at 525, 398 N.E.2d at 860. If the price was
fair and the commission was standard, the transaction may even have been advantageous
from Barth's point of view.
217. See, e.g., Richard v. Smith, 235 Ark. 752, 361 S.W.2d 741 (1962).
218. See, e.g., Columbia Say. & Loan v. Carpenter, 33 Colo. App. 360, 521 P.2d
1299 (1974), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Judkins v. Carpenter, 189 Colo. 95, 537
P.2d 137 (1975).
219. In Meadors v. Pacific Int'l Petroleum, 449 So. 2d 26 (La. Ct. App. 1984), the
[Vol. 39:307
CONTRACTUAL AND DONATIVE CAPACITY
courts find capacity, the opinions simply cite no evidence that goes
to substantive fairness.22
Third, the opinions do not suggest that courts have ignored
the question of capacity in cases in which a correlation exists be-
tween capacity and fairness or incapacity and unfairness. Most of
the opinions present substantial evidence of either capacity or in-
capacity apart from the nature of the transaction. 21 If anything,
the appellate courts often present more evidefice than appears nec-
essary to support trial court determinations. On balance, then, the
cases indicate that substantive fairness, while unquestionably im-
portant, does not control the work of the appellate courts on the
issue of capacity.
Moreover, the cases suggest that under at least some circum-
stances fairness bears independently on enforceability. For exam-
ple, an incompetent may be bound by a fair transaction that is no
longer executory if the competent party acted without knowledge
of the incompetent's condition.22  To the extent that courts recog-
court reversed a trial judge's finding of incompetence to execute a mineral lease. With
respect to substantive fairness the opinion suggests only that the alleged incompetent's
neighbors were paid more for their mineral rights than he was for his. Id. at 31. In Estate
of McGovern v. State Employees' Retirement Bd., 512 Pa. 377, 517 A.2d 523 (1986), the
court reversed a finding of incapacity to execute an arguably unfair selection of retirement
benefits. The court expressly rejected the Restatement's call for a "post-hoc" assessment of
fairness. Id. at 385, 517 A.2d at 526.
220. See, e.g., Mills v. Kopf, 216 Cal. App. 2d 780, 31 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1963); Curry
v. Curry, 31 11. App. 3d 972, 334 N.E.2d 742 (1975); Smith v. Blum, 143 So. 2d 419 (La.
Ct. App. 1962); Looney v. Chastain, 395 P.2d 571 (Okla. 1964).
221. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 210 (finding capacity) and note 211 (finding
incapacity). There are, of course, occasional cases of invalid transactions in which the evi-
dence of unfairness is much more impressive than the evidence of incapacity. See, e.g.,
Williamson v. Matthews, 379 So. 2d 1245 (Ala. 1980)(invalidating a transaction on the
basis of gross inadequacy of consideration and some evidence of incapacity).
222. The Restatement supports this view:
Where the contract is made on fair terms and the other party is without
knowledge of the mental illness or defect, the [incompetent's power of avoid-
ance] terminates to the extent that the contract has been so performed in whole
or in part or the circumstances have so changed that avoidance would be unjust.
In such a case a court may grant relief as justice requires.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15(2) (1979).
In Upton v. Hall, 225 Va. 168, 300 S.E.2d 777 (1983), for example, an incompetent
entered into an agreement for the sale of real estate. The trial court enforced the agree-
ment without determining whether the buyers were aware of her incompetence. The Vir-
ginia Supreme Court held that this was error:
It is undisputed that [the seller] was incompetent at the time she entered
into the contract with [the buyers]. Therefore, if. . . [the buyers] knew of this
incompetency, [the seller] is entitled to have the contract set aside without plac-
ing [the buyers] in statu quo. If, on the other hand, [the buyers] had no knowl-
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nize an independent role for fairness, they will be less tempted to
exaggerate its relevance to the alleged incompetent's condition.
C. Social Context
To date, the principal doctrinal expression of the role of so-
cial context is the notion that contracts and wills require different
levels of capacity. The judicial rhetoric relating to the conse-
quences of transactional form remains highly variable. Some
courts continue to assert that a higher level of capacity is required
to sustain a contract than to uphold either an inter vivos or a tes-
tamentary gift.223 Other courts state that one standard applies to
both business transactions and donations. 24 Still others adopt the
rhetoric of donative capacity in cases involving contracts2 25 or em-
ploy the language of contractual capacity in cases involving
gifts.226
To the extent that methods of judicial analysis vary from case
to case, however, they tend to do so in response to social context
rather than transactional form. Although the courts do not ex-
pressly classify cases according to their social context, the deci-
sions fall into three general categories. The first consists of more
or less discrete227 business transactions, and the second consists of
edge of [the seller's] incompetency, the transaction may be voided only if [the
buyers] can be placed in statu quo. The trial court erred in not hearing evidence
in order to decide these issues.
Id. at 173, 300 S.E.2d at 779-80.
223. See, e.g., Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Pearson, 67 Ill. App. 3d 457, 459, 384 N.E.2d
548, 550 (1978)("Greater mental capacity is required to make a deed than is required to
execute a will. However, no greater mental capacity is required to make a deed of volun-
tary settlement reserving a life estate than is required to make a will." (citations omitted));
Costello v. Costello, 186 N.W.2d 651, 654-55 (Iowa 1971)(higher standard for contracts
than for wills); Peterein v. Peterein, 408 S.W.2d 809, 813 (Mo. 1966)(higher standard for
contracts than for inter vivos gifts or wills).
The notion that a contract requires a higher level of capacity than a gift or a will is
implicit in the opinions in both Columbia Sav. & Loan v. Carpenter, 33 Colo. App. 360,
368, 521 P.2d 1299, 1303 (1974), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Judkins v. Carpenter,
189 Colo. 95, 537 P.2d 137 (1975); and Greathouse v. Vosburgh, 19 I11. 2d 555, 567, 169
N.E.2d 97, 103 (1960).
224. See, e.g., Rose v. Dunn, 284 Ark. 42, 46-47, 679 S.W.2d 180, 182-83 (1984);
Bach v. Hudson, 596 S.W.2d 673, 675-76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
225. See, e.g., Cundick v. Broadbent, 383 F.2d 157, 160 (10th Cir. 1967); Richard v.
Smith, 235 Ark. 752, 754-55, 361 S.W.2d 741, 742-43 (1962).
226. See, e.g., Conerly v. Lewis, 238 Miss. 68, 79-80, 117 So. 2d 460, 465
(1960)(quoting Lambert v. Powell, 199 Miss. 397, 24 So. 2d 773 (1946)).
227. The term is MacNeil's. He describes a discrete contract as "one in which no
relation exists between the parties apart from the simple exchange of goods." I. MACNEIL,
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transactions between parties to close relationships. In a third cate-
gory, fiduciary principles have a substantial impact on both busi-
ness and social transactions. The presence of the fiduciary does
not create a wholly separate social context. Yet as a result of the
courts' solicitude for the interests of entrustors, the fiduciary rela-
tion tends to overshadow other contextual factors. This Section re-
views cases in each category and recommends approaches for fu-
ture decisions.
1. The Business Context
In general, the courts assess both capacity to engage in busi-
ness transactions and the substantive fairness of the transactions
with little reference to human relationships. In Bach v. Hudson,28
for example, the alleged incompetent agreed to sell a parcel of
real estate to a party he had first met several weeks earlier. 29 The
trial court held that the buyer was entitled to specific perform-
ance, but the appellate court reversed and remanded for a new
trial. The testimony relating to the seller's capacity focused
largely on his lack of business acumen. His son testified that he
had once executed a deed for no consideration and that he was
unable to remember commercial values.230 Other witnesses stated
that the seller's appearance and physical health had deteriorated,
and that he had made "erratic and irrational decisions concerning
sales of fruit and of [sic] agricultural conditions. 231 The evidence
of substantive unfairness, erroneously excluded by the trial court,
was simply that the fair market value of the property was consid-
erably higher than the contract price. 32
The court's analysis of both capacity and substantive fairness
reflected the apparently discrete nature of the transaction. The is-
sue was whether the seller was able to further his economic inter-
ests by functioning effectively in an arena in which competition
was not complicated by relationships. Although the case presents
perhaps the clearest example of this approach, it is by no means
233unique.
supra note 4, at 10.
228. 596 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
229. Id. at 674-75.
230. Id. at 674-77.
231. Id. at 675.
232. Id. at 676-77.
233. In Cundick v. Broadbent, 383 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1967), the court affirmed a
finding of capacity to sell range land, development company stock, and livestock and equip-
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Even in cases of apparently discrete transactions, however,
courts may admit evidence of social functioning. In a case of al-
leged incapacity to contract for the sale of a farm, for example,
the court cited evidence that the seller did not protect his own
interests effectively and also observed that he "trusted strangers
rather than his own family. '23 4 And in assessing a claim of incom-
petence to execute a stock subscription agreement, another court
noted that the subscriber behaved in a bizarre fashion in his per-
sonal life. 35
Indeed, impaired relational skills may help to explain a
party's entry into a disadvantageous business transaction. In In re
Estate of Faris,26 the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed a finding
that Addie Faris, an eighty-four year old widow, lacked capacity
ment. The seller and the buyer had a business relationship that predated the transaction;
the buyer had purchased the seller's lamb crop in earlier years. Id. at 162. The contract
called for seller financing over a period of at least one year. Id. at 163. Moreover, the court
placed considerable stress on the fact that the seller's wife participated in the negotiation of
the transaction. Id. at 163. The appellate court nevertheless treated the transaction as dis-
crete. Its analysis of the seller's capacity did not include an assessment of his ability to
relate to either the buyer or his wife. Nor did its evaluation of the fairness of the transac-
tion make any reference to the relationship between the seller and the buyer.
In Freiders v. Dayton, 61 Ill. App. 3d 873, 378 N.E.2d 1191 (1978), Martha Dayton,
aged 85, signed an agreement for the sale of her home. The purchaser, Lawrence Freiders,
was engaged to Jane Tallent, who worked at the Roosevelt Square Shelter Care Home
where Dayton was a patient. In her capacity as a social rehabilitation worker, Tallent
assisted Dayton in handling her finances, and the two had an "amicable and friendly"
relationship. Id. at 880, 378 N.E.2d at 1197. The relationship did not figure in the court's
analysis of either capacity or fairness, although it was relevant on the issue of undue
influence.
In Smith v. Blum, 143 So. 2d 419 (La. Ct. App. 1962), an alleged incompetent and
his wife agreed to sell their home and to pay a brokerage commission to the plaintiff, whom
they had not met before. The court resolved the issue of the husband's capacity without
reference to the nature of his relationship with his wife. Id. at 420-22.
In Krasner v. Berk, 366 Mass. 464, 319 N.E.2d 897 (1974), the plaintiff and the
defendant were doctors who shared a suite of offices for five years. Near the end of the five-
year term, they renewed the lease for a period of three years and also agreed in writing to
share rent and taxes even if one of them became disabled. The defendant sought to escape
liability under the agreement on the basis of incapacity. Id. at 465, 319 N.E.2d at 898. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the trial court's finding of incompetence
essentially without reference to the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. Id.
at 469, 319 N.E.2d at 900-01.
234. Krueger v. Zoch, 285 Minn. 332, 333, 173 N.W.2d 18, 20 (1969).
235. Knott v. Pervere, 285 F. Supp. 274, 280 (D. Mass. 1968)(The subscriber pro-
posed to a married woman and, three days before his marriage to another woman, "he
solicited advice from his sister and others as to which of three girls then under his consider-
ation he should marry.").
236. 159 N.W.2d 417 (Iowa 1968).
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to execute a five-year lease of her 220-acre farm.237 The lease
worked to her disadvantage in that, unlike the annual rentals that
were customary in the area, it deprived her of flexibility in man-
aging her property.2 38 The court took note of Faris' general inabil-
ity to get along with others. She was confused about her affairs
and needed a conservator,239 but was "one of those extremely in-
dependent old persons who would not hear of any such thing, and
was irrationally suspicious of those who would otherwise have
helped her."240 The court suggested strongly that had she been
under conservatorship the transaction would not have taken
place.2 4' Her relational incapacity thus deprived her of protection
that would have compensated for her other disabilities.
In analyzing business transactions, then, the courts can and
do take relational factors into account. In future cases, judges
should be open to consideration of those factors on issues of both
capacity and substantive fairness. The approach of Bach v. Hud-
son242 is probably justifiable in some instances. Yet business is in-
evitably a social activity,24 3 and a competent assessment of a po-
tential transaction often involves a reasonably sensitive appraisal
of a human interaction. Judges may be more hesitant to inquire
into human factors in a business setting than they are in a family
context.244 Where those factors are important from a business
237. Id. at 421. The lessees, Everett and Edna Lyman, operated another farm in the
neighborhood and were already in possession of Faris' farm under an earlier three-year
lease. Id. at 419. The court noted that Faris "probably did lean on Mr. Lyman some." Id.
at 421. It concluded, however, that the relationship was not confidential and that there was
therefore no presumption of undue influence. Undue influence and confidential relation-
ships are discussed infra notes 288-308 and accompanying text.
238. Faris, 159 N.W.2d at 421.
239. The court's account of Faris' incapacity is graphic. The opinion indicates, for
example, that her personal hygiene deteriorated to an "atrocious" point and that her house-
hold was in complete disarray:
Litter filled the kitchen, as well as a very bad odor. She used a pail for a toilet,
and did not keep it emptied. She used a hot plate for such cooking as she did,
and slept behind the stove on a cot. The bed clothing consisted of gunny sacks,
and the pillow was an old article of clothing filled with rags. The whole thing
was very dirty, and the room was a boar's nest.
Id. at 419. There was medical testimony that she suffered from "severe arteriosclerosis and
chronic brain syndrome, advanced." Id. at 421.
240. Id. at 419.
241. Id. at 421.
242. 596 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (discussed supra text accompanying
notes 228-33).
243. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
244. Professor Llewellyn observes that judges "have an experience with family mat-
ters which is earlier and more intimate than any understanding of business." Llewellyn,
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standpoint, however, they are inevitably relevant to a claim of
contractual incapacity.
2. The Family or Social Context
Many capacity cases involve transactions between parties
who know each other socially or who are members of the same
family. In these cases, judicial conceptions of both capacity and
substantive fairness are strongly affected by relational factors. The
courts' approach effectively counters the principal criticisms of re-
lational analysis 4 5 that are either explicit or implicit in the com-
mentary. Moreover, a relational perspective illuminates the close
connection between incapacity and undue influence. This Subsec-
tion focuses first on capacity cases per se and second on decisions
involving undue influence.
a. Capacity Cases and Close Relationships
Alexander and Szasz's argument suggests that, in assessing
close relationships, the courts will defer to psychiatric testimony
regarding affective functioning24 and will adhere rigidly to tradi-
tional family values. Eisenberg's argument implies that judicial
responses to evidence of allegedly close relationships will be un-
predictable. In general, however, the decisions indicate that these
fears are unfounded.
In Cyrus v. Tharp,247 for example, Olive Adkins executed
both a contract and a deed. Pursuant to the contract, the deed
conveyed her home in Huntington, West Virginia, to Mr. and
Mrs. Tharp. 48 Mrs. Adkins was over eighty years old when she
signed the documents249 and was hospitalized for treatment of a
severe infection that developed following the extraction of two of
Our Case Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, H, 48 YALE L. 779, 785 (1939).
245. As used in this Article, the term "relational analysis" refers to analysis of per-
sonal relationships and does not incorporate a general theory of relational contract. See
supra note 91.
246. Alexander and Szasz do not develop this implication of their argument. One
commentator on the subject of testamentary capacity, however, argues that courts should
seek to identify the members of the testator's "psychological" family, and that psychiatric
or psychological evidence can be particularly useful in that process. Spaulding, supra note
124, at 130, 137-38.
247. 147 W. Va. 110, 126 S.E.2d 31 (1962).
248. Id. at 115-16, 126 S.E.2d at 35.
249. Id. at 112, 126 S.E.2d at 33.
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her teeth. 5 °
Mrs. Adkins and the Tharps had maintained a close friend-
ship for many years. Mrs. Adkins took in boarders,25' and the
Tharps met and were married at her home.2 52 After they were
married, they saw her often, both at her house and at their own.
Mr. Tharp ran errands for Mrs. Adkins, paid bills for her, painted
and repaired her home, and handled the funeral arrangements af-
ter the death of her son. Mrs. Adkins referred to Mr. Tharp either
as like a son to her or as her best friend.25 3 She often told others
that she wanted the Tharps to have her home.2 54 Her brother lived
with her during the two years preceding her death, but he gave
her very little help and the two were not close.255
While Mrs. Adkins was in the hospital, she insisted that Mr.
Tharp have a deed prepared so that she could convey her home to
him and his wife.2 56 Mr. Tharp instructed an attorney to draft
both a deed and a contract. The contract provided that the con-
veyance of the property was in consideration of ten dollars and the
Tharps' promise to provide Mrs. Adkins for the rest of her life
with "food, clothing, shelter and necessary medical and hospital
care if needed . ",257 Mrs. Adkins executed the documents,
and, three days later, suffered a stroke and died.2 58 Her brother,
who was her sole heir, sued the Tharps, alleging that she lacked
capacity to transfer the property. The trial court invalidated the
conveyance,259 but the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Vir-
ginia reversed.260
The supreme court's perception of the relationship between
Mrs. Adkins and the Tharps was clearly critical to the outcome of
the case.261 Although the Tharps did not pay Mrs. Adkins for the
property in cash, the conveyance was fair in light of all they had
250. Id. at 113, 126 S.E.2d at 34.
251. Id. at 113, 126 S.E.2d at 33.
252. Id. at 113, 126 S.E.2d at 34.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 113-18, 126 S.E.2d at 34-37.
255. Id. at 112-13, 126 S.E.2d at 33-34.
256. Id. at 119, 126 S.E.2d at 37.
257. Id. at 115, 126 S.E.2d at 35.
258. Id. at 119-20, 126 S.E.2d at 37-38.
259. Id. at 112, 126 S.E.2d at 33.
260. Id. at 123, 126 S.E.2d at 39.
261. The court denied that the friendship was dispositive, but nonetheless described
it at some length and noted that it did bear on Mrs. Adkins' reason for executing the
documents. Id. at 113-15, 126 S.E.2d at 34-35.
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done for her in the past, what they promised to do for her in the
future, and her relative estrangement from her brother. She had
the capacity to appreciate the transaction's fairness in light of
those factors; she was aware of what the Tharps meant to her,
particularly in contrast to her brother, and of what she could
count on them to do for her in the future.
Indeed, like Yarbrough's agreement with the Luzaders, the
conveyance represented a contribution to Mrs. Adkins' friendship
with the Tharps. The urgency she felt about executing the deed"'2
may well have reflected her desire to avoid feeling unduly in-
debted to the Tharps - to maintain a degree of pride and a kind
of independence without which the relationship would be
diminished.
In Cyrus v. Tharp the transaction was, on one level at least,
essentially donative. Even though the Tharps provided economic
benefits to Mrs. Adkins and the transaction was contractual in
form, the parties were motivated fundamentally by gratitude and
generosity. In cases involving gifts, traditional doctrine can ac-
commodate relational considerations fairly easily; as the Cyrus
court observed, the character of the relationship was relevant to
Mrs. Adkins' reason for executing the documents. 6 a Although the
courts' relational analysis is not always explicit, the holdings in
other cases addressing donative capacity are consistent with the
Cyrus approach. 64
262. A Mrs. Nickel, who shared Mrs. Adkins' hospital room, testified to the urgency
Mrs. Adams felt:
During the time [Mrs. Adkins] was there she had numerous visitors, however,
Mr. and Mrs. Tharp seemed to come most often and appeared to have the most
to do with taking care of Mrs. Adkins. Each time Mr. Tharp came in I would
hear Mrs. Adkins ask him if he had brought the deed for her to sign to [her
home]. The first few times she asked this, Mr. Tharp would tell her to wait until
she was well and out of the hospital and that they would fix up the deed later.
However, Mrs. Adkins deep [sic] insisting to him that she wanted him to bring
the deed in so that she could deed the [home] to Mr. and Mrs. Tharp. On Fri-
day, the day before the deed was finally signed, Mrs. Adkins talked with me at
length while we were [alone] in the room, telling me about her [home] and that
she wanted to deed it to Mr. and Mrs. Tharp.
Id. at 118-19, 126 S.E.2d at 37.
263. Id. at 115, 126 S.E.2d at 35.
264. See, e.g., Eslick v. Montgomery, 3 I1. App. 3d 447, 278 N.E.2d 412 (1972)
(discussed infra notes 297-306 and accompanying text); Greathouse v. Vosburgh, 19 III. 2d
555, 169 N.E.2d 97 (1960) (discussed infra note 284); Conerly v. Lewis, 238 Miss. 68, 117
So. 2d 460 (1960)(upholding deeds to sons who had helped the grantor save the land dur-
ing the depression); Estate of Ferling v. Abernathy, 670 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. Ct. App.
1984)(upholding gift of interest in savings account to friend who furnished a home and
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Moreover, despite doctrinal obstacles,265 courts maintain this
approach in assessing transactions that are clearly contractual.
For example, in First National Bank v. Nennig, 66 Leona Nennig
entered into an agreement to sell her eighty-acre farm to her sec-
ond cousin, Norman Nennig.267 The two had known each other for
many years, and Norman Nennig had worked on the farm and
assisted her in various other ways.268 After negotiating, they
agreed that he would purchase the farm for $32,000, part down
and the rest over time, and would supply her with food for the rest
of her life.269 An acceleration clause obligated him to make pay-
ments in advance of the schedule if she incurred emergency bills
that would otherwise require her to go into debt.
2 7 0
Thirteen days after the parties entered into the agreement,
the First National Bank of Appleton became Leona Nennig's
guardian. The bank sued to invalidate the sale on the theory that
she lacked contractual capacity." 1 On the basis of conflicting evi-
dence on the issues of her capacity272 and the substantive fairness
of the transaction, 7 3 the trial court enforced the contract,274 and
care during the donor's illness).
265. See supra note 77.
266. 92 Wis. 2d 518, 285 N.W.2d 614 (1979).
267. Id. at 520, 285 N.W.2d at 616.
268. Id. at 521-22, 285 N.W.2d at 616-17.
269. Id. at 523-25, 285 N.W.2d at 617-18.
270. Id. at 528, 285 N.W.2d at 620.
271. Id. at 521, 285 N.W.2d at 616.
272. According to medical experts, Leona Nennig suffered from chronic paranoid
schizophrenia and was incompetent much of the time. Id. at 532-33, 285 N.W.2d at 621-
22. The court found that her condition made her susceptible to Norman Nennig's influence.
Id. at 535-37, 285 N.W.2d at 623-24 (susceptibility to undue influence is discussed infra
text at note 290). Moreover, the bank's appointment as guardian only thirteen days after
the parties entered into the agreement suggests that she lacked capacity. Id. at 520-21, 285
N.W.2d at 616.
On the other hand, the doctors who testified agreed that she might have executed the
agreement during a lucid interval. Id. at 533, 285 N.W.2d at 621-22. Her "friends and
acquaintances testified that they could see nothing wrong with her, that she was capable of
playing good cards and conducted business transactions involving the sale of personal prop-
erty in a manner indicating that she knew what she was doing." Id. at 534, 285 N.W.2d at
622. And the lawyer who drafted the agreement and supervised its execution thought she
understood the transaction. Id. at 531, 285 N.W.2d at 621.
273. Three witnesses testified that the property was worth substantially more than
the contract price: one broker thought it was worth $39,750 and another appraised it at
$65,000; an auctioneer and appraiser set its value at $41,000. Id. at 528, 285 N.W.2d at
620. And Leona Nennig testified that after she signed the contract a neighbor offered her
$65,000. Id. at 524, 285 N.W.2d at 618. On the other hand, both the acceleration clause
and Norman Nennig's promise to supply her with food for the rest of her life provided her
with benefits above and beyond the contract price. Id.
274. Id. at 520, 285 N.W.2d at 616.
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the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed.2 75 The supreme court's
explanation focused squarely on the relationship between the
parties:
[Leona] wanted to give Norman the first chance to buy the farm
because he had worked it so long, had done her personal favors,
and . . . at the time, his children were the principal benefi-
ciaries under her will. The evidence also indicates that the price
and interest rates, while low, were of her own choosing because
she felt that Norman could afford to purchase the farm at those
terms and that price, and that the acceleration clause and her
other resources would enable her to get along, particularly in
view of the agreement for Norman to furnish her with meat and
vegetables for the rest of her life .2 6
In short, the transaction made sense in the context of the relation-
ship. Other courts have maintained the same approach in cases of
alleged incapacity to contract.2 7
The method of analysis exemplified by Cyrus and Nennig ef-
fectively refutes the commentators' criticisms. First, in neither
case did the court seek the aid of expert testimony regarding the
relevant relationship.278 While an occasional decision in the family
or social context turns on psychiatric testimony, the testimony sel-
dom, if ever, addresses the nature of a relationship per se.279 In
275. Id. at 534-35, 285 N.W.2d at 623.
276. Id.
277. See, e.g., Anderson v. Anderson, 399 So. 2d 831, 835 (Ala. 1981)(upholding
sale of real estate to family member who was closer to the seller than were the parties
challenging the transaction); Simmons First Nat'l Bank v. Luzader, 246 Ark. 302, 438
S.W.2d 25 (1969)(discussed supra text accompanying notes 19-35); Interdiction of Burns,
486 So. 2d 977 (La. Ct. App. 198 6) (invalidating sale of real estate to nephew in absence of
close relationship).
278. In neither case was psychiatric testimony regarding the nature of the relevant
relationship offered by a party and rejected by the court. The fact that neither court sought
expert testimony on that issue is nevertheless significant, since at times courts emphasize
that expert testimony would be of assistance. For example, in Simmons Nat'l Bank v.
Luzader, 246 Ark. 302, 309, 438 S.W.2d 25, 29 (1969), the court emphasized the absence
of any medical testimony of incapacity (without, however, relating medical testimony to
relational considerations).
279. In Lindsey v. Lindsey, 369 N.W.2d 26 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), modified, 388
N.W.2d 713 (Minn. 1986), a former wife sought to invalidate a stipulation to which she
had agreed in the process of her divorce. She argued that mental illness deprived her of
capacity to enter into the stipulation, and the court agreed:
To deny relief here would be to create an unconscionable result. The unimpeach-
able fact remains that respondent's severe mental illness for a period of years
prior to and at the time of the original decree rendered her incapable of under-
standing the agreements she was signing. Her subsequent bouts with debilitating
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most cases, courts assess human interactions without expert
assistance."' 0
Second, neither Cyrus nor Nennig reflects rigid judicial ad-
herence to traditional family values. Both courts were more inter-
ested in the quality of the relevant relationships than in whether
the parties were members of the same family. Mrs. Adkins was
evidently unrelated to the Tharps and the Nennig court did not
emphasize Leona Nennig's rather remote family relationship with
Norman Nennig. Courts are, of course, willing to recognize the
importance of family ties.21x Yet in the capacity cases family
members do not always prevail over friends.28 2 Nor do the courts
invariably define families,28 3 or rank inter-family relationships,284
depression corresponded to any legal proceeding associated with the dissolution.
369 N.W.2d at 29. The only testimony the appellate court cited was that of the former
wife's psychiatrist. Id. at 28. The doctor, however, did not address the nature of her mar-
riage. Id. On appeal, the state supreme court modified the decision without disturbing the
appellate court's finding on the issue of capacity. Lindsey v. Lindsey, 388 N.W.2d 713, 716
(Minn. 1986).
In Coleman v. Coleman, 681 P.2d 1269 (Utah 1984), a psychologist described a party
to a divorce as deeply depressed but able to "continue her demanding employment and to
make day-to-day decisions." Id. at 1270. The party's family physician expressed essentially
the same opinion. Id. The court cited the doctors' testimony in support of its conclusion
that the party was competent to enter into the property settlement that became part of her
divorce. Id. at 1271. Neither doctor's testimony related to her relationship with her former
husband.
A divorce stipulation, of course, differs from most family and social transactions in
that it represents part of the process of ending many if not all aspects of the relationship.
That process tends to be much more adversarial than the negotiations that result in most
family and social agreements. Despite the heightened emphasis on bargaining, however, a
stipulation is clearly not a discrete business transaction. It is responsive to the history of the
relationship and it may contemplate continuing cooperation in some matters, such as rais-
ing children.
280. See, e.g., Neal v. Jackson, 2 Ark. App. 14, 616 S.W.2d 746 (1981); Estate of
Ferling v. Abernathy, 670 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
281. See, e.g., Simmons First Nat'l Bank v. Luzader, 246 Ark. 302, 312, 438
S.W.2d 25, 31 (1969)(discussed supra text accompanying notes 19-35).
282. See, e.g., Rose v. Dunn, 284 Ark. 42, 679 S.W.2d 180 (1984)(deed to neighbor
upheld despite challenge by heirs); Estate of Ferling v. Abernathy, 670 S.W.2d 109 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1984)(addition of friend's name to bank account upheld despite challenge by
family member); McSpadden v. Mahoney, 431 P.2d 432 (Okla. 1967)(inter vivos gift to
close friend upheld despite challenge by family members).
283. In Neal v. Jackson, 2 Ark. App. 14, 616 S.W.2d 746 (1981), Albert Neal and
his wife, Mary Neal, conveyed certain real estate to their neighbor and friend, Cleo Jack-
son. They also executed wills under which Jackson was the principal beneficiary. David
Neal, who was almost certainly Albert Neal's illegitimate son, sued Jackson claiming that
Albert Neal lacked the capacity to transfer the property and that he was unduly influ-
enced. The trial court upheld the deed, but the court of appeals reversed on both issues.
The appellate court treated the wills and the deed as constituting essentially one transac-
tion in favor of Jackson. It noted that Albert and Mary Neal "gave David their name and
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by reference to traditional criteria. Judges do not insist that inter
vivos dispositions of property replicate the intestacy laws.
Third, in Cyrus and Nennig the courts assessed the allegedly
close relationships by relatively objective criteria. Both cases in-
volved relationships of long standing. Mrs. Adkins had known the
Tharps for many years, and Leona Nennig had known her cousin
all her life. The length of the relationship suggested in each case
that the transaction was indeed consonant with the alleged incom-
petent's basic values. Courts generally grant greater recognition to
relationships that have persisted over time than to those of lesser
duration.285
treated him as a son." Id. at 19, 616 S.W.2d at 748. And it observed that the transaction
in favor of Jackson was inappropriate in light of that relationship:
The disposition of this property made by Albert Neal in his will was not a
natural one. David Neal was Albert's natural son, and had been treated as a son
by both Albert and Mary. They had sufficient love for him in 1971, at a time
when Albert was 86 years old, to deed to him the one-half acre upon which their
home was located, describing David in the deed as their grandson, and in 1974,
when Albert was 89 years old, they built a new brick home on David's land.
Until about December 1, 1975, soon after Mary Neal suffered her first stroke,
there was no evidence of disharmony in the family.
Id. at 25-26, 616 S.W.2d at 752.
284. In Greathouse v. Vosburgh, 19 I11. 2d 555, 169 N.E.2d 97 (1960), Myrtle Wie-
nold, who was over seventy years old, married Ira Vosburgh, who was in his early forties.
Shortly before she married him, Wienold deeded a parcel of real estate to him; soon after
the marriage she placed other properties that she owned in their names as joint tenants.
Less than four months after the marriage, she died. Id. at 557, 169 N.E.2d at 98.
The parties had known each other for some years and Vosburgh had furnished assis-
tance to Wienold, whose health was precarious in the months preceding the marriage. Id.
at 558-59, 169 N.E.2d at 99. After her death, her siblings and descendants of deceased
siblings sued to invalidate the marriage and the deeds, alleging among other things that she
lacked capacity. Id. at 558, 169 N.E.2d at 98. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit.
Id. at 557, 169 N.E.2d at 98. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, id. at 574, 169 N.E.2d
at 107, rejecting the argument that the marriage was inappropriate:
Although the briefs of counsel have variously described this marriage as
"unnatural" or "uncommon," we believe that the marriage is more properly gen-
erally described as a marriage between a wealthy 72-year-old widow dying of
cancer and a 42-year-old man who had been a family friend, who had lived in
her home prior to the marriage, who had administered narcotics to her upon a
doctor's prescription and recommendation, who had performed duties for her
under a general power of attorney prepared by her attorney at her request, and
who had consulted with her on various business matters.
Id. at 567, 169 N.E.2d at 103.
In Columbia Say. & Loan v. Carpenter, 33 Colo. App. 360, 521 P.2d 1299 (1974),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Judkins v. Carpenter, 189 Colo. 95, 537 P.2d 737 (1975),
the court upheld a gift to the donor's granddaughter while the granddaughter's parent was
still living, reversing a trial court's finding of incapacity.
285. Compare Greathouse v. Vosburgh, 19 I11. 2d 555, 169 N.E.2d 97 (1960)(up-
holding inter vivos gifts to friend of long standing) (discussed supra note 284) and McSpad-
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Moreover, in both Cyrus and Nennig the stronger party had
furnished economic benefits to the weaker party. In each case, one
of the terms of the transaction was essentially that the more capa-
ble party would continue to provide economic benefits in the fu-
ture. Thus neither case turned solely on emotional considerations.
Rather, the overall dynamic that the courts described incorpo-
rated an important element of economic exchange.286 In general,
courts are more inclined to enforce challenged transactions if that
factor is present.287
b. Incapacity and Undue Influence
The nature of the relationships described in Cyrus and Nen-
nig holds the key to a fundamental continuity between incapacity
in the family and social cases, on the one hand, and undue influ-
ence on the other hand.288 In both Cyrus and Nennig, the courts'
den v. Mahoney, 431 P.2d 432 (Okla. 1967)(facts similar to those in Greathouse) with
Costello v. Costello, 186 N.W.2d 651 (Iowa 1971)(invalidating sale to nephew in absence
of evidence of longstanding relationship) and Interdiction of Burns, 486 So. 2d 977 (La.
Ct. App. 1986)(facts similar to those in Costello) and Jackson v. Henninger, 482 S.W.2d
323 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972)(invalidating deeds to niece in absence of evidence of longstand-
ing relationship).
286. For discussion of the applicability of social exchange theory, encompassing both
economic and noneconomic components, to the marriage relation, see Shultz, supra note
77, at 255-61. For discussion of gifts as exchanges, see Baron, supra note 80.
287. Compare Greathouse v. Vosburgh, 19 III. 2d 555, 169 N.E.2d 97 (1960)(up-
holding inter vivos gifts to stronger party who had furnished services)(discussed supra note
284) and McSpadden v. Mahoney, 431 P.2d 432 (Okla. 1967)(facts similar to those in
Greathouse) with Costello v. Costello, 186 N.W.2d 651 (Iowa 1971)(invalidating sale to
nephew in absence of any evidence that he had furnished benefits) and Jackson v. Hen-
ninger, 482 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972)(invalidating deeds to niece in absence of
any evidence that she had furnished benefits).
288. Traditional theory recognizes, of course, that incapacity and undue influence
are related concepts; evidence of impaired capacity is probative of susceptibility to influ-
ence. Green, Fraud, supra note 36, at 191-93. One whose capacity is diminished is likely to
be unusually dependent on others in many ways. Yet Green notes that the weight of au-
thority holds that the concepts are distinct: undue influence, unlike incapacity, involves a
relation of dependence and a substitution of the dominant party's will for that of the de-
pendent party. Id. at 190.
Green argues that the courts are willing to blur the traditional distinction for the sake
of invalidating unfair transactions. Id. at 204-05; Green, Proof, supra note 36, at 307.
Thus in some cases "a partial showing of undue influence plus a partial showing of mental
incompetency creates a composite ground for avoiding the transaction." Green, Fraud,
supra note 36, at 196. Yet Green does not emphasize the common relational thread run-
ning through the capacity cases involving close relationships and the undue influence
decisions.
Eisenberg does not discuss the possible connection between the two concepts. He ac-
knowledges the relational nature of undue influence, Eisenberg, supra note 85, at 774-75,
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narratives described interactions that involved trust. Mrs. Adkins
and Leona Nennig knew that they could rely on their transac-
tional partners not to engage in exploitation. In each case, any
donative element in the transaction was appropriate in light of
that confidence. The Tharps and Norman Nennig no doubt exer-
cised considerable influence over their partners, but the influence
was warranted. 89 The relationships were confidential in the best
sense of the term.
Many cases, however, involve relationships that are confiden-
tial in a less than ideal sense - ties that are characterized by
either forced dependence or unwarranted trust. These relation-
ships generally lack either longstanding mutual affection or sub-
stantial economic exchange, or both. The result often is that any
potential finding of incapacity is either displaced or buttressed by
a finding of undue influence. 90 The confidential nature of a close
relationship generates a presumption of undue influence that the
stronger party is unable to rebut. Evidence of disability is proba-
tive of susceptibility to influence rather than, or in addition to,
incapacity.
The analytical continuity is evident in two cases that reach
opposite results on the issue of undue influence. In Davis v.
Pitti,291 the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's can-
which he views as "a special case of unfair persuasion." Id. at 799. He also suggests a
possible link between unfair persuasion and incapacity by defining the former as "the use
of bargaining methods that seriously impair the free and competent exercise of judgment
and produce a state of acquiescence that the promisee knows or should know is likely to be
highly transitory." Id. at 773-74 (emphasis added)(footnotes omitted). Yet his view of the
process of common law adjudication leads him to exclude relation-oriented norms from his
analytical structure. See supra notes 152-57 and accompanying text. His argument implies
that he would by no means emphasize the relational connection between the two concepts.
Although many undue influence cases arise out of transactions between parties to close
relationships, courts also employ the concept in other contexts. See, e.g., Odorizzi v. Bloom-
field School Dist., 246 Cal. App. 2d 123, 54 Cal. Rptr. 522 (1966)(employer-employee
relationship); Pace v. McEwen, 574 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978)(stockbroker-client
relationship).
289. Thus there was no impropriety in Norman Nennig's effort to persuade his
cousin to sell him her farm for less than its fair market value. First Nat'l Bank v. Nennig,
92 Wis. 2d 518, 538-39, 285 N.W.2d 614, 624 (1979). As the court put it in McSpadden
v. Mahoney, 431 P.2d 432 (Okla. 1967), "[i]t is perhaps unnecessary to state that 'influ-
ences' arising from affection and kindness are natural and lawful and do not render a gift
voidable." Id. at 438.
290. Indeed, at least one court has gone so far as to state that the two concepts can
be functionally indistinguishable. Rose v. Dunn, 284 Ark. 42, 45, 679 S.W.2d 180, 182
(1984)("The question of undue influence and mental capacity . . . are so closely interwo-
ven that they are considered together.").
291. 472 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. 1971).
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cellation of a deed on the basis of undue influence. 9 2 The grantor,
Joseph Stallone, was seventy-four years old when he conveyed a
four-family apartment building in St. Louis to one of his four
daughters and her husband.29 3 The daughter, Ann Pitti, had had
little contact with her father during the years preceding the con-
veyance. Agnes Davis, another daughter, had lived at home and
contributed financially to the household much of the time. Even
when she lived elsewhere, Agnes Davis had frequently visited her
father.294
Ann Pitti and her husband, however, saw Stallone frequently
during his last illness, and were in constant contact with him
around the time of the conveyance.295 In affirming the trial court's
judgment, the supreme court emphasized Stallone's relationships
with his daughters:
We are persuaded particularly by the following facts: . . . that
the transfers of this and all [Stallone's] other property were
wholly inconsistent with his regard throughout the years for his
other daughters and particularly for Agnes; that as Agnes testi-
fied, he "changed overnight;" . . . that [Ann and her husband]
had paid little attention to [Stallone] through the years until
March, 1969. . . and that [Ann and her husband] did not even
notify [Agnes and the other two daughters] that [Stallone] was
in the hospital until three or four days after he entered.2"'
Stallone's relationship with Ann Pitti, in contrast to his relation-
ship with Agnes Davis, was characterized by neither longstanding
affection nor substantial economic exchange, and thus failed to
justify the conveyance.
292. Id. at 389.
293. Id. at 383.
294. The court elaborated as follows:
Agnes, the youngest [child], stayed at home until she married about 1949. In
the meantime, she had been working for 10 years and either turned her
paycheck over to her father . . . or, as in later years, paid board. For 20 years
thereafter she saw him two or three times a week. There is considerable evidence
to indicate that [Stallone] regarded and treated Agnes as his favorite daughter
until very shortly before his death.
Id.
295. Ann and her husband moved Stallone into their home on May 14, 1969. They
discouraged contact between him and his three other daughters thereafter. On July 2,
1969, Stallone conveyed the apartment building to himself and Ann as joint tenants. The
transaction was completed at about 5:15 p.m. Later that night, Ann and her husband
checked Stallone into the hospital for the final time. He died on July 15, 1969. Id. 384-85.
296. Id. at 388-89.
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In Eslick v. Montgomery,"' on the other hand, the Appellate
Court for the Second District of Illinois upheld a trial court find-
ing that an eighty-one year old mother's creation of a joint ten-
ancy in her farm with one of her children was not the result of
undue influence.298 The mother, Dolly Montgomery, suffered from
poor eyesight and hearing, diabetes, and hardening of the arteries,
and at times her mind wandered. Although she "enjoyed harmoni-
ous relations with all of her children," '299 George Montgomery, the
child to whom she deeded the real estate, lived with her on the
farm and helped care for her.300 According to her other children,
George was born a female and christened "Maxine. 30' 1 Dolly
Montgomery referred to him as "Maxine" when not in his pres-
ence, but in his presence deferred to his wish to be known as
"George. "302
When Dolly Montgomery executed the deed, she explained to
the lawyer who prepared the documents that George Montgomery
had been working the farm and taking care of her.30 3 Her other
children claimed after her death that her willingness to acquiesce
in his "ambivalent sexual identity . . . established proof of [his]
long continued control . . . over [her] mind and thought processes
... amounting to undue influence. 30 4 The court rejected the
claim:
The fact that [Dolly], who lived with and depended on George
for daily assistance, chose to treat George as a male, thus
preventing acrimony in the household and not forcing a confron-
tation with her child, is not evidence that [Dolly] participated in
the world of unreality out of fear or coercion such as would viti-
297. 3 I1l. App. 3d 447, 278 N.E.2d 412 (1972).
298. Id. at 449, 278 N.E.2d at 414 (the trial court's finding of no undue influence
was "fully supported by the record").
299. Id. at 450, 278 N.E.2d at 414.
300. Id. at 449, 278 N.E.2d at 414.
301. The court did not resolve the issue of George's gender:
The complaint named "Maxine Montgomery, a/k/a George Montgomery" as
defendant. Plaintiffs' counsel and various of the witnesses have used the name
"Maxine" and the feminine pronoun in referring to the defendant; while defend-
ant's counsel and other witnesses have used "George," and the masculine pro-
noun. For convenience, we adopted defendant's usage.
Id. at 449 n.l, 278 N.E.2d at 414 n.l.
302. Id. at 450, 278 N.E.2d at 414. "George testified he was always known as
'George.'" Id.
303. Id. at 450-51, 278 N.E.2d at 415.
304. Id. at 452, 278 N.E.2d at 416.
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ate free will.305
Although Dolly Montgomery "participated in [a] world of unreal-
ity" she did so for reasons that made sense in light of her relation-
ship with her child - a relationship of longstanding mutual affec-
tion that involved substantial economic exchange.306
Davis and Eslick, then, illustrate a basic continuity between
the family and social cases decided under the rubric of capacity
and those decided under the heading of undue influence. 07 The
cases often involve allegations of both incapacity and undue influ-
ence, and a more or less standard form of relational analysis con-
tributes substantially to the resolution of each issue.30
Future capacity and undue influence cases will involve in-
creasing numbers of unconventional family arrangements and
friendships. One consequence of the spread of AIDS, for example,
may well be an increase in inter vivos transactions between homo-
sexual lovers, one of whom is critically ill.309 As social patterns
continue to change, judges must maintain a high degree of sensi-
tivity to genuinely important relationships even where those rela-
tionships are at odds with convention. Courts must also be pre-
pared to apply principles developed in the family and social
context to other transactions, such as charitable subscriptions,
that properly involve consciousness of interdependence but not
necessarily of close relationships.310 On the whole, the cases de-
305. Id.
306. George Montgomery's economic contribution to his mother's welfare was evi-
dently considerably greater than that of his siblings. According to the court, Dolly Mont-
gomery's other children "visited her with varying regularity, from weekly visits to semian-
nual or annual visits . . . . The children made very nominal contributions of food and
money during the course of these visits." Id. at 450, 278 N.E.2d at 414.
307. There are, of course, some differences between the cases decided under the two
headings. Some of the undue influence cases, for example, involve a degree of judicial dis-
approval of the stronger party's conduct that the capacity cases generally do not reflect.
See, e.g., Pace v. McEwen, 574 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978)(upholding an award of
exemplary damages against a party who exercised undue influence). Moreover, the capac-
ity cases do not always display the straightforward form of relational analysis that the
concept of undue influence mandates.
308. See, e.g., Neal v. Jackson, 2 Ark. App. 14, 616 S.W.2d 746 (1981)(discussed
supra note 283); Greathouse v. Vosburgh, 19 Ill. 2d 555, 169 N.E.2d 97 (1960)(discussed
supra note 284); Estate of Ferling v. Abernathy, 670 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984);
First Nat'l Bank v. Nennig, 92 Wis. 2d 518, 285 N.W.2d 614 (1979)(discussed supra
notes 266-76 and accompanying text).
309. The parties may enter into an inter vivos transaction in an effort to forestall a
will contest. For a report that will contests involving AIDS are increasingly common, see
Johnson, AIDS Victims' Wills Under Attack, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1987, at BI, col. 2.
310. Charitable subscriptions are often based on a mixture of tax considerations and
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cided to date represent an encouraging start on the road to a sen-
sitive and reasoned elaboration of the concept of relational
capacity.311
generosity. The generosity, however, is not that of the family or the close friendship.
Rather, it reflects, in Erikson's terms, an awareness of mankind beyond the group that
"counts" in the subscriber's life. E. ERIKSON, supra note 95, at 52. Yet certain of the
norms that relate to capacity and fairness in the family context also bear on the charitable
subscription. For example, in Board of Regents v. Davis, 14 Cal. 3d 33, 533 P.2d 1047, 120
Cal. Rptr. 407 (1975), the California Supreme Court held that the existence of a conserva-
torship per se did not deprive an elderly donor of the capacity to make a pledge to his alma
mater (the court's views regarding the consequences of conservatorship for capacity are
discussed infra notes 352-60 and accompanying text). Although the court merely remanded
the case for trial, it noted that the university was prepared to prove that the pledge was (1)
not improvident in light of the donor's large estate, and (2) reasonable in light of his "long
and friendly association with the university." Davis, 14 Cal. 3d at 43 n.15, 533 P.2d at
1054 n.15, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 414 n.15.
311. Eisenberg might argue that a study based primarily upon appellate opinions
cannot prove that the courts' assessments of relationships are accurate. While this point is
well taken, the fact that the courts engage in relational analysis in capacity cases - as in
divorce cases, see supra text at note 159 - suggests that the burden is on critics rather
than on advocates of a relational approach.
Danzig's treatment of Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement Bd., 25 N.Y.2d 196, 250
N.E.2d 460, 303 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1969), sheds some light on the New York Court of Ap-
peals' assessment of a marriage. The holding was based in part on the court's impression
that the couple, Mr. and Mrs. Ortelere, were "happily married" for approximately thirty-
nine years.
After his wife's death, Mr. Ortelere described their marriage as happy: "I had 40
years the most happiest life a man could have." R. DANZIG, supra note 198, at 174. In
recent years, Erik Erikson, Joan Erikson, and Helen Kivnick conducted interviews with
twenty-nine octogenarians who had been subjects of an extended "life-historical" study in
Berkeley, California. E. ERIKSON, J. ERIKSON & H. KIVNICK, VITAL INVOLVEMENT IN OLD
AGE 7 (1986). The octogenarians almost all described their marriages in terms similar to
Mr. Ortelere's. Yet in reviewing the files of the life-historical study the authors found "va-
rious suggestions . . . of earlier-life marital difficulties and dissatisfactions." Id. at 110.
They speculate that for some elderly people "integrating a sense of love across the whole
life cycle may involve the reevaluating and recasting of earlier experiences to such an ex-
tent that these experiences become unrecognizable to the outsider." Id. at 110-11. This
suggests that Mr. Ortelere's recollection may not have been entirely accurate.
However, Erikson, Erikson, and Kivnick write that, for most of the couples they inter-
viewed, the retrospective view represented integration rather than self-deception:
[S]incere affection and good natured patience often made possible marriages
that weathered their stormy beginnings and proved, ultimately, to be mutually
satisfying and enduring. As they seek to reintegrate qualities of fondness, affec-
tion, and sexuality into a lifelong sense of love, the elders in our study are able to
pass over short-lived early difficulties and to focus, instead, on a long lifetime of
marital satisfaction.
Id. at 112-13. Moreover, Mr. Ortelere gave up his job to care for his wife full-time for
approximately the last fifteen months of her life, R. DANZIG, supra note 198, at 169, and
neither the transcript nor the opinion provides any substantial evidence that the marriage
was unhappy.
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3. The Fiduciary Principle
Many capacity cases involve contracts between fiduciaries
and their allegedly incompetent entrustors. Despite the increasing
social importance of fiduciary relations,312 the presence of a fiduci-
ary does not create a separate social context. Rather, it introduces
fiduciary principles into either a business context or a family or
social context.3 13 In general, those principles mandate a high stan-
dard of substantive fairness 1 4 and a requirement of complete
312. Frankel, supra note 79, at 801-02.
313. Of course, the mere existence of the fiduciary relation means that the transac-
tion is not discrete. Yet as a legal construct the fiduciary relation is relatively impersonal.
Frankel notes that the entrustor need not prove actual reliance on or trust in the fiduciary
in order to be entitled to the benefits of the relation. The delegation of power to the fiduci-
ary, rather than the attitude of the entrustor, creates the obligation. Fiduciary relations
thus differ from the confidential relationships courts frequently find in family and social
settings, which do involve actual reliance. Frankel, supra note 79, at 825 n.100. In Mac-
Neil's terminology, fiduciary relations per se do not involve the whole person and are not
unlimited in scope, although they may be unique and nontransferable. See I. MAcNEIL,
supra note 4, at 13 (ascribing those qualities to personal relations).
The fiduciary construct, however, serves a wide variety of purposes, see, e.g., Frankel,
supra note 79, at 795-96, in both business and family or social contexts. For example,
contracts between lawyers and wards or conservatees are often relatively discrete transac-
tions. In In re Estate of Bradshaw, 606 P.2d 578 (Okla. 1980), a lawyer sought to recover
for services rendered in connection with an accounting and with the ward's effort to obtain
a restoration to capacity. Id. at 579. There was no indication that the relationship between
the ward and the lawyer had any important personal dimension. A restoration to capacity
would probably have affected the ward's closest relationships, but there was no proof that
her chance of success in the restoration proceeding was affected by her employment of the
particular lawyer involved in the case.
In Breaux v. Allied Bank, 699 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. Civ. App. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 638 (1988), an attorney sued to recover for services rendered to a party who was under
limited guardianship. There was no evidence of a personal or other important relationship
between the attorney and the ward. The services for which the attorney sought to recover
may have included defense of the ward's competence to decide where to live and whether to
marry. Id. at 602. While those decisions were obviously highly personal, there was no evi-
dence that the ward's ability to make them depended upon her employment of the attorney.
The contract therefore did not necessarily implicate any important relationships.
On the other hand, the fiduciary and the entrustor may have a close or even an inti-
mate relationship. This is particularly common in cases in which relatives or family mem-
bers serve as guardians or conservators. See, e.g., Beavers v. Weatherly, 250 Ga. 546, 299
S.E.2d 730 (1983)(nephew appointed as guardian); In re Estate of Bechtold, 150 N.J.
Super. 550, 376 A.2d 211 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977), aff'd, 156 N.J. Super. 194, 383
A.2d 742 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978)(sister who instituted incompetency proceeding
later appointed as guardian). The relationship may militate either in favor of enforceability
of a transaction between the fiduciary and the entrustor or against it. A gift from the ward
to the guardian, for example, may be fair in light of assistance provided gratuitously by the
guardian over a period of many years and before the establishment of the guardianship.
The same gift may be unfair if assistance was provided not by the guardian but by others.
314. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
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comprehension by entrustors.3 16 Courts should therefore find it
easy to release allegedly incompetent entrustors from the conse-
quences of their contractual and donative choices.
Most of the cases are indeed resolved in favor of the entrus-
tors and against the fiduciaries. In some instances, judges apply
fiduciary principles appropriately.16 In other instances, however,
the courts' protective approach produces a distorted analysis. In
the future, courts must apply fiduciary principles in a more open
and discriminating fashion.
The cases tend to involve either parties who are under judi-
cially supervised protection or beneficiaries of life insurance poli-
cies or pensions. In cases involving wards or conservatees, courts
often engage in little or no discussion of fiduciary principles. The
analysis turns instead on the traditional rule that declared incom-
petents can neither contract nor make valid gifts.3 17 The rule is
315. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
316. For example, in Pace v. McEwen, 574 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), the
appellate court upheld a trial court judgment that invalidated large gifts by an elderly
widow to her stockbroker and awarded $150,000 in exemplary damages to her estate. The
appellate court reversed the trial court's finding that the widow was incompetent, id. at
799-800, but affirmed the rulings that she did not intend to make the gifts and that the
stockbroker had exerted undue influence over her. Id. at 797-99. In the process, the appel-
late court made it clear that the stockbroker's fiduciary obligation gave him a heavy bur-
den on the issues of capacity and substantive fairness:
A gift between persons occupying confidential relations toward each other
is, if its validity is attacked, always jealously scrutinized by a court of equity,
and unless found to have been [consented to] freely, voluntarily, and with a full
understanding of the facts, [is invalid].
Improvidence of the donor may be considered, with other evidence, as tend-
ing to establish undue influence or abuse of a confidential or fiduciary relation-
ship so as to make a gift invalid. It has been held that if, at the time of the gift,
the donor's mind has been enfeebled by age and disease, even though not to the
extent of producing mental unsoundness, and the donor acted without indepen-
dent advice, such gift being of a large portion or all of the donor's estate and
operating substantially to deprive those having a natural claim to the donor's
bounty of all benefit from the donor's estate, these circumstances, if proved and
unexplained, will authorize a finding that the gift is void, through undue influ-
ence, without proof of specific acts and conduct of the donee. Improvidence may
also be a factor in the determination of the mental capacity of the donor to make
a gift.
Id. at 798-99 (quoting 38 AM. JuR. 2D Gifts § 36 (1968)). The broker failed to show that
the gifts were fair and that the widow understood the transactions. 574 S.W.2d at 799.
317. See, e.g., Beavers v. Weatherly, 250 Ga. 546, 299 S.E.2d 730 (1983)(ward's
deed to her guardian held invalid); In re Estate of Bechtold, 150 N.J. Super. 550, 376 A.2d
211 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977), affd, 156 N.J. Super. 194, 383 A.2d 742 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978)(deed by ward to his guardian held invalid); In re Estate of
Bradshaw, 606 P.2d 578 (Okla. 1980)(contract between incompetent and attorney declared
invalid); Breaux v. Allied Bank, 699 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. Civ. App. 1985)(facts similar to
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arbitrary and inappropriate. 1 In most cases, fiduciary principles
furnish a preferable basis for the same result by imposing upon
the fiduciary the burden of demonstrating either informed consent
or substantive fairness, or both. 1
In cases involving pension or life insurance benefits,320 how-
those in Bradshaw).
318. The theoretical basis for the rule is discussed supra notes 107-10 and accompa-
nying text. Its application is discussed infra notes 336-76 and accompanying text.
319. See Frankel, supra note 79, at 819 n.75. The narratives in the cases typically
suggest that the fiduciaries would be unable to meet the burden. For example, in Beavers v.
Weatherly, 250 Ga. 546, 299 S.E.2d 730 (1983). the ward conveyed property to her
nephew, then her guardian, apparently without consideration. He then sold the property to
a third party. Id. at 546-47, 299 S.E.2d at 731-32. At no point did he seek court approval
for his actions, and his tenure as guardian ended when he was removed for failure to make
returns. Id. at 546, 299 S.E.2d at 731.
In In re Estate of Bechtold, 150 N.J. Super. 550, 376 A.2d 211 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1977), affd, 156 N.J. Super. 194, 383 A.2d 742 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978), the
ward conveyed his home to his sister, then his guardian, for no consideration. She had
initiated the incompetency proceeding that led to the guardianship and had probably called
as a witness a doctor who testified that the ward was and would remain totally incompe-
tent. Id. at 553-54, 376 A.2d at 213.
In Breaux v. Allied Bank, 699 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. Civ. App. 1985), a lawyer provided a
client with estate planning services. Approximately one month later, the client became ill
and the lawyer prepared an application requesting that the probate court appoint a relative
as her temporary guardian. The application stated that the ward was "unable to handle
day-to-day affairs, care for herself, or to do those things necessary to protect and preserve
her property." Id. at 601. The probate court appointed the relative as temporary guardian,
after which the lawyer allegedly furnished additional services, for which she then sought
payment on the basis of a contract with the ward.
Even if the transactions in these cases were substantively fair, the courts would proba-
bly have received evidence of informed consent with great skepticism.
The fiduciary principle unquestionably applies to transactions between protected per-
sons and their guardians or conservators. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 79, at 795. In
Breaux, however, the attorney who claimed to have contracted with the ward for legal
services was neither the ward's guardian nor her conservator. Frankel notes that courts
generally treat contracts establishing fiduciary relations as arm's length transactions. Fran-
kel, supra note 79, at 819. This suggests that the lawyer in Breaux had no fiduciary obliga-
tion in negotiating for fees. There may have been a pre-existing attorney-client relation-
ship, however, resulting from the estate planning services and, perhaps, from the lawyer's
participation in the guardianship proceeding. Moreover, in negotiating a fee with a pro-
spective client, an attorney has duties of both disclosure, see generally C. WOLFRAM, MOD-
ERN LEGAL ETHICS § 9.3.1, at 514-15 (1986), and substantive fairness. Id. at 516-18.
320. Pension and life insurance arrangements involve, in Frankel's terminology, both
specialization and pooling. See Frankel, supra note 79, at 803-04. Arrangements that have
those characteristics pose the problem of potential abuse of delegated power, id., and thus
merit treatment as fiduciary. For general discussion of the fiduciary obligations of pension
systems under federal law, see S. BRUCE, PENSION CLAIMS RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 299-
307 (1988).
According to Couch, the relation between insurer and insured is not that of trustee
and beneficiary. G. COUCH, COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 23:11, at 785
(1984). Nevertheless, an insurer has an obligation to protect the interests of the insured:
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ever, the courts at times engage in unsound analysis of either ca-
pacity or substantive fairness in order to further their protective
policy. This tendency is well illustrated by Ortelere v. Teachers'
Retirement Board,2 1 in which the New York Court of Appeals
strongly suggested that a teacher's election of pension benefits was
invalid.322 The court was clearly influenced by fiduciary principles:
Nor should one ignore that in the relationship between re-
tirement system and member, and especially in a public system,
there is not involved a commercial, let alone an ordinary com-
mercial, transaction. Instead the nature of the system and its
announced goal is the protection of its members and those in
whom its members have an interest. It is not a sound scheme
which would permit 40 years of contribution and participation in
the system to be nullified by a one-instant act committed by one
known to be mentally ill. This is especially true if there would
be no substantial harm to the system if the act were avoided . 23
The court should have rejected as irrelevant the thought that in-
validating the election would result in "no substantial harm" to
the retirement system,324 and the opinion relates no evidence that
the teacher's choice was either actuarially unsound or unwise in
light of her health.32 5 Moreover, the court's impression of the
[I]nsurance policies are contracts of the utmost good faith and must be adminis-
tered and performed as such by the insurer. Good faith demands that the insurer
deal with laymen as laymen and not as experts in the subtleties of law and un-
derwriting. Particularly where the language expressing the extent of the cover-
age may be deceptive to the ordinary layman, there is an implied covenant in
insurance contracts of good faith and fair dealing and that the insurer will not
do anything to injure the right of its policyholder to receive the benefits of his
contract.
Id.
321. 25 N.Y.2d 196, 250 N.E.2d 460, 303 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1969). The decision's con-
siderable reputation stems from the court's treatment of the issue of mental illness. See
supra notes 188-99 and accompanying text.
322. The election deprived the teacher's husband of the benefit of her contributions
to the pension system. Ortelere, 25 N.Y.2d at 199, 250 N.E.2d at 462, 303 N.Y.S.2d at
364.
323. Id. at 205-06, 250 N.E.2d at 466, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 370.
324. Id. at 206, 250 N.E.2d at 466, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 370. Also irrelevant was the
court's observation that "there are no significant changes of position by the system other
than those that flow from the barest actuarial consequences of benefit selection." Id. at
205, 250 N.E.2d at 466, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 370.
325. Although the teacher died soon after making her election, the court's reasoning
makes sense only if she was or should have been aware of her diminished life expectancy.
If, as Judge Jason argued in dissent, she had no reason to think she would die soon, then
the higher monthly payment was a reasonable choice. The excerpts from the transcript
reprinted in R. DANZIG, supra note 198, contain no clear evidence of her awareness of her
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teacher's capacity was based in large part on its view that the
election was foolish. 26 Yet as Judge Jason pointed out in dissent,
her choice may have made sense in light of her family's financial
circumstances.3 2 7  The court's determination to protect the
teacher's husband from the consequences of her election thus led
to flawed analyses of both substantive fairness and capacity.32
In a 1986 decision,329 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court up-
held an alleged incompetent's selection of retirement benefits.330
However, three courts have reached opposite results in cases in-
volving surrender of life insurance policies3 31 or release of health
imminent death, yet she may have feared it. Her psychiatrist testified that she regretted
the election after making it, id. at 190, which suggests that as of then she was afraid that
she might die soon.
326. The election deprived the teacher's husband of the benefits of her contribution
to the retirement fund. Ortelere, 25 N.Y.2d at 200, 250 N.E.2d at 462-63, 303 N.Y.S.2d
at 365. The court concluded that she was probably psychotic:
On the record none may gainsay that her selection of [benefits] while under
psychiatric care, ill with cerebral arteriosclerosis, aged 60, and with a family in
which she had always manifested concern, was so unwise and foolhardy that a
fact finder might conclude that it was explainable only as a product of psychosis.
Id. at 206, 250 N.E.2d at 466, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 370.
327. Id. at 207-08, 250 N.E.2d at 467, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 372.
328. Federal law now protects certain surviving spouses directly. If a pension plan is
subject to the Employment Retirement Income Security Act, the participant's spouse must
consent to an election not to take a joint and survivor annuity. 29 U.S.C. §
1055(c)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 1988). See generally S. BRUCE, supra note 320, at 273-77.
329. Estate of McGovern v. State Employees' Retirement Bd., 512 Pa. 377, 517
A.2d 523 (1986).
330. Id. The employee, Francis J. McGovern, chose his wife as his beneficiary under
a joint survivor annuity retirement arrangement. She predeceased him by several days,
with the result that his estate received a lump sum payment of $27,105 and a portion of
one monthly benefit in the amount of $499.92. Had McGovern chosen either no beneficiary
or one who survived him, his estate would have been entitled to $154,311.45. Id. at 380,
517 A.2d at 524.
The State Retirement Board held a hearing at which it determined that McGovern
had the capacity to execute the retirement option. Id. at 381, 517 A.2d at 524-25. The
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania reversed, finding that the board's conclusion re-
sulted from a capricious disregard of the evidence. Id. at 381, 517 A.2d at 525. The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court reversed again, upholding the decision of the State Retirement
Board. Id. at 387, 517 A.2d at 527-28.
331. In Gulf Life Ins. v. Wilson, 123 Ga. App. 631, 181 S.E.2d 914 (1971), the
opinion provides no indication of either the face amount or the surrender value. The in-
sured, who was hospitalized for terminal cancer, executed the request for surrender ten
days before his death. Id. at 631, 181 S.E.2d at 915. The insurance agent who dealt with
him testified that he was coherent and seemed to know what he was doing. His wife stated
that he was weak both physically and mentally. His doctors reported that he was toxic,
which would inevitably have affected his thinking, and a nurse testified that he suffered
from loss of recent memory. On the basis of this conflicting evidence the appellate court
upheld a jury finding of incompetence. Id. at 634, 181 S.E.2d at 916.
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insurance claims.3 32 In at least one of the surrender cases, the
finding of incapacity was probably unjustified.333
The pension and insurance cases highlight the potential for
abuse of the fiduciary principle. They offer judges and juries the
temptation to find unfairness3 34 and incapacity on less than ade-
quate proof in order to reach deep-pocket results. A high standard
of substantive fairness and a requirement of full understanding on
the part of entrustors are indeed appropriate in cases involving
fiduciaries. Moreover, the volume of appellate litigation to date by
no means suggests that the burden on fiduciaries is unduly
heavy.335 Rather than disregarding fiduciary principles, courts
In Chesson v. Pilot Life Ins., 268 N.C. 98, 150 S.E.2d 40 (1966), the insured surren-
dered for the sum of $25.40 a policy whose face amount was $5,000. Twenty days later, at
the age of 39, he suffered a cerebral hemorrhage and died. His wife sued to rescind the
surrender. The insured was a heavy drinker who had been hospitalized several times for
"acute alcoholism with resulting mental disorders." Id. at 99, 150 S.E.2d at 41. He was
released from the hospital five days before surrendering the policy. According to psychia-
trists at the hospital, he suffered from a "depressive reaction." Id. at 101, 150 S.E.2d at 42.
One of the doctors testified that he was competent and not in need of further psychiatric
treatment on the day of his release. Id. A doctor who attended him on the day of his death
stated that he was hypertensive but "not feeble-minded." Id. at 100, 150 S.E.2d at 42. His
wife handled all of their business affairs. The insurance company official who accepted the
surrender of the policy testified that he appeared competent. Id. The jury concluded that he
lacked capacity and the appellate court upheld the jury finding. Id. at 99-103, 150 S.E.2d
at 41-44.
332. Allied Reserve Life Ins. v. Pierson, 357 P.2d 205, 209-10 (Okla. 1960).
333. Chesson v. Pilot Life Ins., 268 N.C. 98, 150 S.E.2d 40 (1966). In both Chesson
and Gulf Life Ins. v. Wilson, 123 Ga. App. 631, 181 S.E.2d 914 (1971), the other surren-
der case, the probative force of the affirmative evidence of capacity is difficult to assess -
it turns largely on the credibility of the insurance company employees who dealt with the
allegedly incompetent insureds. Even if the employee in Chesson lacked credibility, how-
ever, there was little evidence of incapacity. Chesson, 268 N.C. at 100-01, 150 S.E.2d at
42-43.
334. The problem lies chiefly in a failure to relate the issue of substantive fairness
back to the original agreement, which in each case fixes the terms of the challenged trans-
action. For example, in Chesson v. Pilot Life Ins., 268 N.C. 98, 150 S.E.2d 40 (1966), the
trial court put a series of questions to the jury. The jury found, inter alia, that: (1) the
insured lacked capacity to surrender the policy, (2) the insurance company was aware of
his incapacity, (3) the company paid a "full and fair consideration" for the surrender, and
(4) the company took unfair advantage of the insured. Id. at 101, 150 S.E.2d at 43. If the
answer to the fourth question meant only that it was unfair for the company to deal with
someone who lacked capacity, then the series is at least internally consistent. Yet the jury
probably thought that after seven years a $5,000 life insurance policy should have a surren-
der value of more than $25.40, despite the fact that the policy provided for loans and paid
dividends. Id. at 99-100, 150 S.E.2d at 41-42. In Estate of McGovern v. State Employees'
Retirement Bd., 512 Pa. 377, 517 A.2d 523 (1986), the court expressly rejected the Re-
statement's call for a "post-hoc" assessment of fairness. Id. at 385, 517 A.2d at 526.
335. Professor Langbein comments that in America most will contests are intended
to generate pretrial settlements. This suggests that the appellate cases form only a small
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should recognize that issues of capacity and substantive fairness
remain relevant and demand candid and intellectually honest
analysis. The presence of a fiduciary should thus function simply
as one important contextual factor.
Although the recent capacity cases fall into business, social,
and fiduciary categories, the categories should by no means be-
come doctrinal compartments. Social context remains relevant in
cases involving fiduciaries, many business agreements are affected
by personal relationships, and considerations of self-interest often
bear on family and social transactions. The true lesson of the deci-
sions is that courts can indeed visualize transactions as incidents
in ongoing relationships. In future cases, judges must engage in
relational analyses of both capacity and substantive fairness wher-
ever the facts warrant it, even at the expense of their traditional
conceptions of commercial activity and their desire to protect
entrustors.
D. Guardianship and Conservatorship
As Green and Weihofen noted, a traditional protective pro-
ceeding culminates in a judicial declaration of incompetence and
the appointment of a guardian or conservator with virtually com-
plete authority over the property of the protected person. As a
consequence of the declaration and in order to assure the fiduciary
control over the estate, the ward or conservatee has no power to
contract or to make inter vivos donations. 36 For the reasons that
Weihofen adduced, however, the rule of per se incapacity is
inappropriate.37
Although the necessary reform is by no means complete, re-
cent years have witnessed considerable movement toward protec-
tive arrangements that do not necessarily deprive disabled individ-
fraction of the total volume of testamentary capacity litigation. Langbein's estimates sup-
port an argument in favor of a system of "living probate," whereby the issue of testamen-
tary capacity may be resolved at the time of execution of the will. Langbein, supra note 65,
at 64-68. If the volume of litigation involving fiduciaries were comparable, it might justify
an alternative system of establishing capacity to contract or to donate in a fiduciary setting.
Measured by appellate cases, however, the capacity law relating to fiduciaries is minuscule
in comparison to the law of testamentary capacity. Moreover, the factors that buttress the
nuisance value of a typical will contest, see id. at 66, are not present in most of the fiduci-
ary cases.
336. For a summary of Green's views regarding protective proceedings, see supra
notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
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uals of contractual or donative capacity. The law relating to
protective proceedings is largely statutory and legislatures have
acted on two different fronts.
First, virtually all the states have increased the range of al-
ternatives to conservatorship and guardianship3 8 by adopting stat-
utes that provide for durable powers of attorney. A durable power
either survives or takes effect upon the principal's incapacity.33 9
The purpose of the arrangement is to permit the agent to carry
out tasks that the principal is unable to perform; to execute a du-
rable power is thus to anticipate disability. The creation of the
agency, however, does not involve a judicial assessment of the
principal's condition, and the existence of the power per se should
have no effect on the principal's capacity to engage in inter vivos
property transactions. 340
Second, the Uniform Probate Code34  and some states3 2 now
provide for limited protective arrangements. Under the Code, for
example, a court may establish a conservatorship without finding
338. The alternatives include informal arrangements and inter vivos trusts.
339. Most of the statutes are modeled after Article 5, Part 5, of the Uniform Pro-
bate Code. See UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 5-501 to -505 (1983). The sections are identical to
UNIF. DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY AcT §§ 1-5 (1983). The statutes are collected in
Meiklejohn, supra note 73, at 116 n.12.
340. In the case of a springing power the agent theoretically has no authority until
the principal suffers "disability or incapacity." UNIF. PROB. CODE § 5-501 (1983). If the
power provides that the principal's incapacity triggers the agent's authority, the principal
should lack capacity for as long as the agent is entitled to act under the power. The code
does not specify how the principal's incapacity is established. The comment to the section
suggests that "two or more named persons, possibly including the principal's lawyer, physi-
cian or spouse, [might] concur that the principal has become incapable of managing his
affairs in a sensible and efficient manner and deliver a signed statement to that effect to the
attorney in fact." Id. at comment. Whatever the process, however, it would not even create
a presumption of incapacity in a suit over a transaction entered into by the principal after
the agent began to act.
As a practical matter, of course, the effect of any durable power is to transfer at least
some degree of control over the principal's property to the holder of the power. Following
the onset of the principal's incapacity, the holder of the power is not subject to effective
supervision. The arrangement therefore inevitably diminishes the principal's economic au-
tonomy. Unlike guardianships and conservatorships, durable powers do not involve judicial
supervision over the fiduciary. Under some circumstances, the lack of supervision may pose
serious problems. See, e.g., Union Nat'l Bank v. Mayberry, 216 Kan. 757, 760, 533 P.2d
1303, 1306 (1975)("[I]n many situations [a] conservatorship may have [an] advantage
over the sometimes used but questionable power of attorney in that the conservator is
under bond under judicial supervision."); Friedman & Savage, supra note 6, at 287.
341. UNIF. PROB. CODE (1983).
342. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1801-2112 (West 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§
59-3001 to -3038 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-101 to -310 (1984); TEX. PROB. CODE
ANN. §§ 108-127A, 130A-1300 (Vernon 1980).
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incapacity, 34 3 and may also restrict the conservator's power over
the conservatee's property. 44 The arrangement is designed to
maintain at least some of the flexibility and dignity that plenary
guardianships and conservatorships tend to destroy.
3 45
The appellate case law relating to protective proceedings for
the most part reflects the legislative mixture of traditional and
modern rules. According to the Restatement, plenary guardian-
ship or conservatorship forecloses any inquiry into the protected
person's capacity.348 In general, courts agree as to both con-
tracts347 and gifts.348 There are, however, occasional exceptions.3 49
343. The court may appoint a conservator on the basis of the following:
(i) the person is unable to manage property and business affairs effectively for
such reasons as mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability,
advanced age, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, confinement, detention
by a foreign power, or disappearance; and (ii) the person has property that will
be wasted or dissipated unless property management is provided or money is
needed for the support, care, and welfare of the person or those entitled to the
person's support and that protection is necessary or desirable to obtain or pro-
vide money.
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 5-401(c) (1983). Thus, for example, the court might appoint a conser-
vator on the basis that the person is unable to manage his assets and business effectively by
reason of physical infirmity or old age, with resulting waste. That finding would by no
means amount to a declaration of mental incompetence.
A separate subsection provides that "[a] determination that a basis for appointment of
a conservator or other protective order exists has no effect on the capacity of the protected
person." Id. § 5-407(d).
344. Id. § 5-425.
345. The Code directs that a court "shall exercise [its protective authority] to en-
courage the development of maximum self-reliance and independence of a protected person
and make protective orders only to the extent necessitated by the protected person's mental
and adaptive limitations and other conditions warranting the procedure." Id. § 5-407(a).
See also id. prefatory note to Article 5 (explaining the decision to incorporate limited
protective proceedings).
For an argument in favor of limited protective proceedings, see Frolik, Plenary Guard-
ianship: An Analysis, A Critique and A Proposal for Reform, 23 ARIz. L. REv. 599
(1981). See also Fellows, supra note 212, at 622 n.63 ("In recent years, we have become
more sensitive in designing procedures and protections that minimally intrude on the liber-
ties and prerogatives of the protected person . . . . If the property owner is capable of
giving consent, the conservator and the court should consult and abide by the property
owner's decisions.") (footnotes omitted).
346. Section 13 of the Restatement states that "[a] person has no capacity to incur
contractual duties if his property is under guardianship by reason of an adjudication of
mental illness or defect." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 13 (1979). A com-
ment to the section explains that "[tihe control of the ward's property is vested in the
guardian, subject to court supervision; that control and supervision are not to be impaired
or avoided by proof that the ward has regained his reason or has had a lucid interval,
unless the guardianship is terminated or abandoned." Id. at comment a.
347. See, e.g., In re Estate of Spengler, 12 I11. App. 3d 30, 297 N.E.2d 401
(1973)(contract entered into by adjudicated incompetent held invalid); Breaux v. Allied
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Moreover, some of the decisions that follow the general rule are
intelligible in light of principles that have nothing to do with per
se incapacity. For example, in the cases that invalidate promises
and gifts from protected persons to their guardians or conserva-
tors, fiduciary law furnishes an alternative ground for the
results.3 5o
The Restatement recognizes limited protective proceedings.3 51
Bank, 699 S.W.2d 599, 603 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985)(ward's contract for legal services held
invalid).
348. See, e.g., Beavers v. Weatherly, 250 Ga. 546, 299 S.E.2d 730 (1983)(ward's
conveyance of real estate to guardian, evidently without consideration, held invalid); In re
Estate of Spengler, 12 Ill. App. 3d 30, 297 N.E.2d 401 (1973)(gift by adjudicated incom-
petent held invalid); In re Estate of Taylor, 114 R.I. 562, 337 A.2d 236 (1975) (transfer by
ward to his wife, evidently without consideration, held invalid); Freshour v. Aumack, 567
S.W.2d 176 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977)(facts similar to those in Taylor).
349. In Brisacher v. Tracy-Collins Trust Co., 277 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1960), the
court held that Brisacher had capacity to execute an inter vivos trust agreement in Utah
naming Tracy-Collins as trustee. Brisacher was under guardianship in Utah at the time.
The parties agreed that the sole basis of the Utah guardianship proceeding had been a
California adjudication of incompetence that was no longer in force when Brisacher exe-
cuted the trust agreement. Id. at 521-22. The court concluded that "under the circum-
stances of this case the reasons for the rule of technical disability in a ward who is in fact
fully competent do not exist and the rule does not therefore apply." Id. at 523. The circum-
stances included ratification by Brisacher and by the trust company, which also served as
his guardian. Id. at 521-23. Both ratifications constitute alternative grounds for the result.
See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
For a case in which a court upheld a promissory note executed while the maker was
technically subject to a judicial order declaring him incompetent, see Lakeside State Bank
v. Dearmond, 671 P.2d 674 (Okla. 1983). The order was issued in connection with the
maker's involuntary commitment to a hospital, id. at 675, and the opinion does not indicate
that he was ever under guardianship. The Restatement indicates that under those circum-
stances the normal rule of automatic contractual incapacity was never triggered in the first
place. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 13, comment c (1979).
350. See, e.g., Beavers v. Weatherly, 250 Ga. 546, 299 S.E.2d 730 (1983)(ward's
conveyance of real estate to guardian, evidently without consideration, held invalid); In re
Estate of Bechtold, 150 N.J. Super. 550, 376 A.2d 211 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977),
af'd, 156 N.J. Super. 194, 383 A.2d 742 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978)(ward's deed to
his guardian held invalid). For discussion of fiduciary principles, see supra notes 312-35
and accompanying text.
351. A comment to section 13 provides as follows:
[The rule of per se incapacity] does not apply to cases where a person is commit-
ted or voluntarily admitted to an asylum or hospital without the appointment of
a guardian, or where a guardian of the person only is appointed . . .. In some
states it makes no difference that the guardian is known as a committee, conser-
vator, or curaor, or by some other title, but in others, conservatorship is a less
drastic procedure not conclusive and sometimes not even probative on the issue
of incompetency. Where a statute authorizes the appointment of a guardian on
the voluntary application of the ward-to-be without any adjudication of disabil-
ity, the ward may retain some capacity to contract, subject to subsequent judi-
cial approval, either where the guardian consents or where the guardian's control
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The judicial response to the concept, however, has been mixed.
Two cases that reach opposite results on the issue of the con-
servatee's capacity illustrate the courts' disagreement over the pol-
icy underlying limited protective arrangements. In Board of Re-
gents v. Davis,3 52 Davis, a voluntary conservatee who had not been
declared incompetent, executed a pledge to his alma mater to
match other contributions "up to a total of $150,000." The uni-
versity publicized the pledge widely in order to raise other funds,
but after Davis' death his estate refused to honor his promise. 53
The university sued,354 contending that the pledge was reasonable
in light of both the size of Davis' estate and his "long and
friendly" association with the institution.3 55  The trial court
granted the estate's motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding
that the conservatorship deprived Davis of capacity to execute the
pledge.356
The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
lower court had misconstrued the limited conservatorship law. 357
The court reasoned that the act carried out the legislative purpose
of permitting people to take advantage of assistance in the man-
agement of their property without the stigma of incompetency. 58
In answer to the argument that the holding would prevent conser-
vators from fulfilling their responsibilities, the opinion likened a
conservator for a competent conservatee to a co-manager or super-
visor, and pointed out that any transaction would remain "subject
to supervision and review by the probate court. '3 59 The case thus
of the property is not impaired.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 13, comment c (1979).
352. 14 Cal. 3d 33, 533 P.2d 1047, 120 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1975).
353. Id. at 37, 533 P.2d at 1049, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 43 n.15, 533 P.2d at 1054 n.15, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 414 n.15. For discus-
sion of the transaction's social context, see supra note 310.
356. Davis, 14 Cal. 3d at 37, 533 P.2d at 1049-50, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 409-10.
357. The court pointed out that the limited conservatorship statute provided that the
conservator should pay debts incurred by the conservatee, other than for necessaries, only if
they "appear to be such as a reasonably prudent person might incur." Id. at 43, 533 P.2d
at 1054, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 414. The size of Davis' estate and his association with the
university bore on the reasonableness of the pledge. Id. at 43 n.15, 533 P.2d at 1054 n.15,
120 Cal. Rptr. at 414 n.15. The court also noted that the trial court's position was inconsis-
tent with other provisions of the law relating to conservatorships and guardianships. Under
those provisions, "both a ward and conservatee, if employed, retain complete control of his
wages or salary unless the court directs otherwise." Id. at 41 n.12, 533 P.2d at 1054 n.12,
120 Cal. Rptr. at 413 n.12.
358. Id. at 38, 533 P.2d at 1051, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
359. Id. at 43, 533 P.2d at 1054, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
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represents full judicial recognition of the notion underlying limited
protective proceedings - that a need for judicially supervised as-
sistance in the management of affairs does not necessarily reflect
incapacity. 6 0
In Citizens State Bank & Trust Co. v. Nolte,a61 however, the
Kansas Supreme Court effectively rejected that notion. The case
involved an agreement between Helen Reller, an elderly widow,
and her longtime friend and neighbor, Larry Nolte. The agree-
ment provided essentially that Nolte, who had already been caring
for Reller and her husband,62 would provide her with certain as-
sistance until her death, and would then receive her farm. 3 '
Helen Reller executed the agreement while under a voluntary con-
servatorship that was established without any finding of
incompetence.36 4
Citizens State Bank & Trust, in its capacity as conservator,
brought suit to invalidate the agreement, but the trial court en-
tered judgment in Nolte's favor.3 6 5 The court found that Helen
Reller was competent when she executed the contract, that her
promise was supported by adequate consideration, and that Nolte
did not exert undue influence. The bank appealed, arguing that
the voluntary conservatorship deprived Helen Reller of capacity as
a matter of law. 66
360. For a report that, in practice, California conservatorships almost invariably
amount to traditional, plenary arrangements, see Friedman & Savage, supra note 6. Pro-
fessor Friedman and Mr. Savage suggest, however, that the fundamental problem does not
lie in the conservatorship law: "The words of the statute point toward a fair, flexible sys-
tem, and ostensibly this is the goal." Id. at 290. Rather, it results from a stereotype of the
elderly as incompetent. Genuine reform of the process "must begin with a change in atti-
tude toward people in the twilight of their lives." Id.
361. 226 Kan. 443, 601 P.2d 1110 (1979).
362. Nolte provided considerable assistance to the Rellers:
In 1967, Harvey F. Reller became ill and was operated on for a cancer. Thereaf-
ter, he was unable to perform his usual farm duties. The trial court, in its find-
ings, found that those farm duties were performed by . . . Nolte, willingly and
without expecting compensation. [Nolte] shopped for the Rellers and ran er-
rands for them and took Harvey to St. Joseph about twice a month for checkups.
This continued until Harvey's death. Harvey, for a period, was placed in a nurs-
ing home. During that time, the defendant made daily visits and tended to Har-
vey's needs which included cleaning him and dressing him up. He also assisted
Helen Reller with chores and shopping and visited her every day.
Id. at 444, 601 P.2d at 1111. Harvey Reller lived for approximately seven years after
becoming ill in 1967. Id.
363. Id.
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Before the Kansas Supreme Court, Nolte relied principally
on the California court's decision in Davis. 387 The Kansas Su-
preme Court declined to follow Davis, however, citing differences
between the Kansas conservatorship law and the California stat-
ute. 68 The court held that, given the conservatorship, Nolte was
not entitled to enforce the contract.369 Nowhere in its opinion did
the court question the trial court's findings that Helen Reller was
competent and that the contract was supported by adequate con-
sideration and untainted by undue influence.
The Citizens State Bank holding may represent a reasonable
construction of the Kansas limited conservatorship statute.370 The
opinion, however, effectively eviscerates the notion of limited con-
servatorship. The court did acknowledge that the principal pur-
pose of the Kansas statute was to permit voluntary conservatees to
avoid humiliation.3  It argued, however, that the only way to
achieve that purpose was to make limited conservatorship func-
tionally the same as plenary conservatorship; a truly limited ar-
rangement would be attractive to neither the conservatee's rela-
tives nor a person considering acting as conservator.3 72
The court's reasoning depends upon at least three assump-
tions. One is that a person who needs assistance will have relatives
who are concerned enough to institute a protective proceeding.
Another is that those relatives will inevitably lack respect for the
person's liberty. And a third is that the court will be willing to
approve a plenary arrangement when a less restrictive alternative
would suffice - to brand the disabled person incompetent without
justification. In any given case, one or more of those assumptions
may well be incorrect. 73
367. Id. at 449, 601 P.2d at 1114.
368. Id. at 450, 601 P.2d at 1114-15. The court did not seek to distinguish Davis on
its facts. A possible distinction is that Helen Reller's four-hundred acre farm probably
constituted the bulk of her property, whereas the $150,000 that Davis pledged amounted to
less than ten percent of his net estate. Board of Regents v. Davis, 14 Cal. 3d 33, 36, 533
P.2d 1047, 1049, 120 Cal. Rptr. 407, 409 (1975). In general, the argument for requiring
approval by the conservator may be stronger with respect to transactions of major impor-
tance. The argument should not prevail, however, in a case in which the conservatee is in
fact competent to enter into the transaction.
369. Citizens State Bank, 226 Kan. at 452, 601 P.2d at 1116.
370. The court pointed out, for example, that unlike the California statute at issue in
Davis, the Kansas statute did not explicitly grant to a voluntary conservatee the right to
incur debts or to enter into contracts. Id. at 450, 601 P.2d at 1115.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 450-51, 601 P.2d at 1115.
373. For example, the conservatee's relatives might recognize, as the Davis court
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Moreover, even assuming that the assumptions prove correct
much of the time, they do not provide a basis for failing to recog-
nize limited conservatorship. The solution to the problem of over-
protection 37 4 lies in reform of the process whereby courts approve
plenary conservatorships rather than in refusal to provide an alter-
native vehicle for supervised assistance.375 To the extent that the
problem is one of unfounded attitudes toward people who suffer
from disabilities, Citizens State Bank serves only to compound it
by announcing that a conservatorship cannot function properly if
it respects the conservatee's abilities and autonomy.
Davis and Citizens State Bank are two of only a small num-
ber of cases to date that address the issue of the capacity of a
party under limited conservatorship or guardianship.37 It is too
early to predict whether the courts will be genuinely receptive to
the concept of co-management. If they are, the result will be a less
formalistic capacity doctrine and an increase in the liberty and
dignity of at least some people who need judicially supervised as-
sistance in the handling of their property.
pointed out, that the probate court may review transactions entered into by the con-
servatee. Davis, 14 Cal. 3d at 43, 533 P.2d at 1054, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
Moreover, the Citizens State Bank court undercut its own rationale by pointing out
two features of Kansas law that it said mitigated the impact of its holding. First, the court
noted that under the conservatorship statute, a voluntary conservatee who wishes to con-
tract can do so simply by requesting that the court terminate the conservatorship. The
supervising court must comply and the conservatee, if competent in fact, may then con-
tract. Citizens State Bank, 226 Kan. at 451, 601 P.2d at 1115. Second, the court pointed
out that powers of attorney offer an alternative vehicle for assistance that has no effect on
capacity to engage in inter vivos transactions. Id. To take advantage of either of those
provisions, however, a person must enjoy a degree of liberty that is inconsistent with the
court's assumptions.
374. A study of conservatorship in California, where the Davis decision established
the possibility of co-management, indicates that plenary conservatorships are probably used
inappropriately in "some small number of instances." Friedman & Savage, supra note 6, at
285-86.
375. Reform is not necessarily structural. A report on civil commitment proceedings
in California suggests that the educational background of those making commitment deci-
sions probably influences the outcome of the decisions. Morris, Civil Commitment Deci-
sionmaking: A Report on One Decisionmaker's Experience, 61 S. CAL L. REv. 291, 335
(1988). The author also concluded that follow-up studies of decisions to release individuals
from commitment might well produce more appropriate release rates. Id. at 351.
376. See also Edmunds v. Equitable Say. & Loan, 223 A.2d 630 (D.C. 1966)(party
under conservatorship was competent under law of Maryland to agree to other party's
withdrawal from joint savings account); Jones v. Kuhn, 59 Or. App. 135, 650 P.2d 999
(1982)(option executed by person under conservatorship declared void).
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CONCLUSION
In capacity cases, most courts successfully meet the commen-
tators' challenges. Judges maintain a legal rather than a medical
standard of capacity, treating psychiatric testimony as relevant
but not dispositive. Despite the temptation to base their decisions
entirely on notions of substantive fairness, they generally remain
committed to a serious analysis of capacity. Many of the opinions
display a degree of responsiveness to social context that is foreign
to traditional contract theory. And courts and legislatures have
made some progress toward more fexible rules relating to guardi-
anship and conservatorship.
The capacity doctrine is but one manifestation of a general
tension between the abstract, formalistic nature of traditional con-
tract theory and the complexity and importance of transactional
contexts. As Kronman observes, the traditional approach carries
serious risks:
The law of contracts does not encourage or even permit, except
in extreme cases, an inquiry into the promisor's motives, emo-
tions, and personal circumstances. When the promisor is treated
in this way, as a disembodied ego or will without personal quali-
ties, it is easy to forget that even the most impersonal market
transaction occurs between human beings with a natural history,
and to underestimate the importance, for freedom itself, of the
capacities people normally acquire as they mature.377
The courts are justified in continuing to apply the capacity doc-
trine, and their sensitivity to human relationships in the family
and social cases is both appropriate and important. Judges must
maintain that sensitivity in assessing disputes that arise out of
business transactions and fiduciary relationships. To the degree
that they succeed, the result will be a more principled doctrine
that better resolves competing claims of liberty and substantive
fairness and that more clearly illuminates the law of contract and
of gift.
377. Kronman, supra note 16, at 797 (footnote omitted).
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